Bosnia: Model for a New Colonialism?
by Paul D'Amato
International Socialist Review
Issue 8, Summer 1999
Since the start of NATO's air war against
Yugoslavia, various Western officials have spoken openly of turning
Kosovo into a military protectorate along the lines of Bosnia.
Clinton has called the NATO/UN operation in Bosnia a model for
what should take place in Kosovo: "What we did in Bosnia
was functional." Clinton is not alone. "[T]he only viable
course is to use the Bosnian precedent and establish a NATO protectorate
in Kosovo," wrote the London Observer on March 28. No one
should have illusions in what such an arrangement would mean.
In the earlier part of this century, the biggest imperialist powers
established protectorates in a number of countries. They asserted
their right as "civilized" nations to rule over the
local peoples until they were deemed capable of governing themselves.
"After this new war it must be clear
that there is no military exit strategy from this region,"
said UN Kosovo mediator Carl Bildt. "For NATO, the Balkans
will now become the new central front, and an international military
presence to guarantee peace there must be seen in the coming decades
as something as natural as it was for NATO to have troops in divided
Germany during the Cold War years."1 Bildt ought to know
what he's talking about: he served as former UN High Representative
in charge of running the Bosnian protectorate.
The Bosnian protectorate stemmed from
the November 1995 Dayton Accords, completed at Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, which ended the Bosnian civil
war. The agreement between the major powers and representatives
of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia placed Bosnia under the control
of a NATO military force and various civilian institutions. An
alphabet soup of foreign agencies-from the UN, to the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)-took over Bosnia's day-to-day affairs. Four
years later, international agencies show no signs of leaving Bosnia
to its people. As the UN and NATO gear up for another similar
operation in Kosovo, it's worth reviewing their record in Bosnia.
A partition by any other name
Dayton established a Bosnia that is united
on paper, but divided in practice. The agreement states that Bosnia
is a single country, but divided into two "entities":
the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim-Croat Federation. The
two are divided by what is known as the interethnic boundary.
In reality, the nationalist politicians that dominate each area-former
war leaders and profiteers-want little to do with each other.
The Muslim-Croat Federation-a shotgun wedding imposed by Washington-is
a fiction. The Croat-controlled areas operate independently, using
the Croatian currency, and are all but officially annexed to Croatia.
Although Dayton calls for a joint Croat-Muslim military, the Croat
and Muslim forces operate separately. They come together only
to receive military training under a U.S.-sponsored program run
by retired U.S. military personnel.
From the start, Dayton institutionalized
ethnic division, creating a de facto partition of the region.
Voters for the three-member presidency, for example, are not allowed
to vote for anyone outside their community. Bosniaks (as Muslims
are now called) are can only vote for one of the Bosniak presidential
candidates. This, of course, has reinforced the domination of
nationalist parties in each parastate. As a result, the same parties
and leaders who launched the 1992-95 civil war dominate each enclave.
The Party of Democratic Action (SDA), headed by Alija Izetbegovic,
rules the Muslim enclave. Gojko Susak of the Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ) rules the Croatian area. The Serbian RS is a battle
zone between indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic's Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS) and various breakaway factions encouraged
by U.S./NATO intervention. In short, behind the rhetoric, Dayton
is designed to police segregated communities.
Militarily, Bosnia is policed by 35,000
NATO troops under the name "Stabilization Force" (SFOR,
originally called IFOR). The executive and legislative power lies
in the hands of the UN's High Representative, a position currently
held by Spaniard Carlos Westendorp, whose powers have increased
over time in order to enforce the fiction of unity over a divided
territory. Westendorp sits atop a massive colonial-style bureaucracy:
In all, there are perhaps 10,000 foreign
nation-builders in Sarajevo alone; at least 40,000 others are
scattered across Bosnia, including 35,000 soldiers from around
the globe. A New Zealander sits as chief of the central bank.
An ex-cop from Los Angeles is deputy chief of Bosnia's international
police force. Mr. Klein, a French-born American, serves as deputy
in Sarajevo's Office of the High Representative, or OHR, the closest
thing Bosnia has to an executive branch.2
Employees of this massive foreign bureaucracy
account for a third of all jobs in Bosnia and a third of its gross
national product, according to the Soros Foundation's Sarajevo
The UN High Representative can remove
politicians from office, shut down media outlets and force through
legislation when the parties cannot agree. Westendorp exercised
his powers most recently by removing from office Nicholas Poplasen,
the newly elected president from the RS. Poplasen's support for
the absorption of the RS into Serbia placed him in Westendorp's
Westendorp takes his job as Bosnian dictator
very seriously. He once told a Bosnian periodical that if Bosnia's
elected officials cannot "agree about some decisions, for
example the passports, the license plates, the flagI will stop
this process of infinite discussions. In the future it will look
like this: I will give thema term to bring a certain decision,
that is to agree about some decision. If they do not, I will tell
them not to worry, that I will decide for them."3
The High Representative's power extends
even to the rewriting of Bosnian history. A year ago, Westendorp
announced that his office was dissatisfied with the textbooks
used in Bosnia because they were either "nationalistic,"
"Marxist" or too "anecdotal." He therefore
implemented a "Textbook Review Project" to remove "offensive
materials" from textbooks used in primary and secondary schools.
This action angered the local population and played into the nationalists'
hands. As David Chandler, the author of an excellent study of
the Bosnian protectorate, wrote in a recent op-ed piece:
The Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims
have all had their autonomy restricted, and their political parties
and media emasculated by international vetting and censorship.
They have seen their institutions overruled and undermined by
international edicts acted upon by the international community's
High Representative, who is empowered to draw up legislation and
to impose it against the will of all three ethnic constituencies.
The reaction against such high-handedness has inevitably strengthened
The colonial bureaucrats have failed to
create any viable institutions of governance over Bosnia as a
whole. On the contrary, the High Representative's powers have
expanded, and Bosnia's Dayton-implemented political institutions
have become more impotent. Dayton has papered over-and helped
to deepen-the de facto division of Bosnia. By denying the peoples
of Bosnia any means to change their circumstances, the "international
community" has strengthened the nationalists' hold over each
enclave. Nationalists exploit the peoples' natural hostility to
the occupying power, turning that sentiment to their advantage.
The saga of Biljana Plavsic
If there is any doubt about this assessment,
a look at the liaison between the U.S. and former RS president
Biljana Plavsic makes it clear. In early 1997, Plavsic met with
U.S. diplomats and announced that she was breaking with SDS leader
Radovan Karadzic and forming a new political party. With Western
backing, she initiated a political campaign attacking corruption.
Serb nationalists loyal to Plavsic, centered in the Bosnian city
of Banja Luka, feuded with nationalists around Karadzic, based
in Pale. In 1997, SFOR troops, shoring up Plavsic's power base,
disarmed Banja Luka police loyal to Karadzic. U.S. troops tried
to take over the police station in the strategic town of Brcko
in order to hand it to officers loyal to Plavsic. They also intervened
to close down media outlets that supported Karadzic.
Portrayed in the U.S. press as a "moderate"
alternative to Karadzic, Plavsic is anything but. A violent nationalist
committed to an ethnically "pure" Serbian state, Plavsic
has been a member of the ultranationalist SDS from its inception.
Nicknamed by fellow Serbs "the Iron Lady" (after former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher), she was a loyal lieutenant
of Radovan Karadzic during the war.
Plavsic is an outspoken supporter of ethnic
cleansing, saying in 1993, "I would prefer completely to
cleanse eastern Bosnia of Muslims. When I say cleanse, I don't
want anyone to take me literally and think I mean ethnic cleansing.
But they've attached this label 'ethnic cleansing' to a perfectly
natural phenomenon and characterized it as some kind of war crime."
Her favorite wartime hero is Zeljko Raznjatovic-or "Arkan"-whose
paramilitary Tigers participated in the most horrific acts of
ethnic cleansing in the entire war. She once embraced this notorious
butcher, calling him "a Serb hero."
Plavsic is also an extreme racist, referring
to Muslims as "genetically deformed material"-a claim
her professional training as a biologist makes all the more outrageous.
"We are disturbed," she explained in 1994, "by
the fact that the number of marriages between Serbs and Muslims
has increasedbecause mixed marriages lead to an exchange of genes
between ethnic groups, and thus to a degeneration of Serb nationhood."
She shows an equal contempt for the mass of Serbian people, once
musing, "There are twelve million of us [Serbs], and even
if six million perish the other six million will live decently."5
By manipulating RS politics on behalf
of one right-wing nationalist against another, the U.S. showed
it cares nothing about promoting interethnic harmony. Instead,
it wants to find pliant politicians whom they hope will be loyal
Western puppets. As Mohammed Filipovic, a philosophy teacher at
Sarajevo University wrote:
Plavsic is politically no different from
Karadzic. Perhaps she was not the author of the criminal policy,
but she gave it her heartfelt support. She has not rebelled against
a policy that, for instance, excludes Muslims and Croats from
Western policy continues to prop up Tudjman,
[Muslim president] Izetbegovic and [Croatian president] Zubak,
continues to prop up the Pale crowd, continues to prop up Milosevic-all
these people are its hostages. Some U.S. ambassador can always
come and lecture Tudjman, while still keeping him in power. They
will threaten Izetbegovic, but they will keep him in power. After
all, it is much easier to manipulate a person who depends upon
you and whose dark secrets are known to you. For this reason I
think the West's policy in our region is not correct. It is systematically
designed to protect the interests of the present ruling structure.6
In the end, U.S. meddling strengthened
the very forces it set out to undermine. U.S. officials promised
to hand over some economic aid to the RS on condition of Plavsic's
success. This plan has completely backfired. In September of last
year, Plavsic was voted out as RS president in favor of Nicholas
Poplasen, a member of the neo-fascist Serbian Radical Party. Plavsic's
opposition was able, with complete justification, to taint her
as a puppet for having called upon NATO in her struggle against
Karadzic. In March 1999, Westendorp fired Poplasen.
But this doesn't mean that ordinary Serbs
are fond of Plavsic's opponents. "No one likes these politicians
in [the city of Pale, where Karadzic has his power base],"
one farmer told the New York Times. "We know they are all
getting rich. But this does not mean we will support Plavsic selling
us out to the West. We know who our real enemies are. Besides,
do you think she just found out about this corruption? She wants
power just like the rest of them."
Balance of terror
U.S. post-Dayton military policy toward
Bosnia also assumes that Bosnia's ethnic groups will remain in
separate zones, prepared to fight each other at any time. The
U.S. committed itself to a "train and equip" program
designed to arm and train the army of the Muslim-Croat Federation.
The program, worth $400 million by the end of 1997, provides military
training and hardware to the Croatian army. Military Resources,
Inc., the same private company of retired U.S. military officers
that trained the Croatian army, oversees the program. The aim
seems to be similar to that which prompts the U.S. government
to arm rivals Greece and Turkey to the teeth: to create a balance
The Serb republic of only 1.2 million
people is economically the weakest entity in the federation. The
cost of resuming military activities would push it even further
backwards. Knowing this, Croat nationalists are content to let
things stand because "although in theory absorbed into the
federation, [they] still maintain de facto independence in most
of Herzegovina and benefit from a secure economic position due
to their control of major trade routes to the Federation and to
their open border with Croatia."8
The Muslim nationalists, with the largest
military force-newly trained and equipped-may be the most likely
to resume efforts to seize more land by force. At the end of 1997,
the Bosnian Muslim media carried a discussion of just such a scenario.
It debated whether, in the event of a NATO departure, the Federation's
increased military capacity might allow it to relaunch a territorial
offensive against the RS. According to one Sarajevo monthly:
With the blessing of Alija Izetbegovic,
a few months ago a multidisciplinary team of trusted people has
begun workwith the task to analyze as many as possible conditions
which would occur with the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Considered
as an optimal solution in the given international circumstances
is a state that would cover at least double the area of the territory
which is now under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.9
Though the article states that Izetbegovic
and the SDA leadership believe that this new carve-up could be
reached through negotiation, it is hard to see the possibility
of such an outcome without a new war.
The Dayton Accords provided that refugees
would be allowed to return to their original homes. But of the
2.3 million refugees and displaced persons, only 358,000 (16 percent)
had returned home by the end of 1997. The vast majority of these
were relocated to areas where they are part of the ethnic majority,
not to their original homes. Only 45,500 had returned to areas
in which they formed a minority. The Croat population has reached
only a little over of half of its prewar level. Even after Dayton
was signed, the transfer of minority populations continued. Thousands
of Croats and Muslims have been intimidated into leaving their
homes in the RS, and by the end of 1997, only 2,200 Muslims and
Croats had returned. In Sarajevo more than 60,000 Serbs left the
city, citing intimidation, threats and violence.
In dozens of cases, Muslim, Serb and Croat
refugees attempting to return to areas designated as belonging
to another group have been met with rent-a-mob hostility and violence
orchestrated by local police and officials. In Dvrar, for example,
returning Serbs were met with rioting and burning of homes in
April 1998 by the Croatian nationalists who now dominate the city.
Mostar, once a multiethnic center of Muslims, Serbs and Croats,
is now a city divided by the Neretva River, with Muslims living
on one side and Croats on the other side. Croats refuse to buy
beer manufactured in the Muslim western part of the city.
"Ethnic reengineering" has converted
Sarajevo into a city where 70 percent of the population is of
rural origin. Hundreds of thousands of people live elsewhere than
their place of origin. This has created a political environment
where many people back the main nationalist parties as a guarantee
that they will not be removed from apartments and houses that
once belonged to others. To quote Filipovic again:
[R]uralization isa basic instrument of
rule. The ruling party in practice relies upon these people, they
are its hostages, and this unfortunately has long-term consequences
for political relations in this countryBut in Sarajevo public
and especially political life is moribund, because most of the
city's inhabitants today are people from elsewhere who are totally
dependent on the military power that allows them to stay. They
live in other people's apartments and the whole business is illegalThe
government attempts to deny the rights of the apartments' real
owners; it attempts precisely to legalize the vast usurpation
that has taken place in this domain.10
Each nationalist ruling party discourages
refugees of "their" ethnicity to return to their original,
prewar homes, unless to do so would help strengthen the control
of that party by preventing the "wrong" refugees from
returning. The Muslim-dominated SDA has taken advantage of the
influx of Muslims (many of them forced out of Germany) to relocate
them in Sarajevo, even if they do not come from that city.
In practice, SFOR has done little to aid
refugees, despite its mandate to assist refugees to return to
their original homes. One year after Dayton was signed, a group
of Muslim families from the Serb-controlled Prijedor region informed
international officials of the location of their original homes.
The officials then gave the list to the Serb police in Prijedor.
Within 48 hours, the Muslims' homes had been destroyed.
Intimidation and insecurity are not the
only reasons that many refugees have not returned. In fact, many
young people in search of better economic prospects have left
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and hundreds of thousands of refugees have
opted not to return.
Dayton was supposed to create an economic
environment conducive to reconstruction, economic growth and the
return of refugees. The new constitution agreed to at Dayton hands
over the reigns of economic policy to the U.S.-controlled IMF
and other financial institutions controlled by the biggest powers.
The IMF appoints the governor of the Bosnian central bank. The
governor cannot be a Bosnian. The London-based European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) supervises all operations
of public sector enterprises, as well as public sector restructuring,
Over $5 billion in funds earmarked for
reconstruction have gone into Bosnia. But the economy has yet
to recover even to its prewar level. More than half of the housing
stock was destroyed during the war, and much of it has yet to
be rebuilt. Even the OHR has conceded that "possibilities
for people to return to their homes of origin are limited not
only by their concerns about the security environment, but also
by the lack of available housing, employment and social services,
as well as the level of infrastructure and communications."11
The Muslim-Croat Federation has experienced
some growth, but it has yet to reach 1990 levels. The RS has received
less than 5 percent of the reconstruction aid. Its economy has
now shrunk to less than a quarter of its prewar level. Official
unemployment stands at about 60 percent in Bosnia.12 In Banja
Luka, the RS's largest town, only 30,000 out of a population of
250,000 had jobs two years into Dayton.13 In the past two years,
total investments in Bosnia-Herzegovina equal only 4.7 percent
of total donor aid. Without foreign aid, growth rates in Bosnia-Herzegovina
would be about negative 1 percent.14 The reality is that each
statelet in Bosnia is not economically viable. Yet national divisions
prevent the interregional economic cooperation to rebuild trade
relations both inside and outside Bosnia.
At the top, the High Representative and
his supporting institutions-the IMF, the World Bank, the OSCE-control
the Bosnian economy. Underneath this, the same shady figures,
profiteers and murderers who rose to the surface during the war
continue to operate on the local level. As one Bosnian journalist
wrote several months after the start of Dayton:
According to the currently accepted standards
of Serbdom or Croatdom, the status of a prestige Serb or Croat
is given to former criminals, persons from the bottom of the pit,
marginal characters and primitives which have affirmed themselves
in this war as murderers and pillagers. One of those, promoted
through the media as the hero of the home war, killed Tudjman's
minister of tourism, paid with the sum of 15 thousand deutsche
The guy would, probably, for a larger
sum, accept to shoot Tudjman himself. Bosnia is absolutely abundant
with these types. During the war, they have represented the striking
fists of the militarized national parties, enriching themselves
on the way through pillaging and contraband. Today, these are
the local power brokers, who do not allow anybody to pass through,
the leaders of the gangs which practically control the entire
public life in their area.15
Dayton doesn't challenge these people-it
gives them a space to flourish. The leaders of the nationalist
parties have themselves pocketed large amounts of the aid money,
while ordinary workers go homeless and jobless by the thousands.
The heads of the main political parties are often heads of major
state-owned enterprises. For example, the vice president of the
Muslim SDA runs the main utility company in the Federation.
But the alternative touted by the international
managers-privatization-can hardly be seen as a solution. A quick
look at Russia should quickly dispel that illusion. Privatization
would mean the closing down of a number of companies and an even
greater increase in unemployment. Moreover, it would do little
to change the relations of ownership and control. As one report,
entirely supportive of NATO's occupation of Bosnia, noted:
In some ways the situation is especially
bleak in Bosnia, as the breakdown in the rule of law during the
war led to the criminalization of a substantial part of economic
activity. Numerous politically connected business figures, in
some cases simply Mafia gangs, have already made fortunes out
of the wartime opportunities for smuggling, arms trading, etc.
It is just such people, with their political and business connections
who are likely to be best placed to take advantage of the privatization
process to gain control of those assets which still offer the
prospect of profit.16
It is these forces that NATO guns, IMF
money and UN political maneuvering are bolstering.
In 1995, Western officials touted the
Dayton Accords in terms strikingly similar to those they use to
describe their plans in Kosovo today. The Dayton agreement would,
they promised, help to reunite the fractured country, build an
environment in which displaced refugees could return to their
original homes and create the basis for real democracy in Bosnia.
In reality, the Bosnian "model" represents nothing more
than a NATO-policed cease-fire. The NATO/UN occupation of Bosnia
has actually reinforced nationalist divisions, not healed them.
In turn, Bosnia has then been used to justify the maintenance
of indefinite NATO control for almost four years (and counting)
beyond its original one-year mandate.
Under the guise of promoting peace, growth
and democracy, NATO allies have ensured future war, permanent
economic crisis and have transformed local political institutions
into rubber stamps for the decisions of the UN High Representative.
Despite the rhetoric, the accords have served to cement ethnic
separation. The purpose of Dayton was never to help the peoples
of Bosnia find a way out of the horror, but merely to put a large
lid over the conflict. Underneath that lid, the seething tensions
continue to bubble.
The Bosnian protectorate needs to be seen
in its larger context, as part of the search to establish a new
role for NATO through the establishment of a new military front
across the Balkans that requires constant NATO preparedness-under
U.S. leadership. Therefore, it is no accident that U.S. and Western
intervention has exacerbated and encouraged nationalist rivalry.
Ironically, though, their intervention, designed to create "stability"
in the region, actually creates the conditions for deeper crisis
and bloodier conflicts in the future.
In Bosnia today, there is exhaustion from
war, hatred for the politicians that have profited from the bloodshed
and ethnic cleansing, and despair at economic ruin and mass unemployment.
But this is likely to express itself among ordinary workers as
a disgust with politics, especially without a political alternative.
The result is that the nationalists continue to dominate-even
though, for example, in the fight between Pale (Karadzic) and
Banja Luka (Plavsic), the Karadzic forces were only able to muster
1,000 people for a rally that was meant to demonstrate their popularity
in the battle to oust Plavsic as president of the Republic. But
the nationalists' apparent weakness doesn't translate into an
alternative. In fact, the Dayton Accords and the UN High Representative's
manipulation of RS politics reinforces the nationalists' position.
National division is not inevitable. Exhaustion
and indifference can give way to bitterness and anger as it becomes
clear what a disaster clinging to your "own" tiny national
patch under the Mafia-like protection of national butchers and
profiteers is. As one British socialist has pointed out:
A war like that in former Yugoslavia
necessarily gives rise to vague desires for peace among vast numbers
of people and to antigovernment demonstrations. If these feelings
can be fused with the struggles of workers against the cost of
war and the effects of the economic crisis, then the wave of nationalism
can be beaten back.17
During the first Balkan Wars of 1910-12,
the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky argued that a Balkan region
divided into a patchwork of tiny national states, each arming
against the other under the banner of its own national interests,
was a dead end. Each would be economically unviable, while the
imperialist powers played one off the other in an endless drawing
and redrawing of messy borders. The only alternative, he argued,
could be found in a movement by the region's peoples that rejected
imperialist intervention and united in a Balkan Federation of
equal republics. Today, this remains the only solution.
HOW THE U.S. USED ETHNIC CLEANSING TO
SECURE THE DAYTON ACCORDS
The Dayton Accords represented one of
a series of Western interventions in the former Yugoslavia. Germany's
1991 recognition of Croatia's independence, and later, the U.S.
and Germany's recognition of Bosnian independence, accelerated
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Western meddling guaranteed
that Bosnia-with an ethnically mixed population of Serbs (31 percent),
Muslims (44 percent) and Croatians (17 percent) at the time-would
descend into fratricidal warfare. Neither Croats nor Serbs were
willing to live in a Bosnian state dominated by Muslim leaders,
and both Bosnian Muslims and Croats feared being part of a rump
Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia.
In the three-way ethnic war that followed,
Western intervention again reinforced ethnic division. First,
they proposed various peace plans-to be negotiated with the warring
nationalist butchers-that assumed some kind of ethnic partition
of the country. Each time the U.S. or European powers put a proposal
on the table, the warring sides actually stepped up their efforts
to change the map of Bosnia. They sought to create "facts
on the ground" to secure more ethnically pure territory for
their side. Croat and Serb nationalists each looked to carve a
piece of Bosnia to annex to their respective "home"
countries, and Bosnian Muslim nationalists looked to U.S. sponsorship
in their drive to expand their area of control over the country.
The road to the Dayton Accords reveals
this dynamic. The peace agreement was signed only after Croatia,
supported by the U.S. and having its military forces trained by
retired U.S. military officers, drove 200,000 Serbs from their
homes in the Serb Krajina area of Croatia. This ethnic cleansing
campaign, called Operation Storm, combined with a massive NATO
bombardment of Bosnian Serb territory and a successful Croat-Muslim
offensive that retook 20 percent of Bosnia from Serb forces, brought
Serbia to the negotiating table.
Western officials justified this policy
on the grounds that only ethnic cleansing by Serbs counts as ethnic
cleansing. U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, said of
Operation Storm that it did not constitute ethnic cleansing because
"ethnic cleansing is the specialty of the Serbs."1
Then-European Union mediator in the former
Yugoslavia, Carl Bildt, made a revealing statement after Operation
If we accept that it is all right for
Tudjman to cleanse Croatia of its Serbs, then how on earth can
we object if Yeltsin cleanses Chechnya or if one day Milosevic
sends his army to clean out the Albanians from Kosovo?2
Croatia's leader Franjo Tudjman-a Holocaust
revisionist and anti-Serb racist-was the biggest winner in the
war. Before war broke out, Bosnian Serbs outnumbered Bosnian Croats
two-to-one, and the Serbs possessed the best military hardware.
But by 1995, U.S. intervention on the side of Croatia had produced
spectacular success for Tudjman. He had gained international recognition
for Croatia and military training and backing from the U.S. and
Germany, had secured the vast bulk of territory in Croatia by
cleansing the Krajina of Serbs, and had annexed-in fact but not
in name-20 percent of Bosnia to Croatia.
Milosevic, on the other hand, was forced
to sell out the Krajina Serbs (to whom he had long promised a
"Greater Serbia") and to rein in the Bosnian Serbs in
return for international recognition and the lifting of sanctions
against Serbia. In short, the Dayton agreement was achieved through
U.S. support for massive ethnic cleansing-of Serbs.