Texaco's Ecological Terrorism of the Ecuadorian
Amazon
Making the area safe for oil extraction
by Suzanne Simon
In These Times magazine, October 2000
From 1972 until 1992, the U.S.-based Texaco Corporation spearheaded
oil production activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon. They guided
exploration activities, built roads and a trans-Ecuadorian pipeline,
which runs from the oil town of Lago Agrio to the port city of
Esmeraldas. These two decades of oil extraction and production
have resulted in levels of environmental contamination and destruction
which are shocking even to a generation accustomed to hearing
about the acts of atrocity and imperialism committed by U.S. and
multinational corporations throughout the world. After exploiting
the majority of Ecuador's oil reserves, Texaco intentionally left
behind an environment contaminated by over three hundred unlined
oil pits, which are full of toxic and carcinogenic wastes. These
pits-and the commonplace occurrence of oil spills-were led to
contaminate rivers, streams, and ground water. They also left
an entire population ridden with chronic and acute illnesses,
including cancer, in a population where it was previously nonexistent,
and children born with genetic deformities. For all of this, Texaco
has refused to claim any responsibility.
The Ecuadorian Amazon
The Ecuadorian Amazon is a sparsely populated region that
comprises roughly half of all Ecuadorian territory. The people
who live there are almost entirely indigenous and colonos-colonists
who moved to the Oriente during the oil boom. Colonos form a universally
poor and formerly landless population that has come from other
regions of Ecuador. Following the failed land reform attempts
of 1964, the first attempt to reform Ecuador's feudal land-labor
relations, colonos were granted tracts of land in exchange for
colonization, in a policy similar to the American Homestead Act
of 1861. The Ecuadorian government's motives for doing this lay
in colonizing the land by civilizing or pushing the indigenous
groups who lived there deeper into the forest thereby providing
a labor supply for the oil industry and, in general, making the
area safe for oil extraction activities.
Until the oil boom years of the early 1970s, the Ecuadorian
Amazon was virtually impenetrable. Tropical indigenous groups,
such as the Cofan, Siona-Secoya, Shuar-Jivaro, and Huaorani, had
successfully defended their territories against the incursions
of the Inca and Spanish Empires, as well as attempts by the Ecuadorian
government throughout the l9th century to colonize the region.
The first sustained foreign presence in the region occurred at
the turn of the 20th century during the rubber boom. At that time,
rubber barons brought Quechua peoples down from the mountains
to work as slaves, indentured laborers, and to serve the encomienda
system. The largest indigenous population of the Ecuadorian Amazon
are now the lowland Quechua.
The first oil company to go to Ecuador in search of oil reserves
was Royal Dutch Shell during the 1930s. Being unsuccessful in
the Amazon and having discovered oil in St. Elena, they moved
to the coast to exploit oil resources there. The largest foreign
oil presence to date, therefore, has been Texaco-or as it likes
to refer to its phantom subsidiary, "Texpet." Oil is
the primary natural resource extracted from the Oriente, and it
was Texaco's oil production activities that changed the landscape
and demographics of the region.
Texaco in Ecuador
Texaco came to dominate the oil production industry by taking
a hard line against the nationalist and populist military regime
of General Rodriguez Lara. The Rodriguez Lara regime seized control
of the generally unstable Ecuadorian government in 1972 in order
to pursue oil production from a national populist and anti-imperialist
position, and to ensure that the fruits of the oil boom would
be properly invested in the national infrastructure of schools,
roads, and hospitals. CEPE (Coporacion Estatal de Petrolera Ecuadoria)
was established in order to negotiate with and learn the tools
of the trade from Texaco, and to build an Ecuadorian professional
class of oil experts.
The optimistic sentiments of this nationalist regime did not
last long under Texaco pressure. The strong nationalist stance
of the Rodriguez Lara regime had created conditions, which smaller
corporations could not meet, leaving Texaco in a dominant position.
Texaco consolidated its position of power and influence over the
terms of production by enforcing an oil embargo in 1975, pushing
the Ecuadorian economy into a severe financial crisis and its
first period of heavy borrowing. CEPE subsequently bought out
the shares of Texaco-Gulf (the other major competitor) leaving
CEPE as a majority shareholder, but still in a subordinate position
vis-a-vis Texaco, and Texaco as the foreign oil company to monopolize
the industry. In this way, Texaco forced the Ecuadorian government
to conform to its standards as the only oil producer in the nation,
and squelched nationalist ambitions in a matter of a few short
years. Although since the early 1970s CEPE held a nominal majority
shareholder position (Petroecuador is the main oil company now,
having assumed all of Texaco's holdings in 1992 as per contract),
it was widely recognized that control of the oil industry in Ecuador
rested in Texaco's hands, both because of their powerful position
as a global corporation-Ecuador was in need of foreign investment-and
because only Texaco had the knowledge, expertise and technology
to pursue oil production.
While it is true that the Ecuadorian government shares blame
with Texaco for the environmental contamination in the Oriente
region, clearly Texaco made the decisions of where and how to
drill and what technology to use. The Ecuadorian government played
their part by considering these lands (which were inhabited by
indigenous peoples) as "vacant," by dismissing as dispensable
the lives of both the indigenous peoples who had already lived
there and the newly relocated migrant group, and by using the
Ecuadorian military to make inhospitable areas safe for oil production.
It is well known that the oil companies with the help of the
Ecuadorian military forcibly removed indigenous peoples and farmers
from their lands. One woman told me of how, as recently as 1990,
the Ecuadorian military came to her home and forcibly removed
her family. Her three children were beaten before they were all
able to escape by swimming across the river and fleeing into the
forest. They stayed at a neighbor's crowded hut where her three-
year-old daughter fell into a cooking fire. To this day she is
severely scarred. In Guayaquil the mother of the family made a
courageous denuncia on a sympathetic television channel, only
to have her own life threatened by local military officials and
to be told that they should have killed her "worthless"
Indian daughter.
It has yet to be discovered how many stories like this exist,
but the implication was made clear to me, as an investigator,
that this was, and is, an all too commonplace event. Military
surveillance of oil production areas is a fact; I was stopped
and questioned by a large military patrol over 50 miles away from
a well where I had taken pictures, implying close radio communication
between the seemingly isolated guard and the Ecuadorian military.
Although it is painfully clear that the Ecuadorian government
was never concerned with the welfare of the indigenous peoples
and colonos who inhabit the region, it was always assumed that,
with respect to the actual technical business of exploring, drilling,
pumping oil, and disposing of the toxic wastes, Texaco would follow
normal, industry-approved standards. Wasn't this precisely the
role that Texaco was supposed to assume vis-a-vis the Ecuadorian
state and CEPE, to initiate them into the business of oil production
in the way that it is done in the rest of the world?
So it came as a shock for many Ecuadorians to learn that,
rather than using trusted and industry-approved standards for
oil production in the Amazon, Texaco had chosen to cut corners
and use inadequate and inappropriate technology. Texaco intentionally
chose not to install the reinjection technology, which had been
the de jure practice of oil production since the early 20th century
in the United States. By doing so, they saved approximately $1
million per well for the more than 300 wells that were drilled
there.
Causes of Oil Contamination
Drilling for oil involves handling a series of toxins, ranging
from the highly toxic "produced" or formation waters-extracted
along with the code in the drilling process and then separated
out during processing-to the various hazardous chemicals used
in the drilling and separation process. Normally, all toxic "produced
waters" are reinjected into the earth at the same subterranean
level from which the oil was extracted. Texaco allowed the various
produced and waste waters to collect in unlined pits barely scratched
from the surface of the earth, forming what Judith Kimmerling,
in her 1990 work Amazon Crude, has referred to as a "toxic
soup" of brine, crude, PAHs (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons-a
well-known carcinogen) and VOCs (volatile organic compounds).
While these pools would be hazardous to the environment anywhere,
they are especially so in the Amazon region, where the extraordinary
delicacy of the lush forest is held together through thousands
of web-like streams and rivulets. Oil has also seeped deep into
the groundwater, traveling far from the sites of the original
pits.
Texaco also added insult to injury by engaging in even more
egregious abuses. Gaseous substances which collect on the surface
of the waste pits are often burned off, cresting what the local
inhabitants refer to as "black rain" and releasing even
more PAHs in their most toxic airborne form, and excess crude
is poured onto unpaved roads in order to control the dust in the
dry seasons. People who clean the pits or who walk these roads
must use gasoline to clean off the oil, and are often treated
for burns in local hospitals. The pipeline is considered to be
poorly built, without enough turnoff spigots to control the spill
during a pipeline break. Oil spills are a commonplace occurrence
in the Ecuadorian Amazon, so common that, when a local resident
talks of how their farm is faring, they may make reference to
an oil spill as casually as if they were speaking of bad weather.
In such an extraordinarily wet environment with thousands
of natural sources of water, the indigenous peoples and colonists
in the region have access only to contaminated rivers and streams
for drinking, fishing, bathing, and laundry. They suffer from
chronic problems such as diarrhea and malnutrition, and a number
of illnesses are widely documented among the population, including:
spontaneous abortions, respiratory disorders, severe and constant
head and throat aches, skin discoloration, childhood leukemia,
children born with genetic deformities, and cancer of the larynx,
bile duct, throat, stomach, lung, and uterus. The rate of cancer
is 130 percent higher than what would be expected under normal
conditions. Many people have already died, and a cancer epidemic
is expected to spread throughout the area in the comma years.
In addition to having their land raped and various previously
unknown illnesses introduced into their population, the main oil
towns of the Oriente-Coca and Lago Agrio-are now facing rising
unemployment and violence. Due to Ecuador's well-known economic
woes, Petroecuador has cut back on the maintenance work for pipeline
and other oil-related activities, eliminating an importance source
of employment for the colonists who live in the region and, especially
in the towns. Most colonists rely on a combination of farming
the poor soil of the Ecuadorian Amazon and working for the oil
companies in order to survive. Petraecuador's cutbacks, in addition
to the fact that oil reserves are running out and are expected
to be completely exhausted by the year 2010, indicate that unemployment
will continue to rise. One can only speculate as to what will
happen to the two large towns and other colonist communities which
are isolated from the rest of the Ecuadorian national economy
and which rely almost exclusively on oil for the income necessary
to survival. It is certain that more clear-cutting of the Amazon
rain forest-the "lungs of the worlds, source of what many
scientists consider as a possible ethnobotanical cure for cancer,
and one of the ecological "hot spots" for its extraordinarily
high levels of endemism and biodiversity-will continue to be destroyed.
All so that Texaco could make a few bucks. It is for this reason
that many people refer to Texaco's activities as acts of "ecological
terrorism," and the skull and crossbones are drawn next to
the name Petroecuador on the main pipeline that connects the Oriente
with the coast.
Most people that I spoke with were well aware and vocal about
the fact that the Ecuadorian government and Texaco raped their
land, and that the economic benefits of oil development were enjoyed
only by a very few-the wealthy aristocracy and corrupt military
or political officials. Barely a cent of oil production revenues
were reinvested in the communities which were most connected with
the on-the-ground business of oil extraction: the single road-more
than 100 miles long, connecting the two main oil towns of Lago
Agrio and Coca-is only occasionally paved. Most stretches of the
road are so pocked with potholes as to make for extremely hazardous
driving. A bridge that used to connect the road across the Aguarico
River to Lago Agrio was washed out by the 1987 earthquake, and
has yet to be replaced. Instead a very primitive ferry transports
cars and buses from one side to another. Lago Agrio has only a
few paved roads in town and Coca has none. Medical facilities
are generally poor, as are schools, the water system, and other
public utilities and facilities. As one person informed me, "All
of the oil money went to the cities, where the already rich people
live. None of it came to us, where the poor people live-those
of us who worked for the oil. And now the oil boom is over-it
is too late for us and we will not get anything."
It remains to be seen precisely how the Colombia Plan will
affect this region, but it is certain that it will. During the
second week of July 1999, as plans were developing around the
now U.S. air base at Manta, a spate of articles concerning the
northeast corner of the Oriente-an area usually ignored by the
rest of the nation-were published in the major daily newspapers.
Lago Agrio was targeted as a site of arms and supply transfers
(fuel was added to the fire by a supposedly large cache of arms
discovered there), and the local population was cast as vulnerable
to the subversive influences of the FARC. Having little legitimate
sources of income, it was claimed, they are likely to resort to
illicit activities and insurrectionary politics. The military
presence has already been dramatically increased in these areas,
in order to both "stop the flow" of supplies and arms,
and to beef up the Ecuadorian border in the hopes that Colombia's
problems will not bleed over. The Clinton administration's Colombia
Plan has now allocated $12 million for "community" and
"social development" (as well as $13 million for military
equipment and $86 million for the air base at Manta). Already
entry to and exit from these areas is being closely monitored.
The Lawsuit
In 1993, a class-action lawsuit against Texaco was filed in
New York by an Ecuadorian-American environmentalist lawyer on
behalf of 30,000 indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian Amazon.
In April 1994, Texaco moved to dismiss the case on the grounds
that a lawsuit in their domicile was "harassment." Judge
Vincent Broderick refused the request for dismissal, citing the
1992 Rio Declaration, which, like the 1972 Stockholm declaration,
declared the right to a clean and healthy environment as a fundamental
and inalienable human right Judge Broderick accepted jurisdiction
over the Texaco case without hesitation, and immediately requested
that discovery be conducted to determine the extent of Texaco's
control over Ecuador's petroleum production industry. Judge Broderick
died one year later and jurisdiction was passed to Judge Rakoff,
a known conservative on environmental issues.
Although the Ecuadorian government did sign a deal with Texaco
in 1995 for a $40 million cleanup, it is widely recognized that
the cleanup performed by Texaco was really just an effort to pacify
the Ecuadorian government. Their cleanup activities generally
consist of covering unlined pits with dirt and vegetation so that
they are less noticeable to the naked eye, and removing the debris
from pipeline spill visible from the road to a less visible spot
(usually just over the next hill).
Since 1995, the Texaco lawsuit-filed as Aguinda v. Texaco-has
bounced back and forth between the court of Judge Rakoff and the
Second District Court of Appeals. By 1996 Texaco had filed three
motions to dismiss the case on the basis of international comity,
indispensable parties, and forum non conveniens. In November 1996
Judge Rakoff agreed to dismiss the case on the basis of these
principles, but in October 1998 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit court reversed Judge Rakoff's decision. In
late November 1999, Rakoff dismissed the case for a second time,
pointing to the inconsistency of the Ecuadorian government's stance
toward the case: the presidency of Sixto Duran Ballen had signed
an agreement with Texaco in 1998, relinquishing further claims
against the company. This position was refuted by subsequent presidencies
and the Ecuadorian government has since come out in support of
the lawsuit. In early December 1999 the U.S. Second Circuit Court
of Appeals voted unanimously to send the case back to Judge Rakoff,
claiming that he did not have sufficient reason for dismissal.
There are two aspects of this lawsuit that-if the case is
successful-could set a new precedence for the monitoring and control
of multinational corporations activities overseas. The Alien Tort
Claims Act (ACTA) and the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
work in direct contradiction of each other; the former allows
U.S. agents to be tried in U.S. courts for torts committed overseas
against foreign bodies, while the latter permits U.S. corporations
to require that lawsuits filed against them by foreign agents
be tried in the courts of the host country. The claim is that
a U.S. forum is "inconvenient" and that, since the torts
were committed in the host country, the claim should be tried
there. The real motivation in having lawsuits filed against them
tried overseas is that often times, as in the case of Ecuador,
the host country's court system is not sufficient to try mass
toxic tort suits, nor are the environmental laws stringent enough
to allow success of the cases.
CTA, enacted by Congress in 1789, allows foreign citizens
to bring either U. S. citizens, foreigners and-if this case is
successful-corporations to justice in U.S. courts, and to seek
remedy for wrongful conduct "committed in violation of the
law of nations." The Alien Tort Claims Act was rarely used
until 1980, when the case of Filartiga vs. Pena-lrala-in which
the Paraguayan death squad member Americo Pena-Irala was prosecuted
for the torture and murder of 17-year-old Joelito Filartiga in
1976-was won on the principles of ATCA. Since then, it has been
used successfully in a number of lawsuits: a Bosnian-Serb leader
accused of rape, genocide and forced prostitution; a former Guatemalan
army general and defense minister accused of torture; a former
Ethiopian military official accused of torture; a former Argentinian
general accused of kidnapping and torturing many Argentinian civilians;
and the Los Angeles Police Department for the false arrest and
imprisonment of a Mexican couple. The Alien Tort Claims Act has,
therefore, been used primarily to prosecute individuals for human
rights abuses committed abroad.
More recently, however, ATCA has been used to bring multinational
corporations to court for human rights violations. This is what
happened when the New York-based human rights organization, the
Center for Constitutional Rights, filed a class action lawsuit
on behalf of the Burmese government in exile and farmers of the
Tenasserim region of Burma against Unocal, Total, and two Burmese
government institutions, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) and the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) in October
1996 in a Los Angeles court. The defendants were accused of participating
in the relocation of entire villages, forced labor, rape, and
murder to build a natural gas pipeline from the Yadana natural
gas field off the coast of Burma through the Tenasserim region
to the border of Thailand. By April 1997 the LA court had reached
the initial ruling that although the Burmese government institutions
of SLORC and MOGE were able to maintain sovereign immunity under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, the remaining defendants of
Unocal and Total Corporations could still be held under court
jurisdiction based on the ATCA. This appears to be the first time
ACTA has been successfully applied to a U.S. multinational corporation
for its overseas operations. The decision extended the scope of
earlier Filartiga decision from private individuals to transnational
corporations, while at the same time suggesting that multinational
commercial enterprises could be held accountable for the activities
of partners, including foreign or host governments. As William
Aceves in the March 25, 1997 edition of The American Journal of
International Law notes, "Until recently, efforts to address
the issue of corporate responsibility (and liability) with respect
to human rights have met with limited success Prior cases brought
against multinational corporations for international law violations
have had mixed results. In contrast, Doe v. Unocal is perhaps
the first case to recognize the possibility of corporate liability
for human rights violations arising out of corporate activity
abroad."
The additional aspect of this case lies in the principle of
forum non conveniens. A federal common law doctrine, the central
purpose of forum non conveniens is to ensure than a judicial form
is convenient for both parties, and that an adequate alternative
forum exists prior to dismissal of the case. It has been amply
documented (see, e.g., "Texaco on Trial" by Eyal Press,
The Nation May 11, 1999) and it is well-known that Ecuadorian
Courts do not provide an adequate alternative forum.
Perhaps the most famous recent case in which forum non conveniens
has been successfully applied by a U.S. corporation in order to
escape from the consequences of its actions was in the Bhopal
disaster of 1982. Following the December Union Carbide leakage
of tons of poisonous gas into the environment and the immediate
deaths of over 2,000 residents, thousands of Bhopal residents
filed suits in U.S. courts with the help of U.S. Iawyers. These
suits were then consolidated into a single mass toxic tort lawsuit
that was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York. The U.S. District Court dismissed the case on the
basis of forum non conveniens and sent it back to India, maintaining
that victims could seek remedy through the Indian court system.
To this day, most of the Bhopal victims have yet to be compensated.
In 1989, the Indian government negotiated a $470 million settlement
with Union Carbide, but that money continues to sit in the bank
allowing the Indian government to collect interest. Of the 615,000
special claims cases, less than 10,000 have been decided, with
the average compensation being $3,500.00-even for death. Medical
facilities are crowded and inadequate, and the death toll attributed
to gas-related illnesses continues to climb and is currently estimated
to be between 10,000 and 15,000.
A key element of Union Carbide's forum non conveniens dismissal
lay in their claim that since the accident took place in India,
the most convenient forum for trial was in India. They also claimed
that Union Carbide plant was run by' Indians, and threatened that
if court were to be held in the United States, more than 100,000
plaintiffs would have to be flown to the States for testimony.
The claim that the plant resided in India, that most workers were
Indian, obscured the fact that it was the Danbury-based Union
Carbide who had a majority ownership (50.9 percent) and effective
control over its Indian affiliate, Union Carbide India Ltd., as
U.S. owned corporations always do over there less developed partners.
Ironically, Union Carbide stocks rose shortly after the disaster.
As this case demonstrates, the application of forum non conveniens
in a narrow, technical sense has functioned largely to protect
multinational corporations from foreign plaintiffs, and "as
a barrier to holding U.S. multinational corporations accountable
for their environmentally destructive behavior abroad" as
Brooke Clagette in a 1996 edition of Tulane Environmental Law
Journal puts it. In the absence of internationally agreed on environmental
protection measures, the U.S. court system could, however, make
MNCs more accountable for their many egregious actions by allowing
these private injury and mass toxic tort lawsuits to be tried
in U. S. courts. This would require that U.S. federal courts to
take the Alien Tort Statute-and environmental and human rights
abuses-more seriously.
To do so, the U.S. judicial system-and the north American
population in general-must become cognizant of the fact that many
populations in the world, indigenous or otherwise, live in a much
closer relationship with their natural environment and often without
adequate laws or national infrastructure to protect the safety
of both the environment and its peoples. As in the case of Texaco's
activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon and countless similar situations,
rampant environmental racism has been practiced instead. In these
cases, violations of environmental rights should be interpreted
as violations of human rights for indigenous communities and other
residents of these contaminated areas. Unlike environmental laws,
human rights have a strong basis in international law and violations
of human rights should be seen as violations of the law of nations,
as Hari Osofsky (Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Summer 1997)
has argued. Isn't the introduction of cancer into a population
where it was previously unheard of a human rights violation?
In one tiny community alone next to the Napo River and centrally
located next to many oil wells and contamination sites, more than
40 men have died cancer and the majority of their widows suffer
from uterine cancer. I think it's safe to surmise that they would
certainly claim that Texaco Corporation has violated their human
rights.
Suzanne Simon is an anthropology PhD at the New School in
New York. This article is based on her dissertation research.
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