U.S.-China and a New Cold War
by Maryann Keady
www.zmag.org, January 14, 2007
If there was any doubt about the idea
that the world has clearly moved into a Cold War paradigm, the
new national space policy of the United States dispelled that
notion once and for all. It is worth reprinting some crucial excerpts
for those that have not had the chance to look at the fine print.
The report states:
"The United States will preserve
its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space... and
deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities
hostile to US national interests
The United States rejects any claims to
sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies,
or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental
right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from
space;
The United States considers space capabilities
-- including the ground and space segments and supporting links
-- vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy,
the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and
freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either
impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do
so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities;
respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the
use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests;
The United States will oppose the development
of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit
or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control
agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United
States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations
or other activities in space for U.S. national interests; and
The United States is committed to encouraging
and facilitating a growing and entrepreneurial U.S. commercial
space sector. Toward that end, the United States Government will
use U.S. commercial space capabilities to the maximum practical
extent, consistent with national security.
The question is just WHO would want to
'limit' U.S access or use of space? WHICH adversary would they
wish to deny 'the use of space capabilities hostile to the United
States interests'? WHO would want to claim sovereignty 'over outer
space or celestial bodies'? Could it be a) Osama Bin Laden b)
Iran c) Lindsay Lohan or d) China? Yes folks, the guessing game
is over, the only power that could conceivably have ambition or
the capability to use space power 'hostile to U.S national interests'
is China, and it is clear from this document the United States
and China are in one hell of a strategic tussle. This document
is replete with suggestions that the Pentagon planners are ready
to actively make Space the 'final' frontier. (Not that space hasn't
already been a strategic player via satellites and the Global
Positioning System in most wars since Iraq Mark One, Alvin Toffler
first letting us know of its importance eons ago) You might think
this has to do with scientific advancement, and to some extent,
that's correct, the Moon having a particle that can help in the
future development of nuclear fusion, helium three. Unfortunately,
this mostly has to do with the space program of America's 'peer
competitor' China, and the so called threat of Chinese 'asymmetrical
warfare' that might possibly bring down or impede American satellites
and weapons during warfare. The idea is that the Chinese are using
'commercial' technology or lunar technology for military application
in space, thus 'challenging' US military supremacy. Former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the second Rumsfeld Commission (or
'The Report of the Commission To Assess United States National
Security and Space Management and Organization') warned of a possible
space 'Pearl Harbor' and recommended a range of options that basically
protects United States hegemony in space, as does this new space
policy. The idea is that hypothetically, China may be able to
take out United States satellites via anti-satellite weaponry
in the event of war, say during a conflict over Taiwan. The problem
with this logic of course is that while China may be able to momentarily
attack a US satellite, the vast inventory of US space and military
technology would then rain down on the Chinese, and leave the
peer competitor with very little option other than to surrender.
But that has not stopped the Pentagon
planners. Space is now closer to being 'weaponized' as the jargon
states, and 'Star Wars' quite literally, is a little closer to
fruition. The question of course is how far the Chinese have advanced
with their anti-satellite weapons. The interviews I have conducted
for a book looking at US policy and China suggest that the idea
that China is even close to challenging U.S military supremacy
is somewhat fanciful. Most estimates have China trailing US technology
by up to 20 years. However, as one Washington insider puts it
'So there is perhaps a little bit of paranoia
about what China is up to, but as the saying goes, sometimes a
little bit of paranoia is good because sometimes they are after
you'
It is also a paranoia that works well
for the Pentagon, and the bi-partisan policy that wishes to extend
American hegemony well into the mid 21st century when the Chinese
economy is set to outstrip the United States and become the world's
largest economyi
The obvious question is whether it is
in China's interest to start a war with the US, thus disrupt its
own economic development that is vital for future national growth,
and thus increasing its international clout and prestige. Even
conservative analysts concede that China is still 20 years away
from challenging US military supremacy, despite the concern about
its submarine and naval build up. The Chinese are building naval
ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. But is that any serious
challenge to the US bases throughout the Pacific, including Japan,
Guam, Diego Garcia, to name just a few? Hasn't the encirclement
of China in Asia (through the US ratcheting up of military and
diplomatic relations with Asian countries such as the Philippines,
Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Japan and Australia) proved the superiority
of US military and diplomatic power in Asia? The answer is that
this is a new 'Cold War' that is also economic in nature - and
being fought out in territorial spheres, from Africa (Sudan) to
Asia (Thailand) to Central Asia. The only way to ensure that the
'peer competitor' is economically contained is to keep 'good watch'
on its trading partners, and those that can give it crucial energy
supplies. During the old Cold War, Russia bought influence through
local political parties and financial support. It is no different
today, with China buying influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America by the cold hard cash it offers for valuable resources.
The major difference between the 'old' Cold War and the 'new'
Cold War is the global economy, which means while there may be
growing tensions, the reality of economic 'interdependence' means
that everyone from Delhi to Caracas is praying for peace. Shareholders
and executives worldwide are happy to see good times last, even
if 'war' stocks (gold, uranium) are surging. However Aaron Friedberg,
former national security advisor to Dick Cheney had this to say
in an interview when I asked whether economic inter-dependence
would prevent any conflict between the two powers: 'I don't think
a blossoming economic relationship in itself is a guarantee of
peace' That's reassuring. What about US-China relations?
'Now there is a two sided military competition
underway - it's limited and constrained compared for example to
the Cold War military competition between the Soviet Union and
America, but its underway and its serious and its accelerating.'
There are those that choose to argue that 'terrorists' and the
'axis of evil' are the real forces behind America's foreign policy,
but Iran or North Korea are not even close to China's military
capability, while terrorists are unable to threaten the overwhelming
dominant (and extremely sophisticated) United States' space-based
military arsenal. I will not use this platform to deal with the
myriad of flaws in the 'War on Terror' thesis in South East Asia
alone, except to say that it will prove interesting meal for later
journalistic endeavors. iiHowever for those who are still skeptical,
let us briefly examine other factors that have illuminated the
real focus of US foreign policy:
- Examine US policy papers since the mid
nineties. The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 named Asia as
the most important strategic area for the United States - over
Europe and the Middle East. There was even the creation of a new
strategic area called the 'East Asian littoral' which is the area
from the Bay Bengal through to the Sea of Japan. This came out
after September 11, which if logic was determining policy, would
have Central Asia as the strategic area of importance. Also easy
reading is the 2005 Pentagon Annual Report on Chinese Military
Power, or fast forward to today, you can simply read Robyn Lim
(The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium) Aaron
Friedberg (The Future of Chinese US Relations - Is Conflict Inevitable?)
or John Mearsheimer (China's Unpeaceful Rise) on a future US-China
tussle, all of whom come from a policy elite that has worked closely
with US foreign policymakers, as well as Pentagon thinkers. Robert
Kaplan's piece for The Atlantic Monthly - How We Would Fight Chin
a: The Next Cold War June 2005 details just how this may emerge,
and almost as interesting is the commentary on it by Larry Chin
via www.fromthewilderness.com .
- A National Energy Policy (May 2001)
announced by the Bush administration which called for the President
of the United States, to make the pursuit of foreign energy a
major foreign policy objective, and called on the secretary of
state and commerce and energy, to engage in international diplomacy
for this purpose. As Michael T Klare in 'Fueling the Dragon: China's
Strategic Energy Dilemma' (Current History April 2006) notes 'it
would appear safe to assume that disputes arising from the competitive
pursuit of foreign oil will play an increasingly critical role
in the US-China relationship, possibly eclipsing such other concerns
as Taiwan and the bilateral trade imbalance'. From Sudan to Venezuela,
the US and China are fighting for global resources in a tussle
to remain the world's economic powerhouse. This includes oil,
gas, water, steel, gold - just about any resource that either
can lay their hands on. This has led to empowered 'Chinese' favored
producers (Chavez in Venezuela) or boom time for resource rich
countries like Australia (who claims to be hedging its bets but
clearly a US ally.) In Africa, and other small resource rich third
world countries it unfortunately signals turbulent times ahead,
with both powers doing what it can to retain influence. In Central
Asia, a large bidding war has been conducted, with the Chinese
and the Americans fighting to increase their influence in the
region. Central Asia of course is the geo-strategic backdoor to
China, and part of Mackinder's theory on great power politics.
iii Indeed, the 'Great Game' has gone global.
- The militarization of South East Asia
and US support for a militarized Japan. If the 'War on Terror'
is indeed the Pentagon's objective, why then has there been a
steady build up of naval capability by all South East Asian nations
that is focused on submarine technology if China's naval aspirations
aren't the target? Why are US ships moving to the Pacific, and
a US army command being set up in Japan? Why would the US be pushing
Japan to re-militarize, (something that Chalmers Johnson has said
is a direct counter to Chinese growing power)iv and encouraging
Japan renounce its pacifist constitution? Why has there been no
outcry to the election of a Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
whose grandfather was a noted war criminal, something that is
sure to inflame Chinese nationalist sentiments? (Indeed Bruce
Cumings from the University of Chicago stated that he thought
the North Korean nuclear test was linked to the election of Shinzo
Abev) And why is America trying to push through large military
acquisitions by both Taiwan and South Korea if China indeed, is
not the target?
- US pressure for Taiwan to push through
an 11 billion dollar US arms package (which includes a Patriot
anti-missile system, eight diesel submarines and 12 anti-submarine
aircraft) despite protestations in Taiwan that the US is simply
'unloading' old weapons. The pro-independence Taiwanese President
Chen Shui Bian in 2005 dismissed opposition to the package 'irrational'
saying 'the weapons were essential to protect against China, and
the purchase needed to protect the island's close relationship
with Washington.' vi There was delayed comment from the Bush administration
this year when Shui Bian abolished the National Unification Council,
an act Shui Bian himself stated was due to China's 'military threat'.
Prominent figures in the Bush administration have been historically
vocal in their support for Taiwanese independence, and despite
the claim that the US administration is now distancing itself
from Shui Bian, an $11 billion dollar arms package indicates the
views of the US administration on reunification with the mainland.
- The promotion of a pro-US alliance consisting
of Japan, Australia and India as the three major powers that leverage
against the might of China. India's close relationship with the
United States (they are not only working on nuclear cooperation,
but joint space projects as well) is the obvious response geo-political
response to a rising China with India much touted in business
circles as the 'alternative' to China. A resurgent militaristic
Japan warns a belligerent China that its security can not be assured
in North Asia, while Australia serves as Washington's ears in
the Asia Pacific, (not least through the satellite surveillance
station at Pine Gap in central Australia and the US naval communications
facility at North West Cape) through close relationships with
US regional allies (Indonesia, Singapore) and regional missions
such as the Solomon's RAMSI mission and the Timor deployment.
This is the formidable primary alliance that serves Washington
in the Asia-Pacific. These three powers are vital in monitoring
the sea-lanes of the Indian and Pacific that are crucial in ensuring
global maritime supremacy. (Hence Australia's reluctance in 2005
to sign the Asian 'non aggression pact' the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which calls for signatories not
to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Only after it was
made clear that it would not be invited to the East Asian summit
without signing it did Australia go ahead with being a signatory
to its pacifist declarations. Former Malaysian Prime Minister
Mohamed Mahathir has been very vocal about Australia's role as
America's 'deputy sheriff'.)
- The maritime and naval preoccupations
of Washington. This is in direct response to the naval aspirations
of China, who sees naval power as vital to their ongoing economic
resurgence. Using Alfred Thayer Mahn as their guide, American
strategists are making sure that strategic waterways are under
their control from the Straits of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits.
One third of the world's trade passes through the Malacca Straits,
not just crucial energy supplies destined for Japan and China.
Thus we see naval power as the crucial 'force projection', and
US allies scrambling to achieve what is known as naval 'inter-operability'.
Analysts have talked of an 'arms race' in the Asia Pacific, and
even Bill Gertz from the Washington Times has been open about
the naval positioning of the US. ' The Pentagon is moving strategic
bombers to Guam and aircraft carriers and submarines to the Pacific
as part of a new "hedge" strategy aimed at preparing
for conflict with China, Pentagon officials said yesterday Adm.
William J. Fallon, commander of the Pacific Command, has visited
Guam and told reporters that the island will become a pivot point
for U.S. forces in the Pacific because of the relatively short
distances to the Taiwan Strait, South Korea and Southeast Asia.
Yesterday, Mr. Thomas said the Pentagon is strengthening alliances
in Asia as part of the strategy'vii You can read all this first
hand just by glancing through the Pentagon Reports on China, or
'think tank' papers such as the influential Council on Foreign
Relations where the Chinese navy and submarine acquisition is
a large part of these reports. An excerpt from the Executive Summary
of the CFR report of 2003 may give you some idea of its contents:
' China is already the strongest continental military power in
East Asia and destined to become an even greater power beyond
its littoral borders, a sustained and robust U.S naval and air
presence can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future
military capabilities into a real advantage against U.S and allied
interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years
if not longer.' viii Whilst China hawks in Washington such as
Bill Gertz and John Tkacik talk of China's 'string of pearls'
strategy (China's building of strategic alliances along the sea
lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea) the real naval
power of China is hotly debated, with many Washington analysts
privately casting serious doubts on it's capability, saying it
is on par with American naval power twenty years ago. One analyst
in an interview with me called it a 'rustwater navy' while another
dismissed the notion of Chinese military 'pockets of excellence'
and questioned whether these were 'pockets of adequacy, otherwise
surrounded by a sea of mediocrity.'ix If in case you believe that
the battle for naval supremacy was small fry in the Asia Pacific,
then perhaps the sudden and inexplicable move of China-friendly
Burma's capital from Rangoon to rural Pyinmana, (400 kilometres
north of Rangoon) may help you understand just how fearful China
has become of any attempts to 'interfere' in its strategic alliances.
Burma is the site of a Chinese naval port, a rather important
one close to the Malacca Straits and the Bay of Bengal. It is
also the site of an important listening post, many others in the
Asia Pacific having been compromised by flourishing Taiwanese
and US diplomacy. x Following the move there was speculation that
the military leadership may be afraid of a possible US attack
on the coastal capital, and that the new capital will be better
placed to deal with the Indian, Chinese and Thai borders. A factor
that has not been raised is the setting up of an Indian naval
command off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands (situated between
the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait) an attempt to create
an Indian 'blue water navy' to counter China's own regional naval
ambitions. This, as well as the strategic vulnerability of a coastal
capital, cannot be discounted as a factor in the sudden move.
- The United States desperation to control
and patrol one of the world's vital sea lanes - the Malacca Strait
- indicates just how advanced the US China geo-political containment
policy is. A third of all world trade goes through the Strait,
as well as eighty percent of China's oil imports. If hypothetically,
during a crisis, either power was to control the Strait - then
the other would suffer. China clearly has more to lose than America,
with its economic clout clearly dependent on the oil imports and
international trade that keeps it growth in double digit figures.
Due to threats of 'terrorism' and 'piracy' America has set up
the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiatives) and RMSI - the 'Regional
Maritime Security Initiative' which is designed to 'protect' and
'patrol' this waterway. Discussing the issue in the Jakarta Post
in June 2006, Rio Jaslim wrote: 'China's fast-paced economic growth
and strengthening defense capabilities place them in a position
to challenge America's leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.
This latent competition will likely prompt the U.S. to adopt a
strategy to contain China. This would include controlling the
sea-lines of communication and strategic maritime checkpoints,
such as the Strait of Malacca, and thus indirectly controlling
the movement of raw materials and goods to China.
Thus, the real reason American wants to
bolster its presence in the region, and specifically the Strait
of Malacca, is to limit China's access to oil, raw materials,
technology and industrial equipment, and to contain the Chinese
influence in the region. Using the threat of terrorism and piracy
to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiatives is the most
likely strategy.' Whilst US ally Singapore has jumped on board,
Malaysia and Indonesia in the past have justifiably seen any joint
patrolling as an infringement on their sovereignty, and have concerns
about it violating their policy of 'non-alignment'. 'Non-alignment'
of course, is a reference to the choice given them of being 'either
with us, or against us'. States like Malaysia and Indonesia understand
that to enrage the Chinese dragon by entering a 'US coalition'
on the Malacca Strait could have unpleasant side effects - not
least, economic repercussions down the track. The United States,
however, keeps increasing the pressure, indicating just how important
control of this Strait is to its global maritime and trade power
in the 21st Century.xi (There was intense speculation over US
aid efforts in Aceh, a province at the tip of Indonesia near the
Malacca Strait, following the devastating 2004 tsunami. The public
backlash to the world's largest naval aircraft carrier USS Abraham
Lincoln sitting off Indonesian waters was not helped by media
reports that US base Diego Garcia was given prior warning of the
impending disaster. xii The aircraft carrier left Indonesian waters
after the Indonesian government refused to allow pilots to conduct
air patrols and training flights. The sensitivity of the US aircraft
in the Straits can only be comprehended after understanding the
disputes in the region over who has the right to 'patrol' these
waters in light of growing US and Chinese maritime competition.)
All of this goes without discussing the rise of 'nuclear' power
among the Asian countries - Japan, South Korea, Australia, India
and of course, North Korea. The emerging nuclear programs in India
and Australia suggest that the 21st Century is not one that is
going to be predicated on a geo-political landscape of 'failed
states' but one of regional powers flexing their 'nuclear' muscles
and sending serious warnings to the challenging peer 'China' and
her allies. The recent signing of the 'Henry Hyde United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act," between India and
America is just one signal that 'nuclear' power will play a major
part in this geo-political power stand-off. xiii We can no longer
pretend that the world is not in the midst of a New Cold War.
The 21st Century battle is two giant powers fighting for supremacy
using any means necessary. Ideology may be dead, but the naked
grab for power by these economic and political titans is determining
the boundaries of Asia. US policy in the region under the Bush
administration has been aggressive and provocative, with geo-political
'containment' at the forefront, and economic engagement in the
background. If American policy continues in this vein it may push
the region perilously close to an Asian conflagration. It will
be the policies of any new American administration and the subsequent
response by Chinese military hardliners that will crucially determine
whether there is peace in Asia in the 21st century. Maryann Keady
is a freelance radio journalist and reporter. Her internet radio
station 'Asia2025.net' will start broadcasting in February. A
collection of interviews 'China Conversations' will be out in
2007.
i The hype around 'partisan' foreign policy
divisions in Washington is an old tactic used against China, best
illustrated via the Kissinger and Nixon negotiations with China
over Taiwan. Their broken promises to China over Taiwan after
'72 were blamed on the new administration of Gerald Ford, but
whether any American administration was ever going to change the
policy of strategic ambiguity is another matter completely. The
current American 'congagement' China policy has bi-partisan support
- the only difference being the method and level of military adventurism.
Similarly divisions between the 'blue'(anti-China and hawkish)
and 'red'(moderate or 'panda hugger') teams in Washington are
also greatly exaggerated.
ii Hambali, the key to the Asian 'War
on Terror' was previously holed up in a US naval base, with no
journalist able to interview him. He is now in Guantanamo Bay.
US authorities will not hand him over for questioning by Indonesian
or Australian authorities which makes for difficult investigation.
As the Sydney Morning Herald reported on December 23 2006 'No
US official has ever given a reason for the refusal to allow access
to Hambali .Initially it was suggested that outsiders would interfere
with the delicate interrogation and potentially destroy "actionable
intelligence" on future attacks. But six months after Hambali's
capture this excuse was largely seen as irrelevant' Allegations
by the former Indonesian president on who was responsible for
the 2004 Bali bombing were examined in David O'Shea's 'Inside
Indonesia's War on Terror' SBS Dateline October 2005. More on
how Australia's Pacific Policy has little to do with 'failed states'
and terrorism but more to do with China, see the interview with
John Gershman on SBS Dateline July 2003. The skepticism over the
US role in 'War on Terror' in the Philippines deserves its own
separate examination but was raised by reporter John Martinkus,
on SBS's Dateline, May 2005.
iiiSir Halford John Mackinder's most famous
work The Geographical Pivot of History included the quote: "Who
rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the heartland
commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands
the World." He argued that Euro-Asia was the 'pivot' of global
balance and power. Central Asia is considered the 'heartland'
in this theory.
iv In an interview with me, October 2006.
v.Interview Voice of America, October
2006.
vi Voice Of America 27th October, 2005.
vii 'Pentagon Hedge Strategy Targets China'
Washington Times 18th March 2006.
viii Report on Chinese Military Power,
Council on Foreign Relations 2003 p3.
ix These can be viewed as part of a forthcoming
book of interviews out in 2007.
x See SBS Dateline February 25, 2004.
xi In 2005 Lloyd's insurers of London
'Joint War Committee' declared that the Strait was in jeopardy
of 'war, strikes, terrorism and related perils' and had it classified
as a war zone. This may mean that countries will have to pay for
trade to go through the Straits. In March 2006, Malaysia asked
them to review this finding.
xii 'US Island Base Give Warning' Richard
Norton Taylor, Guardian, January 7, 2005.
xiii See 'Using India to Keep China at
Bay' Foreign Policy in Focus, Dec 12 2006 and 'India, China, and
the United States: A Delicate Balance' Council of Foreign Relations
February 27 2006. >
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