Epilogue: The Cold War Ends
and Secrecy Spreads
Targets of Domestic Spying
excerpted from the book
Secrets
The CIA's War at Home
by Angus Mackenzie
University of California Press, 1997, paper
p189
Epilogue: The Cold War Ends and Secrecy Spreads
For nearly ten years Aldrich Ames spent money in lavish fashion
on cars, real estate, and the good things in life. A longtime
CIA agent, Ames often purchased his extravagances with cash. Unbeknownst
to his superiors at Langley, the KGB was regularly paying him
large sums of cash, eventually totaling more than $2.5 million.
In return, Ames was stealing documents from Agency files and supplying
the Soviets with the names of U.S. agents working behind the Iron
Curtain. As far as can be ascertained, the information passed
on by Ames led to the deaths or disappearances of at least twelve
members of the U.S. intelligence community in Europe and the former
Soviet Union. After sustaining a career of thirty-one years with
the CIA, Ames was finally caught in February I994. He immediately
made Agency history as the most senior officer ever found spying
for the other side in the cold war. He was also by far the best-paid
KGB mole inside America-so well paid, in fact, as to raise a question
about how he was able to elude detection for so long.
On accepting a plea bargain that sentenced him to life in
prison without parole, Ames himself suggested an answer in an
extraordinary confession at the U.S. District Court in Alexandria,
Virginia. First Ames described how a culture of cynicism had taken
over at the CIA.
"I had come to believe," he told the judge, "that
the espionage business as carried out by the CIA and a few other
American agencies was and is a self-serving sham, carried out
by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations
of American policymakers and the public about both the necessity
and the value of their work." In order to protect their own
bureaucratic interests, he said, CIA officials set up a system
that keeps every detail from the American people. The "sham"
of the U.S. intelligence community, he said, is immeasurably aided
by secrecy." The revelation of Ames's duplicitous life and
the publicity from his courtroom statement sent shock waves across
Capitol Hill. Senator John Warner, a Republican from Virginia,
spoke grimly about the need to set up an outside, independent
group to issue recommendations for a major restructuring of U.S.
intelligence.
The new CIA director, R James Woolsey, who had been appointed
by the first Democratic president in twelve years, William Jefferson
Clinton, felt obliged to try to counter Ames's allegations during
a speech on July I8, I994, at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington. Woolsey compared Ames to Benedict Arnold
and sarcastically noted that while there were a few differences
between the two traitors, "they are all in Benedict Arnold's
favor." Clearly no one in Woolsey's audience of journalists
and intelligence experts held any brief for someone as mercenary
as Ames, and yet the criticisms leveled by Ames had struck a chord
with the Washington insiders. Since I947 they had promoted the
premise of large-scale secrecy as a necessary element of the cold
war. With the cold war over and arguably won, wasn't it time to
take a hard look to see if the CIA had become too self-righteous
and secretive, too antagonistic to a society based on democratic
precepts?
Woolsey tried to deflect the criticisms by accepting some
of them as valid. "The camaraderie within the [CIA] fraternity
can smack of elitism and arrogance," he admitted. Then, in
a Reaganesque tactic, Woolsey straightened up at the lectern and
aimed his remarks over the heads of his audience to the public
at large. "The American people have the right to ask where
the CIA is going after the cold war and after, for that matter,
Aldrich Ames," he said. "For us to assume your continued
support or your willingness to give us the benefit of the doubt
will not do. We have the obligation to provide you with answers
through the deliberative process with the members of Congress
and through speaking directly to you. Problems that have arisen
will be addressed fully, openly and honestly, warts and all. Programs
that are no longer relevant will be abolished."
No CIA director had ever sounded so defensive about the Agency
in a public speech, nor had a CIA director ever come so close
to a mea culpa for the abuses inherent in the secrecy program.
Nonetheless, the reforms promised by Woolsey-more openness, more
accountability-had been promised before, most recently by Robert
Gates. Given the record of past directors and past presidents,
was it realistic to believe the Clinton administration would usher
in a new era?
The answer lay in a struggle between two forces. One was the
historical and political force created by the end of the cold
war. In America, land of the free, it had usually been assumed
that secrecy was an aberration, something to be tolerated only
in the extreme circumstances of wartime. Now, without a security
rationale for secrecy, the guardians of open government would
presumably be able to rally most of the American people to their
side. On the opposite side was the countervailing force of the
intelligence bureaucracy, whose leaders for nearly half a century
had operated with secrecy uppermost in mind. Although many of
the old cold war warriors were now dead or retired, their younger
proteges still occupied positions of power. Even if Woolsey could
be taken at his word, he would have to overcome active resistance
from within his own ranks, as well as the inertia present in any
bureaucracy.
The key would be the new president. Clinton's election in
I992 had brought into office the first president since Herbert
Hoover who had no association with World War II and who had not
lived through the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Shortly after
his inauguration, Clinton pledged to usher in an era of candor,
and he set into motion various efforts to liberalize the rules
governing secrecy.
The era of candor began with a presidential memo issued on
October 3, I993, addressed to the heads of all government agencies,
which directed them to stop their routine resistance to FOIA requests.
Clinton's attorney general, Janet Reno, explained the rationale
for openness by saying that it was essential to government accountability
and that the FOIA "has become an integral part of that process."
According to Reno, the Justice Department would scrap a I98I rule
promulgated by the Reagan administration that allowed agencies
to withhold information if they had any conceivable legal excuse.
Justice would no longer provide legal counsel as a matter of routine
when federal agencies denied FOIA requests. In an even more radical
departure from the past, Clinton took the position that the public
should not have to rely just on the FOIA to obtain information
about the inner workings of the federal government. Rather, he
wrote in his memo, it is up to the government to keep the citizens
informed: "Each agency has a responsibility to distribute
information on its own initiatlve.
Within a month, however, Clinton's enthusiasm for an open,
accountable government began to fade, and so did the hope that
he would institute a major overhaul of the secrecy program. Like
Presidents Johnson and Nixon before him, Clinton found the sticking
point to be not concern about national security but rather his
own sensitivity about activities at the White House. In essence,
Clinton decided that White House affairs would not be subject
to his policy of openness. Clinton's friend and associate attorney
general, Webster Hubbell, reminded all federal FOIA officers to
return to the White House any document found in the course of
FOIA searches if it had originated at the White House; under no
circumstances were the documents to be released to the public.
In addition, Hubbell increased the number of White House departments
that could be exempt from the FOIA, including such working groups
as the Clinton health care task force, which was then facing a
legal challenge for holding meetings in secret under the supervision
of Hillary Rodham Clinton.
Although actions of the president and his staff had always
been exempt from the FOIA, the Clinton administration soon made
it clear that the ring of secrecy around the White House would
become even tighter. When a request by Knight-Ridder Newspapers
for the salaries of presidential staffers was denied, Richard
Oppel, on behalf of the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
fired off a letter to Clinton: "There may be no specific
law commanding the release of the salaries," he wrote, "but
there is certainly no law authorizing the withholding of the information.
In the absence of such authorization, the information should be
public without discussion. The people's business, we submit, is
the people's business." Despite the scant possible justification
for refusing to disclose as innocuous a piece of information as
someone's salary, the Clinton administration held firm.
In addition, the Clinton administration became the first to
argue in court in favor of a more restrictive interpretation of
the FOIA with respect to National Security Council (NSC) documents.
Previous administrations had agreed that the NSC generated two
kinds of records-presidential records and agency records-and that
the latter were subject to the FOIA. Departing from precedent,
the Clinton Justice Department took the position that all NSC
records fell into the presidential category and could not be obtained
through the FOIA.
A rare opportunity for reforming the intelligence bureaucracy
seemed to be slipping away from an embattled Clinton. At the beginning
of his presidency, Clinton did not boldly challenge the bureaucracy
and relied on others, often the bureaucrats themselves-to carry
out reforms. In the case of the CIA, he relied on Woolsey, a Yale
lawyer whose background and sensibilities were similar to those
of many career officers under him. In light of Ames, that reliance
on Woolsey and the Agency good old boys for reform was now seen
as questionable.
Clinton showed how far he was willing to go with the new policy
of openness in the summer of I994. The issue at hand was whether
the total amount of the intelligence community's annual budget
would remain a secret. For some time there had been no plausible
reason for the American people not to know how much the intelligence
community spends. The full Senate had passed resolutions in I99I,
I992, and I993 favoring disclosure of the figure. Robert Gates
had testified in I99I that he had no problem with disclosure.
Besides, almost everyone who frequented the corridors of Capitol
Hill or the nearby watering holes (including any foreign agents
worth their salt) already knew the number. And, to make the secrecy
even more of a joke, a Senate committee had inadvertently published
enough figures to allow easy calculation of the intelligence community
budget for fiscal year I994 ($28 billion). However, when it came
time for Woolsey to release the budget figure formally, he refused.
Instead, he and Clinton's other national security officials lobbied
Congress to prevent formal disclosure. When Dan Glickman of Kansas,
chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
and Robert Torricelli of New Jersey introduced an amendment to
make the disclosure mandatory, the Clinton team managed to defeat
it by a 22I-I94 vote.
p199
The lifetime secrecy contracts had emerged from the Operation
MHCHAOS offices, spreading throughout the CIA and the National
Security Agency. Then, at ISOO and CIA insistence, the contract
moved into the ranks of government and civilian workers at the
State Department and in the Pentagon and to some I., million employees
of government contractors. The use of the contract expanded pervasively
through the executive branch; as opposition from the defenders
of constitutional rights evaporated, it gradually moved into Congress.
In I99I Garfinkel made some small changes in the secrecy contract
and added whistle-blower protection for congressional Witnesses.
That seemed to silence the last outspoken opposition in the House.
A few senators, including Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa,
continued to be wary of White House intrusions on traditional
congressional independence.
By the I990s, reflecting the general conservative shift in
Congress, many House members were actively welcoming a secrecy
oath. Consideration of the oath, less comprehensive than the standard
contract, first came up in the House Select Committee on Intelligence
during a discussion of the fiscal year (FY) I992 Intelligence
Authorization Act. That led to a House rule requiring the intelligence
committee members and staff to sign the oath. Interest in broadening
the use of the oath did not stop there, especially for committee
member Porter J. Goss of Florida. Goss's ties to the CIA dated
from I962 and his ten-year stint as a clandestine service officer
at the Agency. He and his fellow enthusiast, Henry J. Hyde of
Illinois, offered amendments to the FY I993 and I994 authorization
acts that would require secrecy oaths from every member of the
House. The amendments did not prosper, but when the I04th Congress
convened on January 4, I995, backers of the oath changed tactics.
This time the oath requirement for every I House member was included
in the packet of rules from the House Conference of the Majority.
It became a new rule without debate.
***
p200
In the mid-I980s, Jeane Kirkpatrick sounded the alarm about government
censorship. Although a member of the Reagan administration's inner
foreign policy circle, Kirkpatrick had had a personal encounter
with government censors over her refusal to sign the lifetime
secrecy contract. Upon returning to her political science chair
at Georgetown University from her post as U.S. United Nations
ambassador, Kirkpatrick reexamined John Stuart Mill's classic
essay On Liberty and delivered a lecture on censorship. "Societies
are not made stronger by the process of repression that accompanies
censorship," she warned. "Censorship requires an assumption
of infallibility, and that seems to Mill invariably negative.
Repression of an opinion is thus bad for the censor, who inevitably
acts from a conviction of his own infallibility," she told
her students, "and bad for the opinion itself, which can
neither be corrected nor held with conviction equal to the strength
of an opinion submitted to challenge."
As the twentieth century draws to a close, the I947 National
Security Act has become the Pandora's box that Ambassador Kirkpatrick
and Congressman Hoffman had feared. Placing a legal barrier between
foreign intelligence operations and domestic politics in the National
Security Act has proved ineffectual. In the decades that followed
I947, the CIA not only became increasingly involved in domestic
politics but abridged First Amendment guarantees of free speech
and free press in a conspiracy to keep this intrusion from the
American people. The intelligence and military secrecy of the
I940s had broadened in the I960s to covering up the suppression
of domestic dissent. The I980s registered a further, more fundamental
change, as the suppression of unpopular opinions was supplemented
by systematic and institutionalized peacetime censorship for the
first time in U.S. history. The repressive machinery developed
by the CIA has spread secrecy like oil on water.
The U.S. government has always danced with the devil of secrecy
during wartime. By attaching the word "war" to the economic
and ideological race for world supremacy between the Soviet Union
and the United States, a string of administrations continued this
dance uninterrupted for fifty years. The cold war provided the
foreign threat to justify the pervasive Washington belief that
secrecy should have the greatest possible latitude and openness
should be restricted as much as possible-constitutional liberties
be damned.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union as a world power in
I990, even the pseudo-war rationale evaporated. But the partisans
of secrecy have not been willing to accept the usual terms of
peacetime They have made clear their intentions to preserve and
extend the wartime system. They will find a rationalization: if
not the threat of the Soviet Union, then the goal of economic
hegemony. Thus the U.S. government now needs to keep secrets to
give an advantage to American corporate interests. Yet it is entrepreneurs
who have been making the most use of FOIA-not journalists, not
lawyers. As of I994, the great preponderance of all FOIA requests
have been for business purposes. As the framers of the Constitution
understood, the free exchange of ideas is good for commerce, but
this idea has been widely forgotten in the years since the passage
of the I947 National Security Act.
Only recently in the history of the world's oldest republic
has secrecy functioned principally to keep the American people
in the dark about the nefarious activities of their government.
The United States is no longer the nation its citizens once thought:
a place, unlike most others in the world, free from censorship
and thought police, where people can say what they want, when
they want to, about their government. Almost a decade after the
end of the cold war, espionage is not the issue, if it ever really
was. The issue is freedom, as it was for the Minute Men at Compo
Hill. The issue is principle, as it was for Ernest Fitzgerald,
who never signed a secrecy contract but retained his Pentagon
job because he made his stand for the First Amendment resonate
in Congress. Until the citizens of this land aggressively defend
their First Amendment rights of free speech, there is little hope
that the march to censorship will be reversed. The survival of
the cornerstone of the Bill of Rights is at stake.
***
p203
Targets of Domestic Spying
An Annotated List of Some FBI Surveillance Targets during
the 1980s
I wrote the FBI on February in I987 asking for files on I27
political groups, most of which were opposed to the U.S. government's
arming of the Contras. The Bureau's response was dragged out over
five years. The vast majority of the files were denied under the
I986 FOIA amendment, but the FBI did release some information
about the size of the files, the number of pages kept secret,
and the reasons for that secrecy. The FBI also released a few
heavily blacked-out pages, enough to give a glimpse of the Bureau's
investigations into a number of highly visible political groups.
The unwanted and unwarranted attention to ... politically
active citizen organizations shows both the FBI's institutionalized
disregard for constitutionally guaranteed rights and the use of
FOIA exemptions to hide this abuse of power. Many of the groups
have a long history of lobbying Congress and publishing newsletters-activities
well within the scope of the First Amendment. None of the FBI
investigations resulted in criminal indictments. Rather the purpose
of the investigations, as is evident from the documents, was to
monitor their political activities. The following is a digested
version of information concerning these FBI investigations.
American Committee on Africa/Africa Fund was a New York-based
organization opposed to apartheid in South Africa. The FBI withheld
42, of 6I pages "in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy." On July I8, I979, the FBI searched for all subversive
and nonsubversive information on this group, on which the FBI
kept a domestic security file and a Registration Act investigative
file.
Arms Control Computer Network, Christic Institute, and the
Committee Against Registration and the Draft. The FBI kept all
records on these groups secret for "national defense"
and to protect "confidential sources."
Black Student Communications Organizing Network is based in
Jamaica, New York, and unifies black student groups. FBI files
have been withheld in their entirety to protect "national
defense or foreign policy."
The Center for Defense Information, based in Washington, D.C.,
opposes excessive spending for weapons and policies that increase
the danger of war. The FBI Director, in an administrative matter
involving no alleged violation of laws, searched FBI files for
data on the group for reasons the FBI kept secret. The FBI withheld
fifty-seven pages of documents to protect national defense, privacy,
and confidential sources in a "foreign counterintelligence
matter." Other FBI reports profiled the head of the group,
Gene Robert LaRocque, citing Whos Who: "[He] is a retired
naval officer, commander Task Group in Sixth Fleet, member of
faculty of Naval War College." Another FBI document said
the Center for Defense Information "functions as a 'gadfly'
to the U.S. military establishment and is staffed with very liberal,
anti-establishment, anti-FBI/CIA academics." A memo from
the Special Agent in Charge to the FBI Director was stamped "SECRET"
and said that LaRocque published The Defense Monitor, which reports
timely information regarding military establishments. On August
I3, I986, FBI headquarters requested that information on the group
be forwarded to the FBI agent attached to the U.S. Embassy in
Bonn.
Central American Solidarity Association was a group opposed
to Contra funding. Of the seventeen pages in this foreign counterintelligence-terrorism
file, fifteen were kept secret.
Children's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Environmental
Policy Center is based in Plainfield, Vermont. The FBI has kept
one reference secret to protect "confidential sources."
Citizens Against Nuclear War. The FBI has kept six cross-references
secret for reasons of national defense."
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, headquartered
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, conducts public education and research
and advocates lowering defense spending. In June I983, the Naval
Investigative Service asked the FBI to check on this group because
of a counterintelligence interest.
Interfaith Center to Reverse the Arms Race. The FBI has kept
six cross-references classified secret to "protect the national
defense, privacy, and confidential sources."
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. The FBI kept two cross-references
exempt from disclosure to protect "confidential sources."
Lutheran World Ministries was based on Park Avenue South in
Manhattan, New York. FBI documents containing cross-references
were determined to be exempt from disclosure to "protect
confidential sources.
Medical Aid for El Salvador. The FBI kept secret one file
of an investigation that was pending on November 30, I988, to
protect "confidential" sources and the "national
defense."
National Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala
is a Washington group advocating an end to U.S. military aid in
Guatemala. All FBI counterintelligence-terrorism records on it
are kept secret under the I986 FOIA amendment.
National Network in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua
was a Washington group opposed to arming the Contras. Of the forty-six
pages in this file, the FBI kept secret forty-one pages.
National Peace Academy Campaign, Sojourners Peace Ministry
and World Peacemakers. Four cross-references were withheld to
protect "national defense."
Nuclear Control Institute has worked since I98I in Washington
to oppose nuclear proliferation. Of the FBI file on this group,
the FBI has kept nine pages secret "to protect privacy and
confidential sources."
The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign was a major opponent of
Reagan-Bush arms policies. Of its file, the FBI kept secret thirty
pages and released eight, which revealed that in I985, an FBI
agent got a leaflet in Burlington, Vermont, about the organization
of a nationwide contingency plan by the Resistance Pledge Network
to block U.S. intervention in Central America. The agent reported
the contents of the leaflet, which advocated a nonviolent, no
drugs, no-property damage demonstration against U.S. intervention,
and on March 6, I985, forwarded the report to the CIA, the Naval
Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
the United States Secret Service, and the Army Intelligence Command
at Fort Meade.
Patrice Lumumba Coalition/Unity in Action Network was based
in Harlem, New York. Of the FBI's file of I05 pages, it kept secret
78. At least one FBI document in the file had been sent to the
CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The subjects of the documents
were the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress,
and the identities of individuals who attended the International
Conference on Islam during October I986. The contents of the memo
were withheld to protect "foreign policy" and "privacy."
Peace Child Foundation. The FBI has kept twenty-two pages
secret concerning a June I986 foreign counterintelligence investigation
by FBI Squad I4, San Francisco.
Peace Links: Women Against Nuclear War. An FBI agent in Detroit
wrote headquarters on November 6, I986, that a Peace Links chapter
was part of a national organization of women to promote nuclear
disarmament and peace between East and West. The rest of the memo
was censored to protect "defense, foreign policy and confidential
sources."
Student/Teacher Organization to Prevent Nuclear War of Boston.
The FBI Special Agent in Charge of the New Haven, Connecticut,
Field Office sent documents to the FBI director that had been
provided by a confidential source, including a state, local, or
foreign agency or authority, under the I986 amendment. The New
Haven FBI office placed this file in dosed status March II, I985.
Union of Concerned Scientists. The FBI has kept 296 pages
secret to protect foreign policy, privacy, and confidential informants.
According to a December I6, I986, FBI summary, "The central
files of this Bureau reveal the following information.... The
Union of Concerned Scientists is composed of senior and junior
faculty members and graduate students at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology . . . organized for the expressed purpose of a one-day
strike aimed at turning scientific research applications away
from military technology and toward the solution of environmental
and social problems. The UCS maintained no formal membership rolls....
As of this date, the UCS is under investigation due to the fact
that its activities meet the criteria that fall within the Attorney
General's guidelines."
United Nations Center Against Apartheid, established by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in I962, was opposed to
South African racial policies. The FBI files contain a secret
report from the CIA dated April I984. The CIA withheld the document
in entirety to protect the "national defense."
U.S. Out of Central America. The FBI has kept twenty pages
secret to protect confidential sources.
Washington Office on Latin America was a Washington group
with thirteen employees and an annual budget of $500,000 that
opposed the Reagan policies in Central America. The FBI's file
contained seventy-nine pages, of which the FBI kept secret seventy-three
pages under the FOIA amendment's provisions for hiding foreign
counterintelligence matters. Parts of this file were distributed
to the FBI San Antonio office and to the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Witness for Peace is a Washington group with an annual budget
in excess of $I million that characterizes itself as a grassroots,
faith-based, nonviolent group opposed to U.S. intervention in
Central America. The FBI kept secret eleven pages on this group
under the I986 amendment because they could "reasonably be
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings."
Secrets
- The CIA's War at Home
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