Angola After Savimbi
by William Minter
The Nation magazine, April 29, 2002
The battlefield death on February 22 of Jonas Savimbi marked
the end of an era. With undiluted ambition, consistent ruthlessness
and extraordinary skill in manipulating both friend and foe, he
repeatedly dashed Angolan hopes for peace. Today almost 4 million
Angolans have been displaced by war, and although Angola is potentially
one of the richest countries in Africa, infant mortality is the
second highest in the world. The United States must now help Angolans
rebuild. That means both paying our fair share of the bill for
reconstruction and insisting on transparency in the use of revenues
Angola gains from US oil companies.
The United States has a particular obligation because it intervened
decisively for war in the key period just before Angola's independence
in 1975. As has been long known to specialists and conclusively
documented in a new book by historian Piero Gleijeses, US covert
military action in Angola preceded rather than followed the arrival
of Cuban troops. In the 1980s the United States again joined South
Africa to build up Savimbi's war machine.
Savimbi's death removed the single greatest obstacle to peace.
Three weeks later, the Angolan government declared a unilateral
halt to offensive military actions, and a formal ceasefire was
agreed to in early April. But the war has left generalized insecurity
in the countryside that may well continue. The decades of conflict
have also entrenched a climate of distrust throughout Angolan
society.
These results come in part from Savimbi's military strategy,
which was to make Angola ungovernable. His forces systematically
targeted civilians and cut the economic links between city and
countryside. He also eliminated internal rivals he regarded as
too open to peace. But Savimbi did not create the cleavages in
Angolan society that he exploited. There is a profound gap between
those who profit from Angola's links to the world economy and
those with little chance to do so. This division, more accurately
described as regional and structural than ethnic in character,
dates back to the colonial era. Since independence, Angola's oil
wealth combined with war has further reinforced inequality.
Paradoxically, the Angolan government has served as an unwitting
ally of Savimbi. Relying on income from oil to feed the cities
and to buy arms while leaving the interior to neglect, Luanda
sealed the success of Savimbi's strategy of dividing city from
countryside. At the same time, Savimbi's intransigence raised
the credibility of the Luanda government. In the 1992 election
campaign, for example, the ruling party won support from many
Angolans who recoiled from Savimbi's threats more than they resented
the government's failures.
The Angolan government has taken the first step with its unilateral
truce, but more fundamental changes are also essential. Speaking
in Washington on February 27 after he and Angolan President Eduardo
dos Santos met George W. Bush, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano
listed some lessons learned from Mozambique's experience. He stressed
the need for a comprehensive peace-building process, including
greater openness to dissent and to the connection between social
and economic development and peace. President dos Santos's peace
plan acknowledges these points; however, acceptance of the need
for voices from civil society and independent media has been slow
and inconsistent.
The hardest tests will be outside Luanda. Delivering material
benefits to these long-neglected areas will be critical, but humanitarian
operations are stretched to the limit and badly underfunded. Here
Angola's international partners-governments, multilateral agencies,
oil companies and nongovernmental organizations-have a role to
play. The United States and others should quickly provide the
remainder of the UN consolidated appeal for Angola for 2002, which
as of mid-March had received only 10 percent of the $233 million
required. They should also join Angolan civil society in insisting
that the government commit its resources to schools, clinics and
rebuilding the infrastructure, as well as to immediate humanitarian
needs. Angola earns at least $3 billion each year from oil exports,
but as much as a third disappears into a complex web of transactions
among foreign companies and the Angolan elite.
It would be wrong to punish Angolans by holding up humanitarian
relief, but there are other ways to exert pressure. Currently,
the World Bank and the IMF are conducting a review of the oil
sector with the stated goal of promoting transparency and accountability
of oil revenues; this study should be concluded rapidly and made
public both in Washington and Luanda. The issue of where the money
goes and how to use it must be debated openly. Angolans will quickly
be able to see whether the dividends of peace begin to flow. If
that happens, this time peace will have a chance.
William Minter, the senior research fellow at Africa Action
in Washington, DC, is the author of several books on Angola and
Mozambique, including Apartheid's Contras (Zed) and Operation
Timber: Pages From the Savimbi Dossier (Africa World).
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