China: The State of the Revolution
excerpted from the book
Blowback
The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
by Chalmers Johnson
Henry Holt, 2000
p139
The friendly relations the United States enjoyed with China during
the last eighteen years of the Cold War era, following the historic
Nixon-Kissinger realignment, were based on a common opposition
to the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union therefore ended
China's main usefulness to the United States as an ally, while
enhancing its new status as a possible long-term rival to American
hegemony. In the wake of the Cold War, with the Pentagon intent
on maintaining near Cold War levels of military spending, enemies
on the global horizon were much needed. With the Soviet army increasingly
seen as a disintegrating "paper tiger," China's economic
emergence as a major power in the Pacific offered one possible
fit with the Pentagon's need for a major enemy.
p141
U.S. policy toward China, whatever the disagreements about it'
within the government, is driven by a familiar global agenda aimed
at preserving and enhancing a Washington-centered world based
on our being the "lone superpower." Whether it is called
"globalization," the "Washington consensus,"
"soft power," or the "indispensable nation,"
it still comes down to an urge to hold on to an American-inspired,
-financed, and -led world order. Whereas such hegemonism vis-a
vis Germany, Japan, Latin America, Russia, or the United Nations
is only likely to result in imperial overstretch and the probable
long-term decline of the United States, attempts to establish
American hegemony over China hold out more explosive futures and
are in any case doomed to failure.
p144
Ever since the industrial revolution, the cardinal source
of friction in world politics has been the economic inequality
it produced. This inequality allowed the first industrializers
to use their new power to colonize or in other ways subjugate
and exploit the non-industrialized areas of the world. Nationalistically
awakened elites among these subjugated peoples then sought in
various ways to overcome their relative backwardness, to equalize
relations with or achieve supremacy over their victimizers.
But how can peripheral societies, even when they achieve national
independence, break out of their economic and political dependency?
In the view of the prominent political scientist Andrew Janos,
history offers examples of two grand strategies for dealing with
this issue. The first was for dependent or "late-developing"
countries to attempt through war and revolution to reconstruct
their environments. This strategy required a militarization of
society and the use of a mobilized people to attack and transform
the environment. The execution of this strategy has taken the
forms of aggression and conquest (Nazi Germany, Japan from 1931
to 1945), support for world revolution (Lenin's and Stalin's Russia),
fomenting "people's wars" (China and Cuba), aggressive
neutralism (India), and other projects aimed at altering an environment
in which "advanced" countries exploit "developing"
ones.
The second strategy has been, in Janos's words, a "drive
to imitate the technological innovations of the advanced countries."
This strategy has generally been internally oriented. It is best
illustrated by Japan's state-guided industrialization from 1868
to approximately the Great Depression and again from 1949 to the
present. It may involve only the state's use of tariffs to shelter
its own economy from the penetrative power of stronger national
economies. This was the strategy of the United States during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in accordance with the
ideas of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List. A version of this
strategy also became policy in West Germany after its defeat in
World War 11. But such a strategy involving state guidance of
the economy, cartelization, and the strategic allocation of industrial
finance may so come to dominate a social system that development
itself becomes the main legitimating and organizing principle
of society, replacing or displacing democratic representation,
tradition, or any other set of political or cultural principles.
When that happens, the ensuing regime can be termed a "developmental
state."
Needless to say, in comparing the ways each strategy has been
used during the twentieth century, it seems clear that the developmental
state has proven far more successful than any attempt to forcibly
reconstruct the external world, although it is a tricky strategy
to execute and has many hidden consequences. It is critically
dependent on a permissive international environment, such as the
one the United States enjoyed in the nineteenth century or Japan
vis-a-vis the United States after 1952.
These two strategies also define the history of the People's
Republic of China since its birth in 1949. From the time Mao discovered
that it would not be easy to duplicate a Stalinist program of
development in China-that is, when he discovered that his Great
Leap Forward campaign to move the country toward heavy industrialization
through extreme levels of collectivization had by 1962 resulted
in the deaths by starvation of some thirty million people-he experimented
with altering the external environment on the cheap. He tried
to militarize (he called it "revolutionize") his own
society and to reconstruct the external world by sponsoring or
endorsing "people's wars." Even though in Vietnam this
approach succeeded in tarnishing the image of the United States
as a superpower, it did not really alter the balance of power,
and the Vietnamese soon resented Mao's claims of paternity to
a strategy they had embarked on without Chinese help. Mao's massive
domestic upheaval, the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,"
which started in 1966 and lasted in one form or another almost
a decade, was his revenge against the Communist Party after he
lost control of it in the wake of the Great Leap Forward. It further
discredited him, and communism, in the eyes of his main supporters;
after his death in 1916 and the return to power of the purged
Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the country devoted itself to reform and
recovery from the Cultural Revolution. China began, in short,
to experiment with the second strategy for breaking out of its
backwardness.
By the end of the 1980s, China had begun seriously to incorporate
the lessons of high-speed economic growth pioneered in American-dominated
East Asia. Its still ruling Communist Party also began tacitly
to stress nationalism rather than communism, which was then collapsing
in Russia, to garner political support. On the basis of this new
nationalism, China began to reach out and accept investment and
other forms of assistance from the fifty-five million overseas
Chinese, particularly those living in Hong Kong and Southeast
Asia. It also slowly opened the country to foreign trade and investment
with capitalist countries, so long as the terms were mutually
beneficial. This strategy held the possibility of ultimately delivering
on the second goal of the Chinese revolution- namely, the creation
of a per capita income approaching that of the other major powers.
Since China is by far the world's largest society in terms of
population, if it succeeds it may also become the world's most
powerful nation.
China's attempt to emulate the economies of Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore is, however, fraught with difficulties,
above all how to control the increasing gap between rich and poor
in a previously Communist country. In terms of relations with
the rest of the world, China's products will never enjoy the virtually
unrestricted access to the American market and its sources of
technology that Japan and others enjoyed in exchange for their
support during the Cold War. This was made clear during 1999 when
the United States was caught up in a politically driven panic
over allegations of Chinese industrial espionage and imports of
technologically advanced equipment for purposes of reverse engineering.
On the other hand, China has one major asset not available to
most developing nations: the overseas Chinese. This reservoir
of talent, capital, and experience is open to a China that stresses
nationalism rather than communism. China has so far been very
cautious in lifting currency controls and import barriers that
protect it from the full pressures and volatility of the international
market, a precaution that served it well during the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997 and after. China has no choice but to
continue to open up to international trade; its development strategy
will not work if, as in the Maoist days, it once again isolates
itself from the rest of the world. At least for now, however,
the news from China is reasonably positive. The peaceful reversion
of Hong Kong to mainland rule in 1997 and its maintenance as a
global financial center were a clear sign of China's determination
and its capacity to succeed economically.
Throughout much of recorded history China was the world's
largest economy. Today, as it reemerges on the world scene, the
World Bank estimates that it has already passed Germany to become
the world's third-largest economy, after the United States and
Japan, as well as the fastest-growing economy. The Chinese State
Statistical Bureau has calculated that during 1995 it grew by
some 10.2 percent, down from the 11.8 percent increase of 1994
but still above the govemment's target growth rate of between
9 percent and 10 percent. The global economic crisis that began
in 1997 has slowed but certainly not stopped growth. Even if in
the future China grows at only 7 percent a year, it will surpass
a U.S. economy growing at a 3 percent rate sometime between 2020
and 2030. Needless to say, extending present trends statistically
into the future is a deeply perilous activity. It is perfectly
possible that environmental degradation, or natural disasters,
or a downward spiral into depression and poverty due to fast and
messy industrial modernization will cause pressures of a sort
we cannot even imagine today and sooner than we think. But thus
far, China has a better development strategy than any it has experimented
with since 1949.
Since economic reform began in 1978, China's annual average
per capita income has risen 6.7 times but still remains unimaginably
small: $464 in China's cities and $186.75 in rural areas, according
to 1995 official estimates (but perhaps as much as $2,000 per
capita in terms of purchasing power, given the low prices of basic
human necessities). By contrast, Japan's per capita income in
1993 was $31,450 and that of the United States $24,750. China's
labor costs are still just 10 to 15 percent of those in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and South Korea but on a par with those in India.
The Chinese Communist Party, the world's largest political
organization, no longer has much legitimacy in the eyes of the
Chinese people. Although it came to power in 1949 as the leader
of the largest and most complex revolution of all, it squandered
its great popularity: in rural China because of the famine that
followed the Great Leap Forward; among hard-core Communist revolutionaries
because of the Cultural Revolution; and, finally, among urban
intellectuals and a burgeoning middle class because of the repression
at Tienanmen Square in 1989 and the nearly simultaneous collapse
of communism in Europe.
The Chinese Communist Party continues to rule through a combination
of inertia, improving economic conditions, favorable comparisons
with the past, nationalism, and a complex set of inducements and
penalties. There is every reason to believe that it will be able
to do so for the foreseeable future, despite occasional periods
of instability. Taiwan, whose government comes from a similar
background (single-party rule by Sun Yat-sen's political party,
the Kuomintang, which Chiang Kaishek inherited), offers strong
evidence that the mainland could also slowly evolve into a prosperous,
relatively open society. Pressure for democratization will probably
become a serious internal issue, if it ever does, only around
the year 2010, when some 30 percent of the mainland population
might have reached a per capita income of about $4,000. Until
then, the bulk of the Chinese population will probably remain
content with economic progress, better health care, and other
practical concerns.
From the Politburo down, most Chinese now believe in pursuing
economic reforms, even if different groups support the reform
process for different reasons. There is also something of a consensus
on the necessity of maintaining a powerful, independent political
authority to implement such reforms. The Chinese leaders are firmly
convinced that authoritarian rule is indispensable to the success
of their market-driven policies, and there is evidence that the
Chinese population accepts this view because of the economic achievements
of recent years. In this view, without authoritarian political
control, economic reform will rapidly breed new economic interests
and corruption, already a serious problem. Long-term success requires
some authority capable of occasionally cracking down on corruption,
complete with public executions as warnings to others. The more
corrupt interests become entrenched, the more resentment against
them is likely to generate a cycle of political protest, followed
by economic instability. Always before the Chinese leadership
is the example of the virtual collapse of the former Soviet Union
and the resulting impoverishment of large sectors of the Russian
population when authoritarianism was allowed to lapse and the
economy was "reformed" in accordance with the theories
of American economists. ,
In general terms, the greatest weakness of the development-state
strategy is that it both causes and can be crippled by domestic
political turmoil. In the other East Asian economic success stories,
turmoil has been kept in check by authoritarian political systems
of various sorts, the reasonably equitable distribution of incomes,
and the promotion of distinctive "Asian values" focused
on condemning the alleged selfishness of Western individualism
and sometimes of Western democratic institutions as well. Asian
leaders have often argued that democracy undercuts development.
Lee Kuan Yew, the legendary first prime minister of the rich city-state
of Singapore and a persistent critic of U.S. foreign policy in
Southeast Asia, is the most articulate exponent of this view.
As Lee has put it, "With few exceptions, democracy has not
brought good government to new developing countries. Democracy
has not led to development because the governments did not establish
[the] stability and discipline necessary for development."
It should be noted that in the l990s, Singapore, which may not
be as pleasant a place for an individualist to live, nonetheless
has had a higher per capita income ($23,565) than Australia ($19,960),
something that lends a certain credibility in Asian eyes to what
its leader has had to say.
All of the Asian capitalist developmental states have been
characterized by what I call "soft authoritarian" governments.
Democracy- understood as a political system in which the force
of public opinion makes a difference, a balance of powers exists
within the government (what Americans call the "separation
of powers"), and free elections can actually remove unsatisfactory
officials-exists only partially in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,
thanks to the pervasive, potent influence of unelected bureaucrats.
In none of the three has an independent judiciary or the rule
of law ever fully developed. In South Korea and Taiwan, movements
for democratic reform have in recent years finally succeeded in
bringing formerly "hard" authoritarian governments under
more popular controls. In Japan, public opinion exerts a powerful
influence over the government, but mainly through informal and
traditional channels rather than the formal institutions of parliament
and the courts.
If the government of Japan and its emulator states-South Korea,
Taiwan, and even Singapore-can be characterized as soft authoritarian,
at least during their decades of high-speed economic growth, then
China may be an example of "soft totalitarianism," on
a par with governments like Suharto's in Indonesia or Chiang Kai-shek's
in Taiwan, and considerably softer than the truly totalitarian
worlds of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao.
A soft totalitarian regime directly restricts freedoms of
speech and the press, thereby curbing the effect of public opinion
on the government. Under soft authoritarianism (as in Japan, for
example), such freedoms exist on paper but are attenuated in part
by cartelization of the news media-press clubs in Japan can impose
collective or individual penalties on journalists who report news
that irritates the state-and also by narrow channels of access
to advertising, state-owned broadcasting, and state licensing
of school textbooks. The public is better informed in soft authoritarian
countries because there are always ways around press clubs and
cartels, but public opinion remains only a mild constraint on
the government. Whereas a soft totalitarian state will employ
direct suppression of offending books, imprisonment of authors,
state control of Internet servers, and dismissal or imprisonment
of dissidents, soft authoritarianism achieves its ends through
peer pressure, bullying, fear of ostracism, giving priority to
group norms, and eliciting conformity through social sanctions
of various kinds. Under both types of regimes, elections are usually
to one degree or another only formalities, behind which permanent
state officialdoms actually govern.
p152
Such educational achievements-close to 40 percent of Taiwanese
aged eighteen to twenty-one are enrolled in institutions of higher
learning-are almost unimaginable on the mainland. China, with
a total population of 1.2 billion, has the staggeringly low total
of about 7 million college graduates to help run a massive and
massively modernizing economy and society.
p155
The real economic model for mainland China, although never mentioned
for all the obvious reasons, is undoubtedly neither Japan nor
South Korea but Taiwan, where the state and the ruling Nationalist
Party own outright or directly control about 50 percent of all
corporate assets and account for close to 30 percent of Taiwan's,
gross national product. Numerous and successful state-owned enterprises
are the single most striking feature of Taiwan's economic landscape.
Blowback
- The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
U.S.
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