excerpts from the book
Report from Iron Mountain
On the Possibility and Desirability
Dial Press, 1967, paperback
The report which follows summarizes the
results of a two-and-a-half-year study of the broad problems to
be anticipated in the event of a general transformation of American
society to a condition lacking its most critical current characteristics:
its capability and readiness to make war when doing so is judged
necessary or desirable by its political leadership.
Our work has been predicated on the belief
that some kind of general peace may soon be negotiable. The de
facto admission of Communist China into the United Nations now
appears to be only a few years away at most. It has become increasingly
manifest that conflicts of American national interest with those
of China and the Soviet Union are susceptible of political solution,
despite the superficial contraindications of the current Vietnam
war, of the threats of an attack on China, and of the necessarily
hostile tenor of day-to-day foreign policy statements. It is also
obvious that differences involving other nations can be readily
resolved by the three great powers whenever they arrive at a stable
peace among themselves. It is not necessary, for the purposes
of our study, to assume that a general détente of this
sort will come about-and we make no such argument-but only that
It is surely no exaggeration to say that
a condition of general world peace would lead to changes in the
social structures of the nations of the world of unparalleled
and revolutionary magnitude. The economic impact of general disarmament,
to name only the most obvious consequence of peace, would revise
the production and distribution patterns of the globe to a degree
that would make the changes of the past fifty years seem insignificant.
Political, sociological, cultural, and ecological changes would
be equally far-reaching. What has motivated our study of these
contingencies has been the growing sense of thoughtful men in
and out of government that the world is totally unprepared to
meet the demands of such a situation.
We had originally planned, when our study
was initiated, to address ourselves to these two broad questions
and their components: What can be expected if peace comes? What
should we be prepared to do about it? But as our investigation
proceeded it became apparent that certain other questions had
to be faced.
What, for instance, are the real functions
of war in modern societies, beyond the ostensible ones of defending
and advancing the "national interests" of nations? In
the absence of war, what other institutions exist or might be
devised to fulfill these functions? Granting that a "peaceful"
settlement of disputes is within the range of current international
relationships, is the abolition of war, in the broad sense, really
possible? If so, is it necessarily desirable, in terms of social
stability? If not, what can be done to improve the operation of
our social system in respect to its war-readiness?
The word peace, as we have used it in
the following pages, describes a permanent, or quasi-permanent,
condition entirely free from the national exercise, or contemplation,
of any form of the organized social violence, or threat of violence,
generally known as war. It implies total and general disarmament.
It is not used to describe the more familiar condition of "cold
war," "armed peace," or other mere respite, long
or short, from armed conflict. Nor is it used simply as a synonym
for the political settlement of international differences. The
magnitude of modern means of mass destruction and the speed of
modern communications require the unqualified working definition
given above; only a generation ago such an absolute description
would have seemed utopian rather than pragmatic. Today, any modification
of this definition would render it almost worthless for our purpose.
By the same standard, we have used the word war to apply interchangeably
to conventional ("hot") war, to the general condition
of war preparation or war readiness, and to the general "war
system." The sense intended is made clear in context.
The first section of our Report deals
with its scope and with the assumptions on which our study was
based. The second considers the effects of disarmament on the
economy, the subject of most peace research to date. The third
takes up so-called "disarmament scenarios" which have
been proposed. The fourth, fifth, and sixth examine the nonmilitary
functions of war and the problems they raise for a viable transition
to peace; here will be found some indications of the true dimensions
of the problem, not previously coordinated in any other study.
In the seventh section we summarize our findings, and in the eighth
we set forth our recommendations for what we believe to be a practical
and necessary course of action.
Disarmament and the Economy
We shall briefly examine some of the common
features of the studies that have been published dealing with
one or another aspect of the expected impact of disarmament on
the American economy.
... General agreement prevails in respect
to the important economic problems that general disarmament would
raise. A short survey of these problems, rather than a detailed
critique of their comparative significance, is sufficient for
our purposes in this Report.
The first factor is that of size. The
"world war industry," as one writer has aptly called
it, accounts for approximately a tenth of the output of the world's
total economy. Although this figure is subject to fluctuation,
the causes of which are themselves subject to regional variation,
it tends to hold fairly steady. The United States, as the world's
richest nation, not only accounts for the largest single share
of this expense, currently upward of $60 billion a year, but also
". . . has devoted a higher proportion of its gross national
product to its military, establishment than any other major free
War and Peace as Social Systems
... one common fundamental misconception... It is the incorrect
assumption that war, as an institution, is subordinate to the
social systems it is believed to serve.
This misconception, although profound
and far-reaching, is entirely comprehensible. Few social clichés
are so unquestioningly accepted as the notion that war is an extension
of diplomacy or of politics, or of the pursuit of economic objectives.
The point is that the cliché is not true, and the problems
of transition are indeed substantive rather than merely procedural.
Although war is "used" as an instrument of national
and social policy, the fact that a society is organized for any
degree of readiness for war supersedes its political and economic
structure. War itself is the basic social system, within which
other secondary modes of social organization conflict or conspire.
It is the system which has governed most human societies of record,
as it is today.
The precedence of a society's war-making potential over its other
characteristics is not the result of the "threat" presumed
to exist at any one time from other societies. This is the reverse
of the basic situation; "threats" against the "national
interest" are usually created or accelerated to meet the,
changing needs of the war system. Only in comparatively recent
times has it been considered politically expedient to euphemize
war budgets as "defense" requirements The necessity
for governments to distinguish between "aggression"
(bad) and "defense" (good) has been a by-product of
rising literacy and rapid communication. The distinction is tactical
only, a concession to the growing inadequacy of ancient war-organizing
Wars are not "caused" by international
conflicts of interest... war-making societies require - and thus
bring about - such conflicts. The capacity of a nation to make
war expresses the greatest social power it can exercise; war-making,
active or contemplated, is a matter of life and death on the greatest
scale subject to social control. It should therefore hardly be
surprising that the military institutions in each society claim
its highest priorities.
We find further that most of the confusion
surrounding the myth that war-making is a tool of state policy
stems from a general misapprehension of the functions of war.
In general, these are conceived as: to defend a nation from military
attack by another, or to deter such an attack; to defend or advance
a "national interest" economic, political, ideological;
to maintain or increase a nation's military power for its own
sake. These are the visible, or ostensible, functions of war.
But there are other, broader, more profoundly felt functions of
war in modern societies. It is these invisible, or implied, functions
that maintain war-readiness as the dominant force in our societies.
The Functions of War
The preeminence of the concept of war as the principal organizing
force in most societies has been insufficiently appreciated.
The military function of the war system serves simply to defend
or advance the "national interest" by means of organized
violence. It is often necessary for a national military establishment
to create a need for its unique powers... And a healthy military
apparatus requires regular "exercise," by whatever rationale
seems expedient, to prevent its atrophy.
War production is exercised entirely outside the framework of
the economy of supply and demand. As such, it provides the only
critically large segment of the total economy that is subject
to complete and arbitrary central control.
David T. Bazelon, "The Politics of the Paper Economy",
Commentary, November 1962, p409
Why is war so wonderful? Because it creates
artificial demand... the only kind of artificial demand, moreover,
that does not raise any political issues: war, and only war, solves
the problem of inventory.
"The Economic Impact of Disarmament", U.S. Arms-Control
and Disarmament Agency, January 1962
It is generally agreed, that the greatly
expanded public sector since World War II, resulting from heavy
defense expenditures, has provided additional protection against
depressions, since this sector is not responsive to contraction
in the private sector and has provided a sort of buffer or balance
wheel in the economy.
War cannot be considered wholly "wasteful." Without
a long-established war economy, and without its frequent eruption
into large-scale shooting war, most of the major industrial advances
known to history, beginning with the development of iron, could
never have taken place. Weapons technology structures the economy.
Far from constituting a "wasteful" drain on the economy,
war spending, considered pragmatically, has been a consistently
positive factor in the rise of gross national product and of individual
No combination of techniques for controlling employment, production,
and consumption has yet been tested that can remotely compare
to [war] in effectiveness. It is, and has been, the essential
economic stabilizer of modern societies.
A nation's foreign policy can have no substance if it lacks the
means of enforcing its attitude toward other nations. It can do
this in a credible manner only if it implies the threat of maximum
political organization for this purpose-which is to say that it
is organized to some degree for war. War, then, as we have defined
it to include all national activities that recognize the possibility
of armed conflict, is itself the defining element of any nation's
existence vis-à-vis any other nation. Since it is historically
axiomatic that the existence of any form of weaponry insures its
use, we have used the word "peace" as virtually synonymous
with disarmament. By the same token, "war" is virtually
synonymous with nationhood. The elimination of war implies the
inevitable elimination of national sovereignty and the traditional
The war system not only has been essential
to the existence of nations as independent political entities,
but has been equally indispensable to their stable internal political
structure. Without it, no government has ever been able to obtain
acquiescence in its "legitimacy," or right to rule its
society. The possibility of war provides the sense of external
necessity without which no government can long remain in power.
The historical record reveals one instance after another where
the failure of a regime to maintain the credibility of a war threat
led to its dissolution, by the forces of private interest, of
reactions to social injustice, or of other disintegrative elements.
The organization of a society for the possibility of war is its
principal political stabilizer.
The basic authority of a modern state over its people resides
in its war powers... On a day-to-day basis, it is represented
by the institution of police, armed organizations charged expressly
with dealing with "internal enemies" in a military manner.
Like the conventional "external" military, the police
are also substantially exempt from many civilian legal restraints
on their social behavior. In some countries, the artificial distinction
between police and other military forces does not exist. On the
long-term basis, a government's emergency war powers - inherent
in the structure of even the most libertarian of nations - define
the most significant aspect of the relation between state and
In advanced modern democratic societies the war system has provided
political leaders with ... political-economic function of increasing
importance: it has served as the last great safeguard against
the elimination of necessary social classes.
... The arbitrary nature of war expenditures
and of other military activities make them ideally suited to control
these essential class relationships. Obviously, if the war system
were to be discarded, new political machinery would be needed
at once to serve this vital subfunction. Until it is developed,
the continuance of the war system must be assured, if for no other
reason, among others, than to preserve whatever quality and degree
of poverty a society requires as an incentive, as well as to maintain
the stability of its internal organization of power.
Military institutions ... provide antisocial elements with an
acceptable role in the social structure. The disintegrative, unstable
social movements loosely described as "fascist" have
traditionally taken root in societies that have lacked adequate
military or paramilitary outlets to meet the needs of these elements.
This function has been critical in periods of rapid change. The
danger signals are easy to recognize, even though the stigmata
bear different names at different times. The current euphemistic
clichés-"juvenile delinquency" and "alienation"
- have had their counterparts in every age. In earlier days these
conditions were dealt with directly by the military without the
complications of due process, usually through press gangs or outright
enslavement. But it is not hard to visualize, for example, the
degree of social disruption that might have taken place in the
United States during the last two decades if the problem of the
socially disaffected of the post-World War II period had not been
foreseen and effectively met. The younger, and more dangerous,
of these hostile social groupings [in society] have been kept
under control by the Selective Service System.
Informed persons in this country have never accepted the official
rationale for a peacetime draft-military necessity, preparedness,
etc. - as worthy of serious consideration. But what has gained
credence among thoughtful men is the rarely voiced, less easily
refuted, proposition that the institution of military service
has a "patriotic" priority in our society that must
be maintained for its own sake. Ironically, the simplistic official
justification for selective service comes closer to the mark,
once the nonmilitary functions of military institutions are understood.
As a control device over the hostile, nihilistic, and potentially
unsettling elements of a society in transition, the draft can
... be defended, and quite convincingly, as a "military"
The armed forces in every civilization have provided the principal
state-supported haven for what we now call the "unemployable.
The concept of "nationhood" implies readiness for war.
In general, the war system provides the basic motivation for primary
social organization. In so doing, it reflects on the societal
level the incentives of individual human behavior. The most important
of these, for social purposes, is the individual psychological
rationale for allegiance to a society and its values. Allegiance
requires a cause; a cause requires an enemy.
The credibility of a social "enemy" demands a readiness
of response in proportion to its menace. In a broad social context,
"an eye for an eye" still characterizes the only acceptable
attitude toward a presumed threat of aggression, despite contrary
religious and moral precepts governing personal conduct.
One of the most noteworthy features common to the larger, more
complex, and more successful of ancient civilizations was their
widespread use of the blood sacrifice.
... [Blood sacrifice] was primarily, if
not exclusively, a symbolic reminder that war had once been the
central organizing force of the society, and that this condition
A viable substitute for war as a social system cannot be a mere
symbolic charade. It must involve real risk of real personal destruction,
and on a scale consistent with the size and complexity of modern
social systems. Credibility is the key. Whether the substitute
is ritual in nature or functionally substantive, unless it provides
a believable life-and-death threat it will not serve the socially
organizing function of war.
The existence of an accepted external
menace ... is essential to social cohesiveness as well as to the
acceptance of political authority. The menace must be believable,
it must be of a magnitude consistent with the complexity of the
society threatened, and it must appear, at least, to affect the
Ethologists have often observed that the organized slaughter of
members of their own species is virtually unknown among other
animals. Man's [has a] special propensity to kill his own kind...
War has served to help assure the survival of the human species.
But as an evolutionary device to improve it, war is almost unbelievably
inefficient. With few exceptions, the selective processes of other
living creatures promote both specific survival and genetic improvement.
When a conventionally adaptive animal faces one of its periodic
crises of insufficiency, it is the "inferior" members
of the species that normally disappear. An animal's social response
to such a crisis may take the form of a mass migration, during
which the weak fall by the wayside. Or it may follow the dramatic
and more efficient pattern of lemming societies, in which the
weaker members voluntarily disperse, leaving available food supplies
for the stronger. In either case, the strong survive and the weak
fall. In human societies, those who fight and die in wars for
survival are in general its biologically stronger members. This
is natural selection in reverse.
The regressive genetic effect of war has
been often noted" and equally often deplored, even when it
confuses biological and cultural factors. The disproportionate
loss of the biologically stronger remains inherent in traditional
warfare. It serves to underscore the fact that survival of the
species, rather than its improvement, is the fundamental purpose
of natural selection.
... the efficiency of modern methods of mass destruction. Even
if their use is not required to meet a world population crisis,
they offer, perhaps paradoxically, the first opportunity in the
history of man to halt the regressive genetic effects of natural
selection by war. Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate. Their application
would bring to an end the disproportionate destruction of the
physically stronger members of the species (the "warriors")
in periods of war. Whether this prospect of genetic gain would
offset the unfavorable mutations anticipated from postnuclear
radioactivity we have not yet determined.
Pestilence ... is no longer an important factor in population
control. The problem of increased life expectancy has been aggravated.
These advances also pose a potentially more sinister problem,
in that undesirable genetic traits that were formerly self-liquidating
are now medically maintained.
Many diseases that were once fatal at
preprocreational ages are now cured; the effect of this development
is to perpetuate undesirable susceptibilities and mutations. It
seems clear that a new quasi-eugenic function of war is now in
process of formation that will have to be taken into account in
any transition plan. For the time being, the Department of Defense
appears to have recognized such factors, as has been demonstrated
by the planning under way by the Rand Corporation to cope with
the breakdown in the ecological balance anticipated after a thermonuclear
war. The Department has also begun to stockpile birds, for example,
against the expected proliferation of radiation-resistant insects,
War is the principal motivational force for the development of
science at every level, from the abstractly conceptual to the
narrowly technological. Modem society places a high value on "pure"
science, but it is historically inescapable that all the significant
discoveries that have been made about the natural world have been
inspired by the real or imaginary military necessities of their
epochs. The consequences of the discoveries have indeed gone far
afield, but war has always provided the basic incentive.
War as a general social release
This is a psychosocial function, serving
the same purpose for a society as do the holiday, the celebration,
and the orgy for the individual - the release and redistribution
of undifferentiated tensions.
War as a generational stabilizer
This psychological function, served by
other behavior patterns in other animals, enables the physically
deteriorating older generation to maintain its control of the
younger, destroying it if necessary.
Substitutes for the Functions of War
Economic surrogates for war must meet two principal criteria.
They must be "wasteful," in the common sense of the
word, and they must operate outside the normal supply-demand system.
A corollary that should be obvious is that the magnitude of the
waste must be sufficient to meet the needs of a particular society.
An economy as advanced and complex as our own requires the planned
average annual destruction of not less than 10 percent of gross
national product, if it is effectively to fulfill its stabilizing
The war system makes the stable government of societies possible.
It does this essentially by providing an external necessity for
a society to accept political rule. In so doing, it establishes
the basis for nationhood and the authority of government to control
its constituents. What other institution or combination of programs
might serve these functions in its place?
... the end of war means the end of national
sovereignty, and thus the end of nationhood as we know it today.
But this does not necessarily mean the end of nations in the administrative
sense, and internal political power will remain essential to a
stable society. The emerging "nations" of the peace
epoch must continue to draw political authority from some source.
[A political substitute for war] must be found, of credible quality
and magnitude, if a transition to peace is ever to come about
without social disintegration. It is more probable, in our judgment,
that such a threat will have to be invented...
In a world of peace, the continuing stability of society will
require: 1) an effective substitute for military institutions
that can neutralize destabilizing social elements and 2) a credible
motivational surrogate for war at can insure social cohesiveness.
[A] possible surrogate for the control of potential enemies of
society is the reintroduction, in some form consistent with modern
technology and political processes, of slavery. Up to now, this
has been suggested only in fiction, notably in the works of Wells,
Huxley, Orwell, and others engaged in the imaginative anticipation
of the sociology of the future. But the fantasies projected in
Brave New World and 1984 have seemed less and less implausible
over the years since their publication. The traditional association
of slavery with ancient preindustrial cultures should not blind
us to its adaptability to advanced forms of social organization,
nor should its equally traditional incompatibility with Western
moral "and economic values. It is entirely possible that
the development of a sophisticated form of slavery may be an absolute
prerequisite for social control in a world at peace. As a practical
matter, conversion of the code of military discipline to a euphemized
form of enslavement would entail surprisingly little revision;
the logical first step would be the adoption of some form of "universal"
Games theorists have suggested ... the development of "blood
games" for the effective control of individual aggressive
impulses. It is an ironic commentary on the current state of war
and peace studies that it was left not to scientists but to the
makers of a commercial film to develop a model for this notion,
on the implausible level of popular melodrama, as a ritualized
manhunt. More realistically, such a ritual might be socialized,
in the manner of the Spanish Inquisition and the less formal witch
trials of other periods, for purposes of "social purification,"
"state security," or other rationale both acceptable
and credible to postwar societies. The feasibility of such an
updated version of still another ancient institution, though doubtful,
is considerably less fanciful than the wishful notion of many
peace planners that a lasting condition of peace can be brought
about without the most painstaking examination of every possible
surrogate for the essential functions of war. What is involved
here, in a sense, is the quest for William James's moral equivalent
... establishing the antisocial, for whom a control institution
is needed, as the "alternate enemy" needed to hold society
together. The relentless and irreversible advance of unemployability
at all levels of society, and the similar extension of generalized
alienation from accepted values" may make some such program
necessary even as an adjunct to the war system.
There is no question but that universal requirement that procreation
be limited to the products of artificial insemination would provide
a fully adequate substitute control for population levels.
Total control of conception with a variant of the ubiquitous "pill,"
via water supplies or certain essential foodstuffs, offset by
a controlled "antidote" - is already under development.
Excess population is war material. As long as any society must
contemplate even a remote possibility of war, it must maintain
a maximum supportable population, even when so doing critically
aggravates an economic liability. This is paradoxical, in view
of war's role in reducing excess population, but it is readily
understood. War controls the general population level, but the
ecological interest of any single society lies in maintaining
its hegemony vis-à-vis other societies. The obvious analogy
can be seen in any free-enterprise economy. Practices damaging
to the society as a whole-both competitive and monopolistic-are
abetted by the conflicting economic motives of individual capital
interests. The obvious precedent can be found in the seemingly
irrational political difficulties which have blocked universal
adoption of simple birth-control methods. Nations desperately
in need of increasing unfavorable production-consumption ratios
are nevertheless unwilling to gamble their possible military requirements
of twenty years hence for this purpose.
The Nature of War
War is not, as is widely assumed, primarily an instrument of policy
utilized by nations to extend or defend their expressed political
values or their economic interests. On the contrary, it is itself
the principal basis of organization on which all modern societies
are constructed. The common proximate cause of war is the apparent
interference of one nation with the aspirations of another. But
at the root of all ostensible differences of national interest
lie the dynamic requirements of the war system itself for periodic
armed conflict. Readiness for war characterizes contemporary social
systems more broadly than their economic and political structures,
which it subsumes.
War has provided both ancient and modern societies with a dependable
system for stabilizing and controlling national economies. No
alternate method of control has yet been tested in a complex modern
economy that has shown itself remotely comparable in scope or
The permanent possibility of war is the foundation for stable
government; it supplies the basis for general acceptance of political
authority. It has enabled societies to maintain necessary class
distinctions, and it has ensured the subordination of the citizen
to the state, by virtue of the residual war powers inherent in
the concept of nationhood. No modern political ruling group has
successfully controlled its constituency after failing to sustain
the continuing credibility of an external threat of war.
War, through the medium of military institutions, has uniquely
served societies, throughout the course of known history, as an
indispensable controller of dangerous social dissidence and destructive
antisocial tendencies. [War] has ensured the degree of social
cohesion necessary to the viability of nations. No other institution,
or groups of institutions, in modern societies, has successfully
served these functions.
War has been the principal evolutionary device for maintaining
a satisfactory ecological balance between gross human population
and supplies available for its survival. It is unique to the human
An acceptable economic surrogate for the war system will require
the expenditure of resources for completely nonproductive purposes
at a level comparable to that of the military expenditures otherwise
demanded by the size and complexity of each society. Such a substitute
system of apparent "waste" must be of a nature that
will permit it to remain independent of the normal supply-demand
economy; it must be subject to arbitrary political control.
A viable political substitute for war must posit a generalized
external menace to each society of a nature and degree sufficient
to require the organization and acceptance of political authority.
In the permanent absence of war, new institutions must be developed
that will effectively control the socially destructive segments
of societies. Second, for purposes of adapting the physical and
psychological dynamics of human behavior to the needs of social
organization, a credible substitute for war must generate an omnipresent
and readily understood fear of personal destruction. This fear
must be of a nature and degree sufficient to ensure adherence
to societal values to the full extent that they are acknowledged
to transcend the value of individual human life.
Substitute institutions ... have been proposed for consideration
as replacements for the nonmilitary functions of war.
... a) An omnipresent, virtually omnipotent
international police force. b) An established and recognized extraterrestrial
menace. c) Massive global environmental pollution. d) Fictitious
... a) Programs generally derived from
the Peace Corps model. b) A modern, sophisticated form of slavery...
... a) Intensified environmental pollution.
b) New religions or combination mythologies. c) Socially oriented
blood games. d) Combination forms.
... A comprehensive program of applied
The war system, for all its subjective repugnance to important
sections of "public opinion," has demonstrated its effectiveness
since the beginning of recorded history; it has provided the basis
for the development of many impressively durable civilizations,
including that which is dominant today. It has consistently provided
unambiguous social priorities. It is, on the whole, a known quantity.
It is possible that one or more major sovereign nations may arrive,
through ambiguous leadership, at a position in which a ruling
administrative class may lose control of basic public opinion
or of its ability to rationalize a desired war. It is not hard
to imagine, in such circumstance, a situation in which such governments
may feel forced to initiate serious full-scale disarmament proceedings
(perhaps provoked by "accidental" nuclear explosions),
and that such negotiations may lead to the actual disestablishment
of military institutions. As our Report has made clear this could
be catastrophic. It seems evident that, in the event an important
part of the world is suddenly plunged without sufficient warning
into an inadvertent peace, even partial and inadequate preparation
for the possibility may be better than none
To the best of our knowledge, no serious quantified studies have
ever been conducted to determine, for example:
* optimum levels of armament production,
for purposes of economic control, at any given series of chronological
points and under any given relationship between civilian production
and consumption patterns;
* correlation factors between draft recruitment
policies and mensurable social dissidence;
* minimum levels of population destruction
necessary to maintain war-threat credibility under varying political
* optimum cyclical frequency of "shooting"
wars under varying circumstances of historical relationship.
(1) We propose the establishment, under executive order of the
President, of a permanent War/Peace Research Agency, empowered
and mandated to execute the programs described in (2) and (3)
below. This agency (a) will be provided with nonaccountable funds
sufficient to implement its responsibilities and decisions at
its own discretion, and (b) will have authority to preempt and
utilize, without restriction, any and all facilities of the executive
branch of the government in pursuit of its objectives. It will
be organized along the lines of the National Security Council,
except that none of its governing, executive, or operating personnel
will hold other public office or governmental responsibility.
Its directorate will be drawn from the broadest practicable spectrum
of scientific disciplines, humanistic studies, applied creative
arts, operating technologies, and otherwise unclassified professional
occupations. It will be responsible solely to the President, or
to other officers of government temporarily deputized by him.
Its operations will be governed entirely by its own rules of procedure.
Its authority will expressly include the unlimited right to withhold
information on its activities and its decisions, from anyone except
the President, whenever it deems such secrecy to be in the public
The first of the War/Peace research agency's two principal responsibilities
will be to determine all that can be known, including what can
reasonably be inferred in terms of relevant statistical probabilities,
that may bear on an eventual transition to a general condition
The War/Peace research agency's ... principal responsibility will
be "War Research." Its fundamental objective will be
to ensure the continuing viability of the war system to fulfill
its essential nonmilitary functions for as long as the war system
is judged necessary or desirable for the survival of society.
New World Order