Haiti's Big Lie
by Nik Barry-Shaw
"If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people
will eventually come to believe it."
Joseph Goebbels, Propaganda Minister
of the Third Reich (1933-1945)
With six people killed in the food protests
that erupted throughout Haiti in early April, observers immediately
began trying to explain why violence had once again shattered
the country's two years of apparent stability. Yet rather than
blame the massive structural violence of hunger and social exclusion,
or even the UN troops who were responsible for the deaths of several
protestors, the source of the violence was said to lie elsewhere.
"Behind the riots, the spectre of Aristide," as a headline
in the newspaper Le Devoir put it. "If the demonstrators
had only socioeconomic demands," explained sociologist Laennec
Hurbon, "they would have understood that you shouldn't loot
businesses." Accordign to Hurbon, the looting and violence
had been systematically planned by partisans of exiled former
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in an effort to force his return
to the country.
These kinds of baseless accusations are familiar to anyone who
has followed Haiti's recent history. If there is one "big
lie" consistently told with respect to Haiti over the past
two decades, it is the allegation that Jean-Bertrand Aristide
and his Lavalas movement used - and continue to use - street gangs
to violently achieve political ends. From the attempted coup of
July 2001 that President Aristide staged against himself, to his
instigation of "mob violence" in 1991, to even the attacks
he faked against his church in 1988, the litany of charges against
Aristide made by his foes stretches back to the very beginning
of his involvement in politics. As Peter Hallward notes, it
often seems immaterial to critics of Aristide to make any distinction
between fact and accusation. Yet the success of a propaganda
effort, as Goebbels understood, has less to do with the veracity
of its claims than with their ceaseless repetition.
A "big lie", however, is often difficult to grapple
with - due to its very "bigness", all its various retellings
and embellishments. When analyzing a propaganda campaign, therefore,
it is useful to isolate one element of the "big lie"
common to most accounts. The centerpiece in the most recent campaign
of vilification is undoubtedly "Operation Baghdad" and
the events of September 30, 2004.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's second term as President of Haiti would
end the same way as had his first had, cut short in a U.S.-backed
coup d'état. Aristide's opposition to neoliberalism, his
defiant stance towards the U.S. and France, and his enduring popularity
with Haiti's poor had made him a marked man from the very beginning
of his term in February 2001. After U.S. Marines forced Aristide
out of the country by plane on February 29, 2004, Haiti quickly
came apart at the seams. Haiti's police force crumbled, the prison
system was emptied, and in the absence of any effective public
order, crime, looting and gang warfare spiraled out of control.
At the same time, forces of repression hostile to the poor masses
were quickly gathering strength. Three days after being appointed,
the new Prime Minister Gerard Latortue openly embraced the rebels
in a public appearance in Gonaives and hailed them as "freedom
fighters". The Minister of Interior, himself a former
member of the military, announced that the rebels that had fought
Aristide's government - composed mostly of members of Haiti's
disbanded army and of paramilitary death squads that operated
during the first coup - would be integrated into the police force.
Other factions of the rebels declared the Haitian army to be re-established
and with the support of residents set up a base in the upper-class
neighborhood of Pétionville.
Visiting the country one month after the coup, an Amnesty International
delegation reported a widespread "pattern of persecution"
against supporters of the deposed government. This persecution
was an attempt to pacify the residents of Port-au-Prince's teeming
slum neighborhoods - overwhelmingly supporters of Aristide - who
continued to voice their opposition to the coup d'état
and the Latortue regime that had been imposed on them. As the
Haiti Accompaniment Project reported in July 2004, "despite
stepped up repression, many groups in Port-au-Prince and in other
parts of the country were preparing for ongoing long-term mobilizations
to call for the return of democracy to Haiti."
One such mobilization was the demonstration of September 30, 2004,
marking the 13th anniversary of first coup that ousted President
Aristide in 1991. Starting at 10 a.m., a crowd of more than 10,000
protestors wound their way through the capitol to demand an end
to foreign military occupation, the departure of the Latortue
government, the release of all political prisoners, and the return
of the constitutional government, including President Aristide.
Soon after the crowd passed the National Palace, police opened
fire on the procession, killing two demonstrators. Some press
reports would claim protestors then retaliated, attacking police
officers and looting businesses.
In a radio interview the next day, Gerard Latortue was unrepentant
about police actions: "We fired on them. Some died, others
were wounded, and others fled." The government banned all
further demonstrations and Latortue indicated that they would
take action against unauthorized protests.
The day after the demonstration, government officials would announce
the discovery of the headless bodies of three police officers,
blaming Lavalas supporters for the crime. The beheadings were
described as the beginning of "Operation Baghdad", a
campaign of terror and mayhem led by pro-Lavalas gangs intended
to destabilize the country and force the return of President Aristide.
"The decapitations are imitative of those in Iraq, and they
are meant to show the failure of U.S. policy in Haiti," explained
Jean-Claude Bajeux, head of the Centre Eucuménique des
Droits de l'Homme (CEDH) and an anti-Aristide politician.
In the weeks that followed, Port-au-Prince would crackle with
gunfire. The hospital morgue began to overflow with bodies, and
press reports indicated the death toll to be at least 46 in the
first two weeks of October alone.
The very origins of the name "Operation Baghdad" are
deeply contested. The interim government alleged the "fanatical
hordes" of Aristide partisans "constantly claim responsibility
for the terror they have instilled, operating under names echoing
doom and gloom such as 'Operation Baghdad'." However,
according to Joseph Guyler Delva, head of the Haitian Journalists
Association and widely regarded as one of the most even-handed
observers in Haiti, the term "Operation Baghdad" was
coined by Latortue himself. Lavalas partisans, on the other hand,
had never spoken of any such operation.
The interim government's version of the events of September 30
was equally suspect. Government officials presented no evidence
that the decapitations were the work of Aristide supporters, and
did not release any photos or names of the alleged victims.
The Comité des Avocats Pour le Respect des Libertés
Individuelles (CARLI), a human rights group, reported that two
officers had been decapitated, but by former soldiers on September
29, the day before the demonstration. It was not until after the
demonstration that the government began to blame the crimes on
Lavalas supporters, according to CARLI.
The interim government also failed to substantiate its more general
claim that a violent campaign against it was underway. As the
Observer (UK) noted one month after "Operation Baghdad"
had allegedly begun:
Evidence of such "destabilization" is scant. Shootings
and robberies have become common in central Port-au-Prince, but
it is not always clear whether they are politically motivated
or the result of crime sparked by desperate economic conditions
and an ineffectual police force. [Minister of Justice Bernard]
Gousse said he knew of only two lootings, and that police officers
had only been killed while carrying out raids in slums.
CARLI's investigation of "Operation Baghdad" yielded
the same result, leading the organization to conclude that there
was no such operation launched by Lavalas supporters.
Whatever its origins, the trajectory of the name (or epithet more
accurately) and accompanying story is instructive. The sectors
that had participated in the opposition to Aristide's government
- such as Bajeux's CEDH and other foreign-funded "civil society"
groups, political parties, and intellectuals - enthusiastically
took up the "Operation Baghdad" label. They joined in
blaming Aristide and his supporters for the violence wracking
Port-au-Prince, and called on the interim government for more
vigorous action against them. 
U.S. and UN officials were also quick to jump on the "destabilization"
bandwagon. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was unequivocal
about the source of the post-September 30 violence: "Over
the past two weeks, pro-Aristide thugs have murdered policemen,
looted businesses and public installations, and terrorized civilians."
U.S. Embassy officials would also repeat the claim that police
officers had been beheaded in "a slum gang operation called
'Operation Baghdad'" when speaking with human rights investigators.
Lavalas activists and political leaders, on the other hand, immediately
denounced the violence, and condemned the police for firing on
unarmed demonstrators. One Lavalas spokesperson identified "Operation
Baghdad" as "a calculated attempt to manipulate the
media and U.S. public opinion." Trade unionist Paul "Loulou"
Chery charged that the name had been concocted to "demonize
the movement, the people and Lavalas supporters in particular."
Likewise, tens of thousands of demonstrators in Cap-Haitien marched
behind a banner on December 16, 2004 decrying "Operation
Baghdad" as a plot by the bourgeoisie "to put an end
to Lavalas." These statements, however, rarely if ever
found their way into Western press reports about the violence
in Haiti after September 30.
Faced with a regime intolerant of dissent and outraged at the
attacks on the demonstrators of September 30, the poor neighborhoods
of Port-au-Prince erupted. "Skirmishes, barricades and spontaneous
demonstrations have sprung up daily in poor neighborhoods around
the capital since the police and paramilitary gunmen tried to
stop a massive demonstration on September 30," Haiti Progres
reported on October 6. When the barricades failed to prevent
the police and UN troops from entering the neighborhood, the invaders
would be met with a hail of stones and bottles and other debris
thrown by residents.
Destabilization or no destabilization, the Latortue government
unleashed a new wave of repression against the Lavalas movement.
Scores of prominent Lavalas figures and popular organization activists
were arrested on charges of being "intellectual authors of
the violence", of hiding "organizers of violence",
or simply being "close to the Lavalas authorities."
These arrests were conducted with neither warrants nor evidence
- hardly surprising given the vagueness of the charges. Haiti's
prisons - emptied following the coup d'état - overflowed
with detainees, the vast majority Lavalas members or poor people
from the pro-Aristide bidonvilles.
The frequency and violence of the police operations also increased
dramatically in the following weeks, with some community members
describing their neighborhoods as being "under siege".
The November 2004 delegation of the Centre for the Study of Human
Rights described these chilling conditions:
On an almost daily basis, the Haitian National Police in various
units and dressed in a wide variety of uniforms, often masked,
select and attack a neighborhood in operations reported as efforts
to arrest armed gang members, with UN soldiers backing them up.
. . . [T]here are dead bodies in the street
almost daily, including innocent bystanders, women and children.
The violent repression . . . has generated desperate fear in a
community that is quickly losing its young men to violent death
or arbitrary arrest.
These incursions were characterized by "execution-style killings"
and in some cases massacres, according to the International Crisis
Group (ICG). On 26 October, twelve young men were killed in the
Fort National area, while on 27 October, the bodies of four young
men were found in the Carrefour-Péan area, near Bel-Air.
"All had been shot in the head and at least one had bound
wrists," according to the ICG, and witnesses identified black-clad
police officers wearing balaclavas as the perpetrators.
Calls for an independent enquiry into these killings were stonewalled
by the Latortue government. The interim authorities categorically
denied any responsibility for human rights abuses by its security
forces, while blocking access to either the penitentiary or the
morgue by journalists and human rights observers.
The announcement of "Operation Baghdad" by the interim
government did not happen in a vacuum. By late September 2004,
Haiti's interim government headed by Florida businessman Gerard
Latortue was in dire straits. The 5-month-old administration was
faced with a growing resistance movement in the quartiers populaires
and accusations of corruption and ineptitude were coming from
all quarters. Diplomatic problems began cropping up as well; in
a radio interview on September 16, 2004, "Latortue complained
that human rights criticism was making his relations with donor
The allegations, moreover, seemed perfectly calibrated to the
prevailing North American media environment. The decapitation
of Nick Berg by his captors in May 2004 had caused a media shock
wave, and on September 20-21, 2004, two more American contractors
were beheaded in Iraq, with the fate of a British colleague still
hanging in the balance as of September 30. What better way
for the Latortue regime to discredit its opponents than to accuse
them of the same tactics as Al-Qaida in Iraq?
The government's claims should therefore have invited a substantial
amount of skepticism. Latortue was desperate to recover some domestic
legitimacy and his international backers needed a pretext to continue
supporting the government's pacification of the slums.
Port-au-Prince's poorer residents understood quite clearly the
utility of the "Operation Baghdad" fiction. "By
saying we are 'gang members' or 'chimères,' the press are
trying to discredit our demands for justice," a Bel-Air resident
explained to the San Francisco Bay View. "Who cares about
giving justice to those criminal gang members who just sell drugs
"The police officers will say that this was an operation
against gangs. But we are all innocent," said Eliphete Joseph,
a young man from the Fort National district speaking to journalists
following a police massacre. "The worst thing is that Aristide
is now in exile far from here in South Africa, but we are in Haiti,
and they are persecuting us only because we live in a poor neighborhood."
Such common-sense interpretations were nowhere to be found in
the Canadian media, who generally accepted the government's claims
at face value. Although disappointing, the media's performance
was typical of journalistic coverage of Canada's interventions
abroad; what proved to be much more puzzling was the unflinching
credulity of Canadian organizations that claimed to be giving
a voice to Haiti's grassroots.
On October 22, 2004, as government attacks on the slums were reaching
a fever pitch, the Concertation pour Haiti (CPH) issued a press
release "denouncing the climate of terror ravaging Haiti,
particularly since September 30, when the chimères, the
armed partisans of former President Aristide, launched Operation
Baghdad." Just a few days earlier, the Quebec-based non-governmental
organization (NGO) Alternatives had produced a near identical
analysis of the situation in Haiti. "A vast operation of
terror has been set in motion in Port-au-Prince principally in
the popular neighborhoods of Bel-Air and Cite Soleil. It is militants
of [Aristide's] Famni Lavalas who are behind this campaign,"
wrote Tania Vachon in the Journal d'Alternatives, a monthly insert
in Le Devoir, "dubbed 'Operation Baghdad' because of the
extreme acts of violence that are perpetrated: public beheadings,
sexual assaults, attacks on street vendors etc."
Neither article considered the possibility that the interim government
and its foreign backers were trying to manipulate public opinion.
Latortue's accusation that Lavalas had launched "Operation
Baghdad" was uncritically repeated, while no mention was
made of Lavalas statements to the contrary.
Alternatives and the CPH both lamented the lack of action by UN
forces and Haiti's police in the face of a wave of Lavalassian
violence, with the CPH going so far as to complain that police
operations in the poor neighborhoods "regularly fail[ed]
to produce results." Neither group mentioned the well-documented
"results"- in the form of brutal killings and arbitrary
arrests - produced by the ongoing UN/police incursions into the
pro-Lavalas slums. The CPH communique ended with a call for reinforcement
and increased funding of the police and UN troops.
With blame for the violence being heaped on Lavalas, Latortue's
international patrons were able to give their full backing to
the campaign of repression. Despite a long-standing arms embargo
on Haiti, the US government authorized the shipment of thousands
of new firearms to the Latortue government in November 2004, including
military rifles and machine guns. Then-Prime Minister Paul
Martin, visiting Haiti on November 14, promised Canada would stand
"shoulder to shoulder" in with the interim government
in their efforts to re-establish "security". "You're
not going to have a democracy when people are afraid for their
lives," said Martin.
Sadly, the views of the CPH and Alternatives were not idiosyncratic.
The CPH issued its statement on behalf of a coalition of development
NGOs, unions and civil society groups, and Alternatives generally
occupies the left wing of the NGO world. Despite having opposed
the 1991 coup d'état against Aristide, by the time of the
second coup in 2004 the CPH, Alternatives and the vast majority
of Canadian NGOs working in Haiti were openly hostile to the popular
movement and regarded much of violence that followed as the result
of a shadowy conspiracy of Aristide supporters - with the puppet
master pulling the strings from his exile in South Africa. The
"Operation Baghdad" smear is today common currency amongst
NGOs and continues to be used against Lavalas activists. In a
recently published report, Alternatives referred to it simply
as "one of the most serious massacres since 2004."
The tumultuous class dynamics of Haiti over the past two decades
were deeply linked to the ideological volte-face of the NGOs.
Born of a cross-class alliance against the Duvalier dictatorship,
the Lavalas movement began to fracture along class lines with
the advent of democracy - a process accelerated by foreign funding.
In the struggle that emerged between the Haitian elite and the
popular classes, the shift in aid financing following the May
2000 elections that brought Aristide's Famni Lavalas party into
power proved decisive. The Canadian government, along with the
U.S. and the EU, redirected funds for the elected government to
"civil society", thus tipping the scales in the elite's
Sections of the middle classes were "slowly co-opted by the
steady trickle of project dollars flowing through the almost interminable
list of NGOs infesting every corner of Haiti." Development
funding offered a rare opportunity for upward mobility, and led
to greater control of Haitian NGOs by their internationally-connected
leaderships. Increasingly, positions were "not derived from
a vote of a dwindling membership, but rather reflect[ed] the sentiments
of a small handful of paid leaders."
These educated, French-speaking leaders now regarded their former
ally Aristide as "worse than Cedras or Duvalier" and
"aligned with the elite political movement" pushing
for his overthrow. They dismissed the government's supporters
- overwhelmingly poor, uneducated and Creole-speaking - as nothing
but a small group of "thugs" and "chimères".
Aristide was pronounced a traitor and the popular movement dead.
Interestingly, the international architects of policy towards
Haiti weren't beholden to such illusions about Aristide's popularity.
Speaking with journalist Anthony Fenton, Fabiola Cordova, National
Endowment for Democracy program officer responsible for Haiti,
remarked that "one of the main problems in Haiti has been
a very weak opposition . . . Aristide really had 70% of the popular
support and then the 120 other parties had the thirty per cent
split in one hundred and twenty different ways."
Following the coup d'état of February 29, 2004, Haitian
NGOs hailed the new "democratic opening" as many of
their leaders obtained posts in the interim government. Rallying
behind the interim authorities' repression of Lavalas supporters,
these groups took up the "Operation Baghdad" label as
another ideological stick to beat their opponents with. Canadian
NGOs absorbed the prejudices of their middle-class "partners"
in Haiti, including unquestioning acceptance of the interim government's
"Operation Baghdad" fiction.
In a review of Canada's "difficult partnership" with
Haiti, CIDA concluded that their shift to "supporting civil
society initiatives and Canadian NGO partners produced relatively
good qualitative results." "Substantial support to non-governmental
actors strengthened their ability to mobilize constituents"
while "eroding legitimacy, capacity and will of the state
to deliver key services" through the creation of "parallel
systems of service delivery." Canadian NGOs, in other
words, played an integral part in bolstering the elite-led opposition
while undermining Haiti's elected government.
CIDA's candid description of the Canadian NGOs' role in the imperial
destabilization of Haiti clashes dramatically with their self-image.
These organizations firmly believe that their CIDA project partners
in Haiti "represent" civil society, are the "true"
bearers of the popular movement, etc. The implicit assumption
is that CIDA is in the business of funding progressive, empowering
social change. Yet with the ascendancy of "all-of-government
engagement" and counterinsurgency warfare concepts in Canadian
foreign policy thinking, faith in a benevolent, empowering CIDA
becomes increasingly untenable. Indeed, the subordination
of aid to larger foreign policy goals - goals absolutely hostile
to popular empowerment - is an area where "Canada has made
significant headway" in Haiti, as the CIDA report noted.
To point out that, whatever delusions to the contrary, the empowerment
of the poor may not be the ultimate aim of foreign aid is not
particularly original. As James Ferguson observed in his 1990
book The Anti-Politics Machine: "In spite of the very common
involvement of 'development' with counter-insurgency throughout
the post-war period, a surprising number of Western progressives
have been drawn to 'development' work by way of political commitments
to and solidarity with Third World causes." While Ferguson
allowed that "under certain circumstances" development
work may fulfill such commitments, "it is all too easy to
enter into complicity with a state bureaucracy [representing]
the very social forces . . . that must be challenged if the impoverished
and oppressed majority are to improve their lot." The
case of "Operation Baghdad" illustrates just how real
this danger is.
 "One protester killed as demonstrations grow in Haiti,"
Haiti Information Project, April 4, 2008.
 Étienne Côté-Paluck, "Haïti
- Derrière les émeutes, le spectre d'Aristide,"
Le Devoir, April 12-13, 2008.
 See Jim Naureckas, "Enemy Ally: The Demonization of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide," Extra!, November/December 1994, and Ben Dupuy,
"The Attempted Character Assassination of Jean-Bertrand Aristide",
Peter Philips & Project Censored ed. Censored 1999: The news
that didn't make the news, Seven Stories Press, 1999.
 "What Dupuy means by the word 'immaterial', presumably,
is that when he repeatedly accuses Aristide of creating and directing
these [gangs], it is immaterial whether or not such accusations
are in fact correct." Hallward is here reviewing Alex Dupuy's
The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International
Community and Haiti. Peter Hallward, "Aristide and The Violence
of Democracy", Haiti Liberté, July 2007.
 "South Africa to Become Permanent Home for Aristide,"
Washington Post, March 25, 2004.
 Reuters, March 23, 2004.
 Tom Griffin, "Haiti Human Rights Investigation: November
11-21", Center for the Study of Human Rights, p. 18-24.
 Amnesty International, "Haiti: Breaking the cycle of
violence: A last chance for Haiti?".
 Laura Flynn, Robert Roth and Leslie Fleming, "Report
of the Haiti Accompaniment Project," June 29-July 9, 2004.
 James Painter, "Haiti's Escalating Violence," BBC
News, October 14, 2004.
 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, "Haiti
Human Rights Alert: Illegal Arrest of Political Leaders,"
October 8, 2004.
 "Aristide supporters step-up protest", Associated
Press, October 2, 2004.
 "Haiti violence death toll rises to 46," China
Daily, October 13, 2004.
Other sources would claim this significantly undercounted the
number of deaths: "On October 15, it was reported that the
State Morgue in Port au Prince had issued an emergency call to
the Ministry of Health to remove the more than 600 bodies that
had been piling up in the previous two weeks," Anthony Fenton,
"Media Disinformation on Haiti," Znet, October 25, 2004.
 Press Release from the Communication Office of the Prime
Minister, October 22, 2004.
 Reed Lindsay, "Police Terror Sweeps Across Haiti,"
The Observer, October 31, 2004,
and Lovinsky Pierre-Antoine, "Caught in Their Own Trap",
Haiti Action Committee, November 9, 2004.
 IJDH, "Haiti Human Rights Alert".
 Griffin, p. 39.
 Griffin, p. 39
 e.g. Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé, "Haïti dans
la violence des chimères," AlterPresse, November 12,
 "Violence in Haiti," U.S. Department of State Press
Statement, October 12, 2004.
 Griffin Report, p.31.
 "'Operation Baghdad' brought to you by AP," Haiti
News Watch, October 3, 2004.
 Paul Chery interviewed by Kevin Skerrett, "A Situation
of Terror", Znet, November 4, 2005.
 "Massive Protest demanding Aristide's return in Haiti's
second largest city," Haiti Information Project, December
 "Street Resistance to Occupation Regime Surges,"
Haiti Progrès, October 6 - 12, 2004.
 "Haiti: Rebellion in Bel Air," Revolutionary Worker,
October 17, 2004.
Rosean Baptiste interviewed by Lyn Duff, "We Won't Be Peaceful
and Let Them Kill Us Any Longer," November 4, 2004.
"Resistance in the Slums of Port-au-Prince," Black Commentator,
October 14, 2004.
 IJDH, "Haiti Human Rights Alert".
 Lindsay: "'We fought to bring democracy to Haiti, but
since this government took over, it's been a dictatorship,' said
Mario Joseph, a lawyer who worked to bring past human rights abusers
to justice under Aristide and is now representing 54 people he
says are political prisoners. The prison was emptied by armed
groups led by former military officers after Aristide's departure,
and Joseph believes the majority of the new prisoners are Lavalas
 Griffin, p.12-13.
 "A New Chance for Haiti?" International Crisis
Group, November 18, 2004, p.15.
 Lindsay, and Griffin, p. 53.
 IJDH, "Haiti Human Rights Alert".
 Steve Fainaru and Karl Vick, "British Hostage Beheaded
in Iraq," Washington Post, A23, October 9, 2004.
 Baptiste interview.
 Concertation pour Haïti, "Haïti : de l'insécurité
à la terreur," Alterpresse, October 22, 2004.
 Tania Vachon, "Les victimes politiques de Jeanne,"
Journal d'Alternatives, 19 October, 2004.
 Robert Muggah, "Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing
Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration," Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 10-12.
 "Martin says violence preventing democracy from taking
hold in Haiti," CBC News, November 14, 2004.
 The CPH's members include Development and Peace, Entraide
Missionaire, Centre international de Solidarite ouvriere (CISO),
Centre Canadien de Coopération Internationale (CECI), the
FTQ and CSQ union federations, and the Quebec chapter of Amnesty
International. Co-signers of subsequent CPH statements concerning
Haiti have also included Solidarité Union Coopération
(SUCO), AQOCI, the umbrella group of Quebec's development NGOs
and the Canadian government-controlled group Rights & Democracy.
 Pierre Bonin and Amelie Gauthier, "Haiti: Voices of
the actors," Alternatives and FRIDE, p. 13, fn 63.
 Canadian International Development Agency, "Canadian
Cooperation With Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of 'Difficult Partnership',"
December 2004, p. 8.
 Stan Goff, "A Brief Account of Haiti," Black Radical
Congress News, October 22, 1999.
 Anne Sosin quoted in Tom Reeves, "Haiti's Disappeared,"
Znet, May 5, 2004.
 Reeves, "Haiti's Disappeared".
 Anthony Fenton, "Declassified Documents: National Endowment
for Democracy FY2005," Narcosphere, February 15, 2006.
Little has changed since the election of Rene Preval in 2006,
according to David Malone, then-Assistant Deputy Minister (Global
Issues) at Foreign Affairs Canada: "To the distress of the
Group of Friends [i.e. Canada, the US and France], Aristide remains
the most potent political force within Haiti." Sebastian
von Einsiedel and David M. Malone, "Peace and Democracy for
Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?" International Relations,
Vol 20(2): p. 153-174.
 E.g. "Depuis le 30 septembre 2004, le peuple haïtien
en général, les populations de Port-au-Prince en
particulier, vit sous la coupe réglée des bandes
armées exécutant les ordres de Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Ces bandits ont enclenché une opération baptisée
« Opération Bagdad » dont la finalité
ouvertement déclarée est le retour physique de Jean-Bertrand
Aristide au pouvoir." "Pétition citoyenne pour
réclamer la mise en accusation de Jean-Bertrand Aristide
et de ses partisans en Haïti," Alterpresse, July 22,
2005. Signed by PAPDA, GARR, EnfoFanm, and SOFA, Haitian NGOs
with numerous ties to Canadian NGOs.
 CIDA, "Canadian Cooperation With Haiti," p. 12.
 Ibid, p. 18. "As the head of the army, Lt. Gen. Andrew
Leslie, recently told journalists in Vancouver, the Canadian Forces
work 'hand in glove with the folks from the Canadian International
Development Agency [as well as] reinforce the diplomatic activities
and efforts of Foreign Affairs.'" Jon Elmer and Anthony Fenton,
"Development Aid as Counterinsurgency Tool," Inter-Press
Service, March 23, 2007.
 CIDA, "Canadian Cooperation With Haiti," p. 18.
 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 283-284.