The Sudan & The Darfur
by Gillian Lusk
CovertAction Quarterly, Spring
And they keep on dying. Over a year since
Sudan's lslamist government began slaughtering its own citizens
in the remote western region of Darfur, those citizens continue
to be killed by a government that claims to represent them. In
April 2004, many people marked the commemoration of the Rwandan
genocide of April 1994 by saying "Never again!" Yet
Darfur's genocide is still underway!
Among those warning that "Rwanda
in slow motion" was taking place were Sudanese, journalists,
human rights activists and the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire,
who had helplessly watched his own United Nations troops helplessly
watching Rwanda's genocide unfold .3 Also among them was the man
who had headed the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Department at
that terrible time and who is now head of the entire U.N. machine,
Three months after the Rwandan's tenth
anniversary, on July 22, the United States Congress declared that
genocide was taking place. Four days later, on July 26, the Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, issued a "genocide emergency,"
signifying that genocide was taking place or was "imminent."'
Five months after Rwanda's anniversary, on September 9, and after
much shuffling in the corridors of power, Secretary of State Cohn
Powell declared that genocide had indeed occurred. He then announced
that the U.S. government wasn't going to do anything about it.'
International law requires action once genocide is established.
A Department of State official told me the U.S. government had
already done what international law required, a reference to the
two U.S-sponsored resolutions put to the Security Council,' demanding
that Khartoum disarm its Janjaweed militias', which it has not
Eight months after the Rwandan anniversary
[in December 2004], the ordinary villagers of Western Sudan continue
to die at the hands of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime
which rules them and the world still watches helplessly. Perhaps
150,000 people have already died, virtually all of them innocent
and unarmed civilians. Some medical people put the death toll
at double that." In the midst of such a slaughter and in
a country devoid of accurate statistics and cursed with a regime
that doesn't want anyone to know the true figures, no one can
be sure. Many die uncounted.
Estimates of the current death rate range
between a few hundred and 1,000-plus a day. Most are ordinary
villagers. Some are killed by the NIF regime and the militias
it controls. Some die of earlier injuries or because illness and
hunger have weakened their resistance to the many virulent diseases
that prowl through the camps of over 200,000 refugees in neighboring
Chad or the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside
Darfur, which provide a kind of refuge for hundreds of thousands
more. Little children die first.
However, many of the men - and from some
villages, most - are already dead, lined up by the government
militias and shot. They were almost all country folk, leading
a traditional life herding sheep, goats and cattle and farming
family plots of millet and tomatoes. They are the poorest of the
poor in a country where in normal times, one American-sized plate
of food would be far more than the majority of people eats in
a day. Their possessions would not fill one giant modern suitcase
- indeed, this is one of the many forms of wheeled transport that
is not available to them. They rely on donkeys and sometimes camels
This tragedy raises two questions: Why
is the Government of Sudan killing these villagers? And why is
the "International Community" not trying to stop the
killing? These two questions are necessarily connected.
The starting point inevitably has to be
in the Sudan and there, the question to ask is less "Why
are the rural people of Darfur being killed?" than "Why
is the Sudan Government killing them?" That might sound rhetorical:
It is not. Khartoum's Islamist regime has done its utmost to steer
attention (domestic and foreign) away from itself. This works
well, for the interested governments - African, Arab, Asian and
Western - can then hide behind the fig-leaf Khartoum has helpfully
offered them. After all, diplomatic convention insists that in
the common run of international relations, governments do not
attack each other, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Thus a kind of conspiracy has developed which helps to prevent
other governments from speaking out, let alone actively intervening,
while conveniently allowing the NIF government to pursue its own
murderous agenda. Which it has done.
The "Other" Disposable People
So why is Khartoum slaughtering its own
people in Darfur? For the same reason that it did so, more slowly
but just as murderously, in other regions, mainly the South and
the adjoining Nuba Mountains." They got in the way. They
constituted a political threat to the NIF's vision of a Sudan
ruled according to its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.
Just like Jews, as well as Slays, Romas and other "others"
for the European Nazis of the 1930s and 1940s, they don't fit
into the grand scheme of things and are therefore utterly disposable.
In the distorted vision of the fanatic, they are "other"
and not fully human. The moment they pose - or are judged by the
government to pose - a political threat, they are dealt with,
often by extermination.
The Darfur disaster is not simply a civil
war or ethnic conflict, as the Sudanese regime has tried, with
some success, to persuade the world. It is true that, in the main,
people deemed "African" have been attacked by people
deemed "Arab." These are not the convenient divisions
that some outsiders would like to imagine, though. Virtually the
entire population of Sudan is of African descent. Many in Northern
Sudan (which includes the western region of Darfur) also have
some Arab ancestry - and even more claim it. This is because Arab
origins mean you can claim to be a descendant of Prophet Muhammad.
Have a look at the Book of Genesis with all its "begat begat
stretching back over the centuries and you will get some idea
of the significance of genealogy in a largely oral (because illiterate)
desert society where religion is woven into the fabric of society
in all its aspects.
This is one meaning of "Arab"
in Sudan. Nevertheless, there are plenty of threads which run
in the other direction. In Darfur, the epithet "Arab"
has traditionally often been used by settled peoples (mainly "African")
as an insult for nomads: in Africa, settled farmers tend to consider
themselves superior to pastoralists, just as settled Europeans
often look down on wandering Roma people. Darfur is one of the
most ancient homes of Islamic scholarship in Africa, so much so
that it merits a "school" named after it within Egypt's
Al Azhar University, one of the globe's main centers of Islamic
scholarship. This tradition was developed in Darfur by "African"
peoples, mainly the Fur." If people are seen as "African,"
it is not just because they are not nomadic - many "Arabs"
are also settled and some "Africans" are semi-nomadic,
for many keep herds of livestock. "Africans" tend to
have two distinguishing features: they see themselves as belonging
to an indigenous tribe (for instance, Fur, Zaghawa) and most of
them speak their tribal language as their first language, with
Arabic as a lingua franca.
This is not then a question of skin color:
most outsiders and indeed many Sudanese couldn't begin to distinguish
the "Africans" and the "Arabs" from one another.
This crisis is not primarily about traditional rivalries over
ethnicity or access to land and water. The Khartoum government
is exploiting competition over resources, replacing traditional
conflict resolution mechanisms with conflict itself, organized
and paid for by the Islamist regime.
One of the givens in reports of the Darfur
slaughter is that this is not about religion because both sides
are Muslim. The audible sigh of relief is misplaced. Everything
the Sudan government does is in some sense "about religion"
because it is an Islamist government. In other words, its raison
d'être is to impose its vision of an Islamic state on Sudan
and beyond that, on the Arab world, the Islamic world, Africa
and even the wider world. The fact that after 15 years of ruthless
rule it has failed to impose this vision even on its own country
does not (contrary to what a lot of foreign officials seem to
think) mean that it has given up its dream. If you believe you
are implementing God's plan, you may not give up so easily. Religious
fundamentalists of every hue have known this throughout the ages.
Yet it is a hard truth to grasp for Westerners, especially Europeans
living in "post-Christian" societies where faith is
widely seen as a matter of personal choice, not a driving force
of society, let alone of politics.
The Sudanese regime knows this and devotes
considerable effort to a "charm campaign" that projects
an image of itself as having abandoned what it called its "Salvation
Revolution" and its "Civilization Project.' The message
is: "We're just cynical power-hungry corrupt politicians
like yourselves." This goes at least some way towards explaining
why Western governments have convinced themselves they should
"engage" with the NIF, despite not only Darfur and years
of killing in the South and elsewhere, but also an integral role
at the heart of the Islamist International, aka al Qaeda.
Soon after it had taken power, the NIF
invited international Islamists from many countries to Khartoum,
founding the People's Arab Islamic Congress (PAIC), later seen
as a precursor of al Qaeda. Its Secretary General was Mustafa
Osman Ismail (aka "Mister Smile"), now Sudan's Foreign
Minister. One Islamist guest was Usama bin Laden. He stayed five
years, owning a tannery (tanneries are useful relay stations for
chemicals) and owning 'farms" used as terrorist training
Usama went back to Afghanistan in 1995.
The NIF regime later claimed that it had offered to hand him to
the U.S. government, which refused. This was categorically denied
by leading politicians of the time, including Sandy Berger, Madeleine
Albright and Susan Rice." Pro-Khartoum lobbies kept the story
going, presenting the N IF as innocent hosts to a passing Persian
Gulf businessman. It is this emphasis that most makes the "attempted
handover" story implausible. Usama was an integral part of
the Sudanese system and the NIF is an integral part of the international
Islamist movement. There is no way the NIF could have betrayed
him without bringing down the wrath of that international movement
(arid we saw on 9/11 what that can produce). It would also have
destroyed its credibility with its own small but highly efficient
support base. However, since Western observers were more interested
in Clintonesque politics than Sudanese politics, it is widely
believed that Khartoum tried to hand Usama back but was refused.
The NIF is far from being an "average"
thuggish government, as many seem to believe. Originally called
the Muslim Brotherhood when it spread to Sudan from neighboring
Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s, the NIF spent years preparing for
power." Students of Islamist extremism take it as meaning
that Islamists work on a different time-scale from most of the
world. This is very clear in the NIF which, in a society already
used to a developed sense of history and a slow pace of life,
trained its cadres to spend years infiltrating the system to take
power." "Sleepers" patiently bided their time in
remote outposts until the NIF, a tiny but highly organized party,
seized power from an elected government in a military coup on
June 30 1989. Others were open about being Muslim Brothers but
benefited from the traditional tolerance of Northern Sudanese
to each others' politics. This was a society where everyone had
a relative who was an Islamist, just as everyone had one who was
a Communist or a Baathist or belonged to one of the two major
parties, both religiously based but Islamic rather than lslamist.
It didn't occur to most Sudanese that the Islamists were seriously
planning to take power or, since they had little base in the army,
that they would succeed."
The main political actors in the NIF's
1989 coup were not the military men led by Brigadier General Omer
Hassan Ahmed el Beshir, now an improbable President and Field
Marshal. The people who were and still are in charge were civilians,
a mixture of lawyers, doctors and other professionals, most with
doctorates from U.S. and other Western universities. The Sudanese
Islamist movement's most famous face was that of Hassan Abdullah
el Turabi, a man with a mission and a masters degree in law from
London and a doctorate from the Sorbonne in Paris - which played
a not inconsiderable role in keeping the French government on
The coup was timed to sabotage talks to
end the war in the South, talks patiently put together mainly
by the Northern political secularists of left and centre who saw
clearly that a "multi-cultural" country could not continue
to privilege Northern Muslims. This multi-denominational united
country is far from being the basis of the North-
South peace deal now being pushed through
by the U.S. and Britain. [The deal's] "one state, two systems"
formula consigns the North to the Islamists in perpetuity, which
is a major reason that it will not work for Northerners who long
to escape from under the Islamist yoke and who treasure the idea
The NIF remains the totalitarian party
it has always been. Though Hassan el Turabi was in 1999 pushed
sideways by the government's most powerful man, his former deputy
Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, little else has changed in the NIF, though
it did (not for the first time) change its name." Nonetheless,
since it has not changed its spots, most Sudanese still call it
In its first years of power, its most
visible atrocities involved war and forced Islamisation in the
South and Nuba Mountains, with torture everywhere." Northern
politicians and the educated elite were "tortured into exile."
Particular targets were the many intellectuals of the center and
left who, while mostly practising Islam, demanded a secular political
system. Most are now in exile in the West or the Persian Gulf
area, and are distraught to find many on the Western left siding
with the government they have fled.
This is the NIF that has committed such
horrific massacres in Darfur. The armed fronts of the opposition
umbrella, the National Democratic Alliance, have been active mainly
in the Nuba Mountains and South, where the Sudan People's Liberation
Army holds sway, and also in the East, bordering Eritrea and Ethiopia."
Yet from the start, the NIF had perceived the vast Darfur (the
size of France but virtually devoid of hardtop roads) as a potential
threat. It attempted to disarm those in "African" ethnic
groups holding weapons and at the same time, armed "Arab"
groups. Arabism is an easy ideology for Islamists to exploit because
of the importance of Arab roots, culture and language for Muslims.
The Quran was written in Arabic, after all.
The NIF has also used "divide-to-rule"
with a tenacity that would have impressed Imperial Romans. It
has consistently armed militias to fight its proxy wars, just
as it has armed the Janjaweed in Darfur. And just as it has in
the South and the southern "buffer zones," it has also
used its own armed forces to back up the militias, from aerial
bombing of villages to providing uniforms. Now, in the name of
"reining in" the Janjaweed as the U.N. Security Council
has requested, it is integrating these killers into the regular
armed forces and police, where they "disappear" into
the ranks - until it is time for the next depredation.
The immediate trigger for these depredations
was attacks by a new opposition front in Darfur, the Darfur Liberation
Front, which rapidly renamed itself the Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA). It had grown from self-defense groups of some "African"
tribes, trying to protect their kinsfolk from "Arab"
and sometimes government-inspired raids. The pattern of earlier
government repression is clear from the number of arbitrary arrests
of lawyers and human rights activists in Darfur in the months
before the conflict broke, as evidenced in multiple reports and
"Urgent Actions" from Amnesty International and from
Sudanese activists." The SLA briefly took the provincial
capital of El Fasher in April 2003.
This is now taken as the starting point
for the conflict, even though the government-backed militias were
armed and ready to go. They did go. Like several NDA parties,
the SLA demands a politically secular constitution for Sudan and
was rapidly accepted into the NDA. Neither this nor its near total
avoidance of killing civilian S21 earned it international respectability,
however. This was largely because of an intense but often covert
campaign by the NIF regime to present Darfur as a "civil
war." This in turn enabled Western, Arab and African governments
to evade their responsibilities to intervene to save lives by
claiming to be "even-handed." Blaming both sides equally
where only one was committing ethnic cleansing.
The picture has been complicated by the
existence of another Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality
Movement. The JEM consists of Islamists seen linked to El Turabi,
who has claimed the JEM for his own. Though it has little recorded
military activity, it is rich where the SLA is poor and, unlike
the SLA, it is expert at dealing with the [foreign] media. Since
it wants a different Sudan from the SLA, its equal place at the
peace talks in Chad" and later Nigeria has not helped the
larger and more powerful SLA. Recently, two and possibly three
more "rebel movements" have sprung up, all conveniently
Islamist indeed the National Movement for Reform and Development
says it split from the JEM because it was too close to the government.
In the South and Nuba Mountains, the NIF
has spent 15 years creating proxy militias to muddy and bloody
the waters. Many Sudanese believe it is doing the same in Darfur.
The NIF has consistently used a tactic
of testing potential external enemies to see how far it can go.
In Darfur, it has gone a long way. It will have learned a lot
and will have regained the confidence that was somewhat dented
by the international sanctions after the Sudan-backed assassination
attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 199527 and
the U.S. bombing of El Shifa pharmaceutical factory, in August
1998.28 The U.S. invasion of Iraq also gave it nightmares. It
need not have worried. The international perception of a failed
if not neo-colonial operation in Iraq has weakened the West and
strengthened the NIF. Western governments can no longer go to
the U.N. Security Council and get a resolution through that criticizes
a terrorist government for committing genocide, let alone does
something to stop it." This is a major change.
All this has immeasurably strengthened
the Sudanese government. With aid and debt relief offered by the
West if it signs up to the Naivasha peace deal with the SPLA,
it appears to have saved itself when five years ago it was likely
to fall, toppled by a combination of Sudanese and foreign pressure.
To stay in power is the NIF's greatest aim and, as it has through
its history, it will make many compromises to do that. However,
these are merely tactical. For it has a much greater aim than
holding power for its own sake, as it has convinced other governments
it wants to do. It in fact remains wedded to its Islamist agenda,
domestic and foreign, and as it showed when it waited patiently
for years to take power, it is ready to bide its time to hold
on to it.
Gillian Lusk is Deputy Editor of the London-based
fortnightly newsletter Africa Confidential and specializes in
Sudanese matters. She lived in Sudan in 1975-1987 working most
of that time as a journalist. She was Chairperson of the Sudan
Studies Society of the United Kingdom (SSS UK) in 2000-2004. She
writes and broadcasts regularly on Sudanese politics.
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