excerpts from the book
Uneasy Empire
Repression, Globalization,
and What We Can Do
by Greg Guma
Toward Freedom, 2003
p9
... John Negroponte, was ... appointed US Ambassador to the UN.
As one State Department official put it, "Giving him this
job is a way of telling the UN: 'We hate you."' Here was
a stalwart imperialist, a man who had proven repeatedly that he
was ready to act alone on behalf of US interests and lie about
it without blinking.
In the early 1970s, Negroponte had been
Kissinger's point man in Vietnam on the National Security Council,
a committed Cold Warrior who sometimes even thought his boss was
too soft in negotiating. As Ambassador to Honduras from 1981-85,
Negroponte had turned that country into a massive staging area
for the Contra war against Nicaragua's Sandinista government and
presided over an era of death squads and violent repression. When
questioned about it by Congress, he denied everything-the murderous
generals, political prisoners, and secret prisons and cemeteries.
That Negroponte was the Bush administration's
choice to represent the US at the UN spoke volumes about what
to expect-more jingoism, lies, confrontation, and a clumsy but
persistent effort to manipulate reality. One clear example of
the latter was the administration's position, dutifully parroted
as fact in most press reports, concerning a UN anti-racism conference
held in South Africa just two weeks before 9/11. The public was
told that Secretary of State Colin Powell and the US delegation
walked out as a protest in response to rhetoric directed against
Israel. But the real fear, insiders knew, was that staying meant
confronting US responsibility for slavery and, more pointedly,
demands for financial reparations.
p19
... systems of authority are widely known to abuse their powers.
As long ago as 1690 John Locke took note of the danger, as did
Alexander Hamilton in his defense of John Peter Zenger. Abuse
of official power has traditionally been viewed as an especially
serious evil indeed. As a result, the US social system generally
embraces the presumption of transparency, that in general the
people have a "right to know," and that a basic function
of the press is to check abuses of power. In fact, this "checking
function" is built into the First Amendment, and, except
in times of war, it has held sway for over a century. Nevertheless,
much important information never reaches the general public. Compounding
the problem, US leaders frequently work with a compliant legislative
branch to tighten access and negate the appropriate role of journalists.
During the 1980s, it was surprising, at
least occasionally, that the press did not make more of directives
on secrecy, a persistent nipping away at public access to documents,
or an executive branch rule that required all federal employees
with access to "sensitive" material to sign secrecy
agreements forcing them to submit any writing for pre-publication
review, even long after they left the government.
Taken together, such restrictions dramatically
reduced oversight of defense and foreign policy in the Reagan-Bush
era.
If the same secrecy rules had been in
effect in the 1970s, the Pentagon Papers, the secret US war in
Angola, and perhaps even some Watergate-era abuses might not have
been exposed. Robert Bernstein, president of Random House, called
Reagan era secrecy orders "clearly an attempt to keep still
more information from the American people...It can he up publication
of any book by a government official indefinitely." Compounding
the problem, in 1982 the US Supreme Court upheld the censors in
the case of Frank Snepp's Decent Interval, an account of the fall
of Saigon. In doing so, the high court essentially usurped the
law-making powers of Congress and went a long way toward enacting
a US version of the British Official Secrets Act. Snepp's book
was eventually published, but the Court also ruled that the government
should seize all the income that would have gone to Snepp and
gave the authorities the right to stop him from writing almost
anything else.
The Snepp case went further than penalizing
one CIA employee for breaking his contract. It sent the message
that any government worker in a relationship of trust with his
agency, whether or not a written agreement existed, could have
his right to speech challenged or rescinded. The Supreme Court,
with four Nixon appointees in the majority, also buttressed lower
court decisions involving the CIA's censorship of ex-agent Victor
Marchetti. A former assistant to CIA director Richard Helms, Marchetti
co-authored The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, which the Agency
attempted to suppress before its publication. Much material was
ultimately cleared for publication, but a substantial amount was
also successfully censored. Dealing with classified material,
the court rulings in that case set a powerful precedent for prior
restraint that clearly violated the public's right to know what
was going on.
Information classification policy during
this period also established a new presumption in favor of secrecy,
eliminating the old requirement that the need should be carefully
balanced against the public's right to know. A similar policy,
designed to insulate the National Security Council, required that
"all contacts with any element of the news media" would
have to be approved by senior of officials; afterward, a detailed
report had to be filed. Neither did Congress resist the trend.
With such laws and administrative rules in effect, it was a wonder
that any informahon leaked unless the administrahon wanted it
that way.
In 2001, especially after 9/11, the federal
government was at it again, quickly moving to restrict the right
to know what the government was doing. One month after the attacks,
Attorney General Ashcroft quietly but forcefully urged federal
agencies to resist requests to scrutinize public records. In effect,
he told government workers to ignore the 1974 Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). By May 2002, he found a legal rationale' at least
for the new Office of Homeland Security. Because it technically
wasn't an "agency" yet and didn't exercise authority
apart from presidential directives, it was exempt from the FOIA,
he argued. His model was the National Security Council, which
had been ruled off limits years before.
Passed after the Nixon administration's
excesses, the FOIA allows anyone to request government records
by sending a letter to the appropriate executive branches, departments,
or agencies. According to the National Security Archive the world's
largest non-governmental library of declassified documents, the
law has "promoted transparency and accountability in government,
preventing the creation of secret law behind bureaucratic walls,
and witnessing to Justice Brandeis' phrase, that 'sunlight is
the best disinfectant'."
p59
The Battle for El Dorado
As troops and planes headed toward Afghanistan,
few people questioned the reasons for military engagement. An
enemy that didn't hesitate to sacrifice thousands of civilian
lives had ruthlessly attacked the nation's capital and brought
down New York's tallest buildings. The identity of the chief "evildoer"
also seemed self-evident: Osama bin Laden, whose al Qaeda network
had struck the US before and was being sheltered in Afghanistan
by the Taliban. In the wake of such an outrage, could anyone doubt
that a "war on terrorism" should begin there?
Yet the roots of war are rarely so simple,
and, as time passed, other powerful motives for military action
in that part of the world slowly came into focus. As it turns
out, strikes against Afghanistan had been in the works months
before the attacks. Like the Gulf War ten years earlier, the rationale
was also, if not mainly, rooted in a struggle over access to oil
and gas, in this case huge finds in the Caspian Sea Basin. The
only thing missing was a plausible reason. What looked like justified
retaliation was, in essence, the first resource war of the 21st
century...
Dropping the Ball
The Bush family was well acquainted with
the bin Ladens, if not their alleged black sheep Osama, long before
the Saudi renegade declared war on the US and its allies in Saudi
Arabia's royal family. Even after the 1998 embassy attacks, the
relationship remained cordial, largely due to the intercession
of the Carlyle Group, a large US defense contractor. In 1998,
and again in 2000, the first President Bush traveled to Saudi
Arabia on behalf of Carlyle, meeting privately with both the Saudi
royals and several of bin Laden's relatives.
This may help explain why, shortly after
it moved into the White House in January 2001, the Bush II administration
reportedly told the FBI and intelligence agencies to back off
investigations involving the family...
Access to Power
Understanding the interests of energy
companies, and how US influence can make a difference, comes naturally
for George W. Bush. Though his start as an oilman in the 1970s
was unimpressive, his father's presidential victory eventually
made him a valuable asset for Harken Energy, a modest Texas oil
company with large ambitions. By January 1990, he was on the board,
receiving generous consulting fees and holding substantial stock.
The timing was perfect: Harken had just defied the odds by making
an oil production sharing deal with Bahrain. It gave the company
the exclusive right to explore for gas and oil off the shores
of the Gulf island nation. If anything was found near two of the
world's largest gas and oil fields, Harken would have the exclusive
marketing and transportation rights.
For a company that had never drilled an
offshore well, the agreement was a remarkable leap. But since
Harken lacked sufficient financing to do the job alone, a partnership
was established with Bass Enterprises Production Company of Fort
Worth, Texas. The Bass family contributed more than $200,000 to
the Republican Party during the Bush I years. Nevertheless, only
five months after Harken's Bahrain deal, Bush suddenly sold most
of his stock for $848,560, a remarkable 200 percent profit. Another
timely move. A week later, the company announced a $23 million
loss in earnings, and less than two months after that, on August
2, 1990, Iraqi troops moved into Kuwait.
Over half a million US troops were deployed
to the Gulf over the next six months, while Harken stock lost
60 percent of its value. According to US News and World Report,
solid evidence suggests that Bush cashed out because knew the
company was facing trouble weeks in advance. Harken evidently
didnít hold a grudge, however, and continued to provide
generous payments for the younger Bush's consulting services throughout
the 1990s. After all, once the Gulf War was over, the Bahrain
deal still held the promise of profits for those who stayed the
course.
Bush II's executive brain trust was even more knowledgeable. Both
his vice president and national security advisor worked previously
with oil companies that had Caspian ambitions. Commerce Secretary
Don Evans was the former CEO of Tom Brown, Inc., a mid-sized oil
and gas outfit. Gale Norton, appointed Secretary of the Interior,
began her career with the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a
conservative think tank funded by oil companies and founded by
her mentor and predecessor, the infamous James Watt. She also
chaired the Coalition of Republican Environmental Advocates, a
front group backed by BP Amoco and the Ford Motor Company. White
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Energy Secretary Spencer
Abraham also have auto company connections, and Attorney General
Ashcroft received major contributions from ExxonMobil, BP Amoco
and Enron during his failed 2000 bid for Senate reelection...
Did Bush and his aides know in advance
about plans to take down the World Trade Center? Despite all the
denials, the jury will probably be out indefinitely. Yet, there
is little doubt that many people, in and out of government, expected
a major attack before it happened. Some may even have been counting
on it. Without a pretext, after all, it might have been difficult
to convince the US public that it was necessary to overturn a
faraway regime, even one that systematically abused women and
publicly executed people in a football stadium. This, of course,
was not the point of the campaign. But then again, neither was
"routing out the terrorists." The true objective, established
well before any planes went down, was to protect and move future
supplies of oil and gas. Whatever the risks, and whoever might
suffer, the road to el Dorado simply had to remain open.
Greg Guma is the editor of Toward Freedom,
a world affairs magazine based in Vermont (USA), and author of
books including The People's Republic and Passport to Freedom.
This article is a chapter for his just-completed book, Liars,
Guns, and Money: Perception Management and Other New World Disorders.
If you wish to know more or would like to reprint the article
in any form, please contact the author at MavMedia@aol.com. Other
articles by Guma may be viewed at www.TowardFreedom.com.
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