The Brightest Are Not Always the
Best
by Frank Rich
New York Times, December 6, 2008
In 1992, David Halberstam wrote a new
introduction for the 20th-anniversary edition of "The Best
and the Brightest," his classic history of the hubristic
J.F.K. team that would ultimately mire America in Vietnam. He
noted that the book's title had entered the language, but not
quite as he had hoped. "It is often misused," he wrote,
"failing to carry the tone or irony that the original intended."
Halberstam died last year, but were he
still around, I suspect he would be speaking up, loudly, right
about now. As Barack Obama rolls out his cabinet, "the best
and the brightest" has become the accolade du jour from Democrats
(Senator Claire McCaskill of Missouri), Republicans (Senator John
Warner of Virginia) and the press (George Stephanopoulos). Few
seem to recall that the phrase, in its original coinage, was meant
to strike a sardonic, not a flattering, note. Perhaps even Doris
Kearns Goodwin would agree that it's time for Beltway reading
groups to move on from "Team of Rivals" to Halberstam.
The stewards of the Vietnam fiasco had
pedigrees uncannily reminiscent of some major Obama appointees.
McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, was, as Halberstam
put it, "a legend in his time at Groton, the brightest boy
at Yale, dean of Harvard College at a precocious age." His
deputy, Walt Rostow, "had always been a prodigy, always the
youngest to do something," whether at Yale, M.I.T. or as
a Rhodes scholar. Robert McNamara, the defense secretary, was
the youngest and highest paid Harvard Business School assistant
professor of his era before making a mark as a World War II Army
analyst, and, at age 44, becoming the first non-Ford to lead the
Ford Motor Company.
The rest is history that would destroy
the presidency of Lyndon Johnson and inflict grave national wounds
that only now are healing.
In the Obama transition, our Clinton-fixated
political culture has been hyperventilating mainly over the national
security team, but that's not what gives me pause. Hillary Clinton
and Robert Gates were both wrong about the Iraq invasion, but
neither of them were architects of that folly and both are far
better known in recent years for consensus-building caution (at
times to a fault in Clinton's case) than arrogance. Those who
fear an outbreak of Clintonian drama in the administration keep
warning that Obama has hired a secretary of state he can't fire.
But why not take him at his word when he says "the buck will
stop with me"? If Truman could cashier Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
then surely Obama could fire a brand-name cabinet member in the
(unlikely) event she goes rogue.
No, it's the economic team that evokes
trace memories of our dark best-and-brightest past. Lawrence Summers,
the new top economic adviser, was the youngest tenured professor
in Harvard's history and is famous for never letting anyone forget
his brilliance. It was his highhanded disregard for his own colleagues,
not his impolitic remarks about gender and science, that forced
him out of Harvard's presidency in four years. Timothy Geithner,
the nominee for Treasury secretary, is the boy wonder president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He comes with none of
Summers's personal baggage, but his sparkling résumé
is missing one crucial asset: experience outside academe and government,
in the real world of business and finance. Postgraduate finishing
school at Kissinger & Associates doesn't count.
Summers and Geithner are both protégés
of another master of the universe, Robert Rubin. His appearance
in the photo op for Obama-transition economic advisers three days
after the election was, to put it mildly, disconcerting. Ever
since his acclaimed service as Treasury secretary in the Clinton
administration, Rubin has labored as a senior adviser and director
at Citigroup, now being bailed out by taxpayers to the potential
tune of some $300 billion. Somehow the all-seeing Rubin didn't
notice the toxic mortgage-derivatives on Citi's books until it
was too late. The Citi may never sleep, but he snored.
Geithner was no less tardy in discovering
the reckless, wholesale gambling that went on in Wall Street's
big casinos, all of which cratered while at least nominally under
his regulatory watch. That a Hydra-headed banking monster like
Citigroup came to be in the first place was a direct byproduct
of deregulation championed by Rubin and Summers in Clinton's Treasury
Department (where Geithner also served). The New Deal reform they
helped repeal, the Glass-Steagall Act, had been enacted in 1933
in part because Citigroup's ancestor, National City Bank, had
imploded after repackaging bad loans as toxic securities in the
go-go 1920s.
Well, nobody's perfect. Given that John
McCain's economic team was headlined by Carly Fiorina and Joe
the Plumber, the country would be dodging a fiscal bullet even
if Obama had picked Suze Orman. But I keep wondering why the honeymoon
hagiography about the best and the brightest has been so over
the top. Washington's cheerleading for our new New Frontier cabinet
superstars has seldom been interrupted by tough questions about
Summers's Harvard career or Geithner's record at the Fed. For
that, it's best to turn to the business press: Andrew Ross Sorkin
at The New York Times, for one, has been relentless in trying
to ferret out Geithner's opaque role in the catastrophic decision
to let Lehman Brothers fail.
No doubt the Pavlovian ovations for the
Obama team are in part a reaction to our immediate political past.
After eight years of a presidency that valued cronyism over brains
(or even competence) and embraced an anti-intellectualism apotheosized
by Sarah Palin, it's a godsend to have a president who puts a
premium on merit. I also wonder if a press corps that underrated
Obama's political prowess for much of the campaign, demeaning
him as a professorial wuss next to the brawny Clinton and McCain,
is now overcompensating for that mistake. No one wants to miss
out a second time on triumphal history in the making.
This, too, is a replay of what happened
when Kennedy arrived, beating out the more seasoned Richard Nixon
and ending eight years of Eisenhower rule. "Rarely had a
new administration received such a sympathetic hearing at a personal
level from the more serious and respected journalists of the city,"
Halberstam wrote. "The good reporters of that era, those
who were well educated and who were enlightened themselves and
worked for enlightened organizations, liked the Kennedys and were
for the same things the Kennedys were for." They couldn't
imagine that "men who were said to be the ablest to serve
in government in this century" would turn out to be architects
of America's "worst tragedy since the Civil War."
Post-Iraq, we're unlikely to rush into
a new Vietnam. But we ignore the past's lessons at our peril.
In his 20th-anniversary reflections, Halberstam wrote that his
favorite passage in his book was the one where Johnson, after
his first Kennedy cabinet meeting, raved to his mentor, the speaker
of the House, Sam Rayburn, about all the president's brilliant
men. "You may be right, and they may be every bit as intelligent
as you say," Rayburn responded, "but I'd feel a whole
lot better about them if just one of them had run for sheriff
once."
Halberstam loved that story because it
underlined the weakness of the Kennedy team: "the difference
between intelligence and wisdom, between the abstract quickness
and verbal facility which the team exuded, and true wisdom, which
is the product of hard-won, often bitter experience." That
difference was clearly delineated in Vietnam, where American soldiers,
officials and reporters could see that the war was going badly
even as McNamara brusquely wielded charts and crunched numbers
to enforce his conviction that victory was assured.
In our current financial quagmire, there
have also been those who had the wisdom to sound alarms before
Rubin, Summers or Geithner did. Among them were not just economists
like Joseph Stiglitz and Nouriel Roubini but also Doris Dungey,
a 47-year-old financial blogger known as Tanta, who died of cancer
in Upper Marlboro, Md., last Sunday. As the Times obituary observed,
"her first post, in December 2006, took issue with an optimistic
Citigroup report that maintained that the mortgage industry would
'rationalize' in 2007, to the benefit of larger players like,
well, Citigroup." It was months before the others publicly
echoed her judgment.
For some of J.F.K.'s best and brightest,
Halberstam wrote, wisdom came "after Vietnam." We have
to hope that wisdom is coming to Summers and Geithner as they
struggle with our financial Tet. Clearly it has not come to Rubin.
Asked by The Times in April if he'd made any mistakes at Citigroup,
he sounded as self-deluded as McNamara in retirement.
"I honestly don't know," Rubin
answered. "In hindsight, there are a lot of things we'd do
differently. But in the context of the facts as I knew them and
my role, I'm inclined to think probably not." Since that
interview, 52,000 Citigroup employees have been laid off but not
Rubin, who remains remorseless, collecting a salary that has totaled
in excess of $115 million since 1999. You may be touched to hear
that he is voluntarily relinquishing his bonus this Christmas.
Rubin hasn't been seen in a transition
photo op since Nov. 7, and in the end Obama chose Paul Volcker
as chairman of his Economic Recovery Advisory Board. This was
a presidential decision not only bright but wise.
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