The Question of Resistance and Alternatives
excerpted from the book
Globalization
and the Decline of Social Reform
by Gary Teeple
Garamond Press / Humanity Books, 2000, paper
p195
The Question of Resistance and Alternatives
There are many who still agree with the position argued 150
years ago' that the struggle against capital is at first national.
The idea remains current in many circles, and some theorists argue
that the national state is a possible instrument for confronting
the processes of globalization. Such positions usually rest on
the persistence of Keynesian beliefs about the interventionist
state, without an understanding of the economic rationale of the
state or without perceiving that such a model has lost its foundation
with the demise of Fordism. We have entered the era of global
capitalism, and attempts to employ the chief instrument of what
was national capital against now-global capital are not likely
to succeed.
The struggle to change oppressive conditions can no longer
be framed in strictly national terms because the nation-state
is more or less rapidly losing its integrity as a system. With
globalization, national forms of struggle are increasingly less
effective against global corporate demands. In the present early
stages of the global era, the decline of national sovereignty,
powers, and laws all go hand-in-hand with the demise of a national
bourgeoisie. The state as a meaningful national political institution
begins to slip into history, just as precapitalist political forms
did with the coming of the bourgeois revolutions.
Most of the movements, political parties, and organizations
that represent property forms other than corporate capital were
and remain defined in national or local terms, and their perspectives
persist within a national framework. Here lies one of the greatest
weaknesses of the opposition and a key reason for much of the
disarray and division amongst many of the counterforces to global
capitalism. The continuing national definition of subordinate
classes and groups creates barriers to their thinking about the
"new reality"; and the limited development of united
or organized global counterforces allows capital to expand without
much restraint or significant opposition at the global level.
Continuous developments in global governance and new instruments
of production have made a singular, unified global market not
only possible but also a growing reality, implying the ultimate
subordination of all national economies. On the one hand, national
labour markets progressively succumb to global changes. The structure
of working classes is transformed; union rights and employment
standards are undermined;S more or less rapid proletarianization
of the Third World takes place; child labour grows enormously;'
and there are new extensions of the economic oppression of women.
On the other hand, orchestrating these changes are transnational
classes and strata that own, manage, and administer global corporate
interests and that oversee the supranational "enabling framework."
Given these developments, globalization can be seen as the
triumph of capitalism,(that is, as)the ascendancy of economics
over politics, of corporate demands over public policy, of the
private over the public interest, of the transnational corporation
and its global framework over
the national state. It represents the approaching completion of
the capitalization of the world. The triumph is embodied in and
affirmed by global agencies whose sole function is the facilitation
of global conditions for capital accumulation, without formal
political access and only limited representation by certain interests.
It is not the occlusion of national politics but the subordination
of national interests and sovereignty to those of the transnational
corporation and its supranational framework.
This rise of the transnational economy, misunderstood by those
preferring to argue for an international version, points to a
significant change in the relation between civil society and the
state: the rise of the polarity of civil society and state at
the global level. This development makes for two such separations,
the first at the national level and the other now unfolding and
clarifying at the global level. To understand the new possibilities
and problems of resistance to the many aspects of globalization,
we need to grasp what is taking place from the perspective of
the concept of civil society and the state.
What many attempts to define the concept of civil society
miss is that it does not stand alone. The concept, like its empirical
referent, the sphere of private interests, appears only as one
side in a relation to the state, the sphere of "the general."
The two comprise the "resolved" components of society:
the private and the public, the particular and the general, the
parts and the whole. They represent the chief distinguishing characteristic
of society become political as in the modern liberal-democratic
nation-state.
In national political systems, the state possesses a monopoly
over the general affairs, albeit in the form of law, administrative
apparatus, the military, state corporations, and so on. Its polar
opposite is civil society, the sphere of particular interests.
Here individuals, groups, trade unions, churches, and, importantly,
private corporations, among others, pursue their specific interests
and advantages, while the formal relation of civil society to
the state is limited to the political rights accorded to individuals.
This divide between general and particular affairs allows prevailing
property relations to be maintained while certain organized parts
of civil society (such as trade unions) can exact concessions
from the state in the form of countervailing property relations
(such as trade union rights, employment standards, and social
rights). Political reforms or concessions are all that can be
hoped for within this system.
Globalization opens a new transnational divide between general
and particular affairs; but at this level the state and civil
society have a different content. On the one side, supranational
quasi-governmental organizations (and the U.S. state) codify,
oversee, and enforce the corporate property relations that define
the global economy. On the other side, global civil society is
composed mainly of TNCs and national states and, to a lesser extent,
international NGOs, including certain religious and environmental
organizations; but it does not include the world's subordinate
classes, which are restricted to national civil societies. We
are faced, then, with the development of a two-tiered contradiction
between the state and civil society.
At the national level, the subordinate classes have some,
albeit limited, access to and influence over the state by means
of the vote, political parties, trade unions, consumer groups,
and in general, the mechanisms of liberal democracy. At the global
level, however, there are no such representative mechanisms; there
the subordinate classes have little institutional presence. Only
national states, representing declining national interests (that
is, corporate interests), and TNCs have any significant relation
to power in this growing global matrix of governing structures.
In effect, the world's peoples are disenfranchised in the global
arena; there is no formal, institutional, legitimate mechanism
for their representation.
The current two-tiered divide between civil society and state
has created a series of new contradictions. Among these are the
contradictions between the world's subordinate classes, progressive
groups and individuals, and the global governance framework for
capital, and their now compromised national states, and the TNCs.
Others have arisen between national states and the agencies of
the global regulatory framework, and the TNCs. And yet others
now exist between the world's peoples and TNC environmental destruction;
between the subordinate classes of the rich and poor nations;
and between the organized working classes of the industrial nations
and the largely unorganized in the Third World. There is, moreover,
the contradiction between political rights at the national level
and economic rights at the global. The world is far from what
it was prior to the early 1970s.
All this has to be taken into account in the consideration
of contemporary resistance and the question of alternatives. When
the main object of resistance is no longer only a national state
and bourgeoisie, but increasingly the TNC and the global "state,"
strictly national strategies contain an implicit defect: they
are the application of, or search for, old solutions to qualitatively
new problems. To fight for the restoration of the sovereignty
of a nation-state makes little sense given that the nation-state
was the political shell and economic market for national capital.
To try to reassert or rebuild the Keynesian welfare state at the
national level, furthermore, has to address the problem of a growing
global labour market, declining incomes and increasing economic
disparities, a dissolving national framework, and TNC pressure
to privatize and deregulate. To fight for socialism in this context,
moreover, means to fight for it in one country; and the theoretical
and practical arguments against this are well known and more pertinent
than ever today. As long as the proposed alternatives are steeped
in the conceptual frameworks and solutions belonging to previous
eras, there can be no successful counterforce, organizational
or ideational, to the present conditions.
None of this is in any way an argument against resistance
or the development of alternatives. The fact of the "new
reality" does not imply that there must be compliance or
subordination to its demands. Numerous labour strikes, demonstrations,
armed resistance, environmental protests, and many other actions
around the world (even the Internet-based resistance to the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment)" aimed at TNCs and their policies
in national guise are all cases in point. The coming of globalization
points to the need to reassess the nature of countervailing demands
and the means to achieve them in a world that bears little resemblance
to what existed even before 1970. New corporate forms, profound
changes in class structure accompanying the new technology, and
the new global enabling framework means that resistance of all
sorts needs to be rethought and reorganized.
It can no longer be assumed that the national, regional, or
local state can act independently of global capital, that the
state can stand on its own in the face of TNCs or continue to
represent national or local capital. The state can be a "site
of resistance," but its intrinsic relation to capital cannot
be overlooked. Where national resistance, alternatives, or threats
have arisen they have met certain similar fates: for example,
in Chile, Nicaragua, Libya, Iraq, Yugoslavia, and East Timor.
The differences between these cases are not the issue; the point
is that each in its own way constituted a national threat to the
operations of global capital.
The challenge for subordinate interests and progressive organizations
and individuals is, first, to understand the nature of contemporary
exploitation and the new contradictions entailed. Second, they
must build global mechanisms for representation and expression
to overcome their national definition and restriction. It follows
that they must also clarify the global demands they are making
and will make, and demand a voice in global governance while critically
analysing its limits and those of national government.
All the struggles that face the subordinate classes and peoples
of the world increasingly find their origins in a system of production
and distribution that is global, more and more dependent on science
and technology, and situated within the complexity of new emerging
contradictions. Effective resistance can only be mounted on the
basis of an understanding of these current global changes. There
can be no answers to problems that are not properly posed or comprehended.
Globalization
and the Decline of Social Reform
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