The Growth of the
Anti-Communist Network
by Ellen Schrecker
from the book
The Age of McCarthyism:
A Brief history with documents
Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994
Internet
The Communists never lacked for enemies. Even before the Bolshevik
Revolution gave birth to the American Communist party, many of
the groups and individuals who were to become its main opponents
had been actively fighting other radicals. Over the course of
the twentieth century, they became increasingly concerned about
Communists and by the late 1940s a wide-ranging anti-Communist
network was in place whose members were to take the lead in the
national crusade against domestic communism. What differentiated
these people from their fellow Americans was not their anti-communism,
which most Americans shared, but its intensity. Zealous partisans
who often made the eradication of the so-called Communist menace
a full-time career, in some respects they were the mirror image
of the Communists they fought. They came into their own during
the McCarthy period, staffing the main organizations in the field
and imposing their agenda on the rest of the nation.
The anti-Communist network was not a monolith, but a coalition
that gradually attracted groups and individuals. Each element
in the network appealed to a different constituency and used its
own tactics; the mixture of offensives became far more potent
than any single campaign would have been. Yet for all its diversity,
anticommunism was indisputably a movement of the political right.
Though liberals and even socialists joined the network, they did
not set its tone. Instead, they enlisted in an ongoing crusade
whose parameters had long been established by conservatives and
whose main effect was to bolster right-wing social and economic
programs. Over time, even those men and women who had originally
been leftists of one kind or another often ended up on the far
right.
Historians have noted the roots of American anticommunism
in what they refer to as the nation's countersubversive tradition:
the irrational notion that outsiders (who could be political dissidents,
foreigners, or members of racial and religious minorities) threatened
the nation from within. Projecting their own fears and insecurities
onto a demonized "Other," many Americans have found
convenient scapegoats among the powerless minorities within their
midst. Native Americans, blacks, Catholics, immigrants--all, at
one time or another, embodied the threat of internal subversion.
By the twentieth century, the American "Other" had become
politicized and increasingly identified with communism, the party's
Moscow connections tapping in conveniently with the traditional
fear of foreigners.
While this countersubversive tradition cannot in itself explain
why McCarthyism came to dominate American politics during the
late 1940s and 1950s, it does help account for its emotional impact
and for its characteristic paranoia. It is also possible that,
at least in part, McCarthyism was the mid-twentieth-century manifestation
of a continuing backlash against the modern, secular world. Accordingly,
as some historians suggest, the political demonology embodied
in cold war anticommunism may well reflect deep-seated anxieties
about individual autonomy, gender identity, and the perceived
loss of community. Such an interpretation, though still largely
speculative, is compelling. Certainly, it is not hard to conceive
of the existence of the countersubversive tradition as a subterranean
source of popular irrationality and xenophobia that could be exploited
by ambitious politicians or special-interest groups to direct
hostility against the opponents of their choice.
By far the most important of these special interests were
those segments of the business community who opposed organized
labor. From the 1870s until the McCarthy period, these employers
identified the labor movement with the Red menace of the moment--whether
anarchists, socialists, Communists, or Wobblies, as members of
the radical Industrial Workers of the World were called in the
early twentieth century. This tactic of Red-baiting made it possible
to confront unions without having to address economic issues.
Businessmen and their allies in the press insisted that workers'
demands were not based on legitimate grievances but were creations
of outside agitators, usually foreign-born, bomb-wielding Reds.
Such charges invariably surfaced during periods of labor unrest
and accompanied almost every major strike wave of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
Closely allied to the industrialists in the business of cracking
down on labor militants and repressing leftists were the forces
of law and order-- private detective companies, local and state
police, and, later, federal agencies like the FBI and military
intelligence. Many of these groups had been formed specifically
to fight radicalism and crush labor unrest and it was not uncommon
for them to be subsidized by local businesses. But they had their
own interests as well. Because of the authoritarian mind-set that
law enforcement work breeds among its practitioners, opposition
to radicalism was widespread. Moreover, their own bureaucratic
interests, including the desire to present themselves as protecting
the community against the threat of internal subversion, inspired
them to exaggerate the danger of radicalism.
The obsessive anticommunism of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
may well have been typical of the beliefs of the nation's law
enforcement agents. Embracing the middle-class, small-town values
of family, flag, and church, Hoover felt almost personally threatened
by radical ideologies and individuals. His vision of the Communist
menace extended far beyond the Communist party to almost any group
that challenged the established social, economic, or racial order,
and he was to dedicate his entire professional career to combating
that menace. Even when ordered to curtail his political activities,
Hoover evaded his superiors and continued to keep the party and
other leftists under surveillance. Because of his enormous success
in building up his own power and that of the FBI, Hoover was able
to transmit his own heavily ideological brand of anticommunism
to the rest of the country.
His first opportunity came during the Red Scare of 1919-20
when, as a young official in the Department of Justice, Hoover
helped plan a massive roundup of foreign-born radicals. The Palmer
Raids, as the roundup was known, were the culmination of almost
a year of near-hysteria on the part of politicians, journalists,
and businesspeople who claimed that the left-wing agitation and
labor unrest that had followed World War I threatened to plunge
the nation into the revolutionary chaos that they claimed was
sweeping Europe. The traditional targets--foreigners, radicals,
and striking workers--were beaten and arrested, and many of the
noncitizens among them were deported.
Though the furor soon abated, the Red Scare left an important
legacy. Not only did it give J. Edgar Hoover his lifelong mission,
it also fostered the development of an anti-Communist community,
with an institutional base in the nation's most important patriotic
organizations and small business groups. Like Hoover, the true
believers within such groups as the American Legion, a veterans'
organization founded in 1919, and the Chamber of Commerce, a national
association of local business leaders, subscribed to an anticommunism
with targets encompassing far more than the Communist party. They
saw little difference between "parlor pinks" and "flaming
Bolsheviks" and considered nonconformity to be as dangerous
as communism. They also adhered to a dualistic view of the world
in which anyone who disagreed with them was an enemy. As a result,
they were often more hostile to their non-Communist critics like
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) than to the Communist
party itself. Keepers of the ideological flame, these professional
patriots and their associates seemed marginal during periods when
the nation was concerned with other issues. But when the political
atmosphere changed, as it did during the late 1930s and again
during the cold war, their views entered the mainstream.
The anti-Communist network that these people nourished expanded
during the labor struggles of the 1930s. Conservatives within
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had long struggled against
radicalism within the labor movement. The presence of Communists
in the CIO allowed its enemies, within both the business community
and the AFL, to charge that the new unions were run by Reds. Moreover,
because of the Roosevelt administration's sympathy for the CIO,
anticommunism became a partisan issue. The American Legionnaires,
right-wing politicians, and other spokespersons for the anti-Communist
network charged that Communists had infiltrated the New Deal and
were using federal agencies to further Moscow's schemes.
They received support from Congress. For years the American
Legion and its allies had been demanding that the nation's lawmakers
investigate communism and do something to curb it. Their efforts
resulted in a few hearings with no lasting impact. But by the
end of the 1930s, as conservative lawmakers in both major parties
began to turn against the New Deal, the professional patriots
found a receptive audience. The result was the creation in 1938
of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which was
to become, along with the FBI, one of the main institutional centers
of McCarthyism. For the small-town politicians in the right wing
of the Republican party and their conservative southern Democratic
colleagues, HUAC's anti-Communist investigations offered a more
effective way to fight the New Deal than opposing its economic
and social reforms. The committee also appealed to those politicians
who, like its first chair, the xenophobic Texas Democrat Martin
Dies, subscribed to the ideology of countersubversion.
From the start, HUAC was to focus on the alleged Communist
influence in the labor movement and New Deal agencies. It took
testimony from ex-Communists, American Legion officials, and other
representatives of the anti-Communist right, as well as from the
CIO's labor opponents. It eagerly pursued evidence that Communists
had infiltrated the government. Committee staff members joined
local Red squads in illegal raids on local Communist party headquarters
and the offices of front groups in Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.,
and elsewhere. These raids produced membership lists that HUAC
used to embarrass the Roosevelt administration by drawing attention
to the hundreds of federal employees allegedly on them.
By the late 1930s the anti-Communist coalition had expanded
far beyond the traditional right. Many of its new recruits, among
them conservative trade union leaders and Socialists, came from
groups that had themselves once been under attack. The Catholic
Church was one such group. The church had long been antagonistic
to "atheistic" communism; the Spanish Civil War accentuated
that hostility, for the Catholic hierarchy was as fiercely committed
to Franco as the Communist party was to the Loyalist regime. The
Soviet takeover of the traditionally Catholic countries of Eastern
Europe after World War II and the subsequent persecution of the
church there intensified Catholic anticommunism, especially within
the Polish-American and other Eastern European ethnic groups.
Within the United States, Catholic anti-Communists concentrated
their activities on the labor movement. The American working class
was largely Catholic and, in order to maintain the church's influence
over its flock and especially over its dwindling male membership,
some Catholic activists undertook to drive the Communist party
out of the labor movement. In the late 1930s, a handful of enterprising
priests and laypeople began to organize anti-Communist nuclei
within a few left-led unions. Though ineffectual at first, these
efforts were to provide the organizational structure for later,
more successful campaigns to eliminate the party's influence in
the labor movement.
Perhaps the most important recruits to the anti-Communist
cause during this period were former fellow travelers and ex-Communists.
Some had been fairly high-ranking party leaders who were expelled
from the party during the sectarian warfare of the 1920s and early
1930s. Others abandoned communism for their own ideological or
personal reasons. They quickly became important members of the
anti-Communist coalition, for unlike the Legionnaires, antilabor
businessmen, and right-wing politicians, they actually knew something
about the party, their alleged expertise gaining greater respectability
for what had been until then a rather haphazard cause. They also
embarked on the task of educating the rest of the nation about
the evils of communism. In the process, they made careers for
themselves as witnesses, publicists, and staff members for the
various organizations that made up the anti-Communist world. By
the 1940s, they had become ubiquitous figures at trials, deportation
proceedings, and congressional committee hearings. It is hard
to conceive of McCarthyism without the former Communists; the
support they gave the rest of the network was indispensable.
The career of Benjamin Mandel was typical. A former New York
City high school teacher who became a full-time party activist
in the 1920s, he was forced out of the party in 1929 when Stalin
removed his faction from the party's leadership. After toying
with a few left-wing sects during the 1930s Mandel found a home
in Congress. First with HUAC and then as the long-term research
director of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS),
he was to orchestrate many of the investigations and purges of
the McCarthy period. The career of J. B. Matthews, Mandel's colleague
on HUAC, followed a similar trajectory. A minister who had been
a leading fellow traveler during the 1930s, Matthews broke with
communism and began to work for HUAC. During the 1940s and 1950s,
he became the eminence grise of the anti-Communist network, supplying
the Hearst Corporation and his other corporate and political clients
with names and information from his famous collection of party
literature and front group letterheads and other memorabilia.
By the 1940s, the professional anti-Communists had coalesced
into an informal network. They shared a worldview that they assiduously
sought to disseminate through whatever means they could. As journalists,
consultants, and committee staffers, they worked closely together,
sharing information and helping each other find jobs and publishers.
They socialized frequently, conscious that they had become, as
one of them jokingly suggested, "Red-Baiters Incorporated."
The interconnections within the network were striking. Some of
Hoover's top aides became key officials within the American Legion.
Former FBI agents worked for HUAC. Father John Cronin, the Catholic
Church's leading anti-Communist, wrote an influential pamphlet
for the Chamber of Commerce in 1946 and then served as the liaison
between the FBI and HUAC member Richard Nixon. These professionals,
because they were organized, committed, and strategically placed,
were to have a disproportionate influence over the ideological
and institutional development of McCarthyism.
Chronologically, the last group to join the anti-Communist
coalition was the liberals. When the signing of the Nazi-Soviet
Pact in August 1939 transformed American Communists from dedicated
antifascists to critics of the U.S. government, the Communist
party lost many of its political allies. Most of the non-Communists
who had tolerated the party because of its dedication to the antifascist
cause turned against it. No longer would these liberals and moderates
serve as a buffer for the party against its traditional enemies
on the right. Instead, they joined them.
Despite intense opposition from isolationists who wanted the
United States to stay out of the war in Europe, the American government
committed itself to the support of Great Britain. Eager to squelch
criticism from both the left and the right of its increasingly
interventionist foreign policy, the Roosevelt administration began
to treat the Communist party as a threat to the nation's security.
It imprisoned the party's leader, Earl Browder, for a passport
violation and tried to deport leading foreign-born Communists.
Roosevelt expanded Hoover's authority to put the party under surveillance.
At the same time, Congress passed several laws clearly directed
against the party. The 1939 Hatch Act barred Communists, Nazis,
and other totalitarians from government employment. The 1940 Voorhis
Act, which stipulated that groups with foreign affiliations register
with the government, was designed to force the American Communist
party to sever its ties to Moscow. And the 1940 Smith Act, the
first peacetime sedition act in American history, authorized the
government to crack down on speech as well as action by making
it illegal to "teach or advocate" the overthrow of the
government or to join any organization that did.
Private organizations also turned against the party during
the Nazi-Soviet Pact period. Some labor unions threw party members
out of leadership positions and others passed resolutions condemning
Nazism, fascism, and communism. These "Communazi" resolutions
popularized the concept of totalitarianism, which treated communism
and fascism as but variants of the same repressive, authoritarian
creed. The purges spread to the academic community where several
colleges and universities, most notably the City College of New
York, dismissed Communist professors. Even the American Civil
Liberties Union turned anti-Communist and expelled a leading party
figure from its board of directors.
For almost two years, until Hitler's invasion of the Soviet
Union in June 1941 returned the Communist party to the Allied
camp, American Communists were confronted with the same kind of
political repression that they were to face a decade later during
the McCarthy period. Abortive though that earlier campaign was,
it did display all the elements of the later anti-Communist crusade.
Washington's imprimatur was crucial; not only did the federal
government itself crack down on the party, but in doing so it
gave the stamp of approval to the previously more marginal activities
of the traditional anti-Communists. In addition, the anti-Communist
campaign of the Nazi-Soviet Pact period perfected many of the
techniques and developed many of the institutional structures
that would become crucial during the McCarthy years.
Document URL: http://www.english.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/anticom-network.html
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