From Guatemala to Iraq
How the pitbull manages his
poodles
by Edward S. Herman
Z magazine, January 2003
When U.S. officials declare that there
is a dire threat from some hapless small country that they have
put on their hit list, their foreign poodles are quickly brought
in line and agree that, yes, there is a dire threat as the pitbull
has declared, but we must go a bit more slowly perhaps in dealing
with it. The hit list is long: Guatemala, Grenada, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua,
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, among others. So too is the list of poodles:
The U.S.'s NATO allies, our other client states, Kofi Annan and
the UN, and the mainstream media, among others.
Recently the pitbull has declared Saddam
Hussein and Iraq a dire threat to U.S. national security, and
once again he has bullied and coerced the poodles who needed bullying
and coercing into agreeing and setting him up for his planned
aggression. But what a familiar process. An interesting and enlightening
analogy with the present one of Iraq, is that of Guatemala in
the early 1950s.
Guatemala 1954
In the early 1950s, the U.S. government
decided on a "regime change" in Guatemala, and even
before the Eisenhower administration had planned Operation Success
the sainted Harry Truman had given a go ahead for Operation Fortune,
his version of a U.S.-organized violent overthrow of the democratically
elected government of Guatemala. As historian Blanche Wiesen Cook
pointed out in The Declassified
Eisenhower, U.S. hostility to Guatemala
began in 1947 when the democratic government "introduced
a work code affirming the right of workers to organize and strike."
That hostility escalated when the Arbenz government proposed taking
unused land from the United Fruit Company (UFC) at modest compensation
rates (those the company had used for tax purposes) for redistribution
to landless peasants.
United Fruit had intimate connections
to the Eisenhower administration, with the U.S. Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, and his brother, CIA chief Allen Dulles, both
having worked on UFC law business, among other linkages. The company
also did an outstanding job of press management, although as Thomas
McCann, UFC's public relations man in charge of its "carefully
staged and regulated tours," noted sardonically, "It
is difficult to make a convincing case of manipulation of the
press when the victims proved so eager for the experience. "
Of course the proclaimed objective of
Operation Success was neither protection of UFC nor the desirability
of getting rid of a social democratic government that allowed
unions-it was the threat of "international communism"
and "Soviet expansionism," the long-time Cold War cover
for U.S. interventionism and support of undemocratic governments.
It is true that there was an active communist party in Guatemala
and it had a minor position in the Arbenz government, but that
government didn't even dare to have diplomatic relations with
any communist powers, and the Soviet Union had minimal involvement
with Guatemala (Court historian Ronald Schneider, with 50,000
documents seized from communists after the regime change, concluded
that the Soviet Union "made no significant or even material
investment in Guatemala"). There was no communist control
or threat of control. Nevertheless, Eisenhower administration
representatives regularly claimed that the Communists had captured
Guatemala and they even declared this a case of "Soviet aggression,"
whereas their own plans for de facto aggression were "self
defense" against a dire threat.
To advance Operation Success, "U.S.
officials began a sustained plan of public denunciations of the
Arbenz administration" (Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope).
The U.S. mainstream media, with the New York Times in the forefront,
parroted the Administration's false claims and featured them relentlessly.
The media were greatly agitated over the alleged Red conquest
of Guatemala (my favorite title, Sydney Gruson's "How Communists
Won Control of Guatemala," NYT, March 1, 1953) while entirely
ignoring the ongoing active planning for U. S. aggression against
Guatemala. "Every American publication within the liberal-conservative
arc blithely dismissed the charge that the United States was plotting
against Arbenz" (Gleijeses, 262).
Does the pattern sound familiar? Note
the progress since 1954, however-in 2002 Bush can openly announce
a "plot" to commit aggression against Iraq, and that
presents no problem to the media given the advanced demonization
process. Under a U.S. arms boycott, and threatened with a U.S.
direct and sponsored attack, Guatemala bought some arms from Czechoslavakia,
delivered in May 1954. When this was discovered, U.S. officials
and media became hysterical at this demonstration of aggressive
purpose of this supposed instrument of Soviet imperialism (which
would be easily overthrown by a rag-tag U. S. -organized mercenary
invasion force from Nicaragua a few months later). This import
of arms ended the necessity of carrying out the CIA plan to plant
and "capture" arms designed for the sinister leader
of Guatemala. "Just a week earlier, the CIA had even started
to plant boxes of rifles with conspicuous Soviet markings near
Nicaragua's Pacific coast, and to arrange for their 'discovery'
by Nicaraguan police who would claim they came from a 'non-America
submarine' sighted offshore" (Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter
Fruit).
Although with the help of the mainstream
media the Administration established a suitable war hysteria at
home, it was also felt necessary to mobilize support among the
Latin American countries for Operation Success. The Administration
therefore planned to press the OAS to include in the Tenth Inter-American
Conference, to be held in Caracas, Venezuela in April 1954, an
agenda item "Intervention of International Communism in the
American Republics." Most of the OAS members were not happy
about holding the meeting in Caracas in the first place, as its
leader Perez Jiminez was possibly the most ruthless dictator in
Latin America, its jails packed with political prisoners. For
that reason Costa Rica refused to attend the conference. But Perez
Jiminez was highly regarded by the Eisenhower administration.
It gave Jiminez a Legion of Merit award and John Foster Dulles
spoke warmly of his regime to Congress: "Venezuela is a country
which has adopted the kind of policies which we think the other
countries of Latin America should adopt. Namely, they have adopted
policies which provide...a climate which is attractive to foreign
capital to come in. "
In answer to OAS country objections to
Caracas, Gleijeses notes that the State Department "denounced
any contrary view as interference in the internal affairs of a
sister republic." The State Department, Congress, and the
media were also very deeply concerned with the limits of democracy
in Guatemala. Does this rigorous adherence to principle sound
familiar?
At the OAS meeting in Caracas the main
aim of U.S. Secretary of State Dulles was to get Latin leaders
to agree to a condemnation of Guatemala, to set the stage for
the already planned regime change. None of the Latin delegations
supported Dulles's campaign, except those of the U.S.-beloved
dictatorships of Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and
Venezuela. Even the New York Times reported that when the Guatemalan
Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello answered Dulles, he got double
the applause given the U.S. Secretary of State, and Time magazine
quoted another Latin representative as saying, "He said many
of the things the rest of us would like to say if we dared. "
But the U.S.'s bribes and threats were
successful. It had to accept minor concessions in language, so
that the resolution adopted, instead of leaving it vague on what
"appropriate action" should be taken in the event that
" international communism" triumphed here, made it the
basis of "consultation"-the triumph "would call
for a meeting of consultation to consider" appropriate actions.
Adding hypocrisy to its bullying the United States tacked on to
the resolution the high principle that, except for dealing with
"dangers originating outside this Hemisphere [the resolution]
is designed to protect...the inalienable right of each American
state to choose its own form of government. "
The 17-1 vote in favor of the U.S.-sponsored
resolution was based on brutal arm twisting. A senior U.S. official
acknowledged that Dulles "spared no blandishment to get this
Caracas Resolution through." In Gliejeses's summation, "Decades
of submission and 'sordid calculations... [based on] the hope
of receiving a quid pro quo on economic issues' ensured the pitiful
capitulation." But one hour after he got his agreement Dulles
was flying back to Washington, and "those Latin Americans
who had sold Guatemala for the lure of U.S. dollars were robbed
of the payment. "
The capitulation of the Latin American
poodles set the stage for the U.S.-organized invasion in June
1954. Despite an appeal to the UN for protection against this
aggression, the United States succeeded in preventing any useful
UN intervention. The democratically elected regime was overthrown
by violence, ushering in a long dark age for Guatemala. The New
York Times had contended back in 1950 that in its Guatemala policy
"the United States is not trying to block social and economic
progress but is interested rather in seeing that Guatemala becomes
a liberal democracy" (ed., April 8, 1950). This was a propaganda
delusion and lie. Guatemala did have a liberal democracy between
1945 and 1954 and it was that democracy that the United States
deliberately and knowingly ended. The counterrevolutionary regimes
that followed did block social and economic progress, destroyed
intermediate groups, outlawed dissent, and ended the possibility
of reform by democratic means.
Given the huge inequalities in the Guatemalan
system, and with peaceable democratic processes foreclosed, guerrilla
warfare periodically surfaced and, as Piero Gleijeses observed,
"only violence could maintain the status quo." The United
States responded to this, not by insisting on democratization
or providing aid that would help those at the bottom, but by increasing
aid and training the military and facilitating counterinsurgency
war. The military gradually took over control of Guatemala, and
Guatemala became perhaps the first "counterinsurgency state."
As Gliejeses has pointed out, "Waves of extreme violence
(as in 1966-1968, 1970-1973, and since 1978) alternated with periods
of selective repression (as in 1974-77), depending on the degree
of pressure from below on the bourgeoisie and the military."
By 1980 the situation had become so terrible that an Amnesty International
report was titled "Guatemala: A Government Program of Political
Murder. "
The U.S. mass media, however, had lost
interest in Guatemala once the "Reds" were ousted, so
the U.S. public was not made aware of the fact that the defeat
of the Reds in 1954 had been a victory over democracy and reform
and that the United States had ushered in, and for many decades
aided and protected, a regime of exceptional terror.
Iraq in 2002
Once again the U.S. is organizing for
a regime change. As in 1954, it has grotesquely exaggerated the
threat to national security posed by a crushed and virtually disarmed
target. But the media play the game, just as they did earlier,
taking at face value wild assertions of a huge and real threat,
pushing this propaganda theme relentlessly, and pretending that
the inspections regime demonstrates the international community's
concerns over this threat, when in fact it is merely an imposition
by the pitbull and his Poodle Number One.
The media do not remind the citizenry
of the history of that dire Guatemalan "threat" of 1954,
nor the hugely undemocratic sequel to that earlier "regime
change." They rarely mention that the pitbull actually helped
Iraq acquire "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs) in
the 1980s when Saddam Hussein was fighting Iran, a U.S. enemy
of the moment, and that he and Poodle Number One went to some
pains to prevent any international condemnation of Iraq for using
chemical weapons in those years. The media also fail to mention
or reflect on the fact that Iraq didn't use such weapons during
the Persian Gulf War when the United States would have retaliated.
To mention these things the media would
have had to be willing to show the monumental U.S. hypocrisy in
this demonization process and claim that Iraq's possession or
use of WMDs poses a serious threat. They would have to recognize
that Iraq can't use them without committing suicide, unless it
did so once again against a target approved by the pitbull. This
might lead to the further reflection that perhaps the real global
problem is the pitbull's possession of WMDs, which he has used
lavishly from Hiroshima to Vietnam to its depleted uranium "dirty"
weapons employed in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, and which he
is actively readying for use in the future as he prepares to dominate
the world by threat and violence.
As in 1954, when the Latin American democratic
states and global community were opposed to the U.S.-engineered
regime change by aggression, so now the world community is opposed
to the planned Iraq war. But as in the earlier case the "international
community" has been bullied and coerced into supporting the
pitbull: agreeing, although not believing, that Iraq poses a serious
threat, and putting the onus for war avoidance on the target.
Just as in the 1954 case, by joining the pitbull in severely condemning
the targeted victim, the poodles have given him the sanction and
moral approval for action.
As in 1954, the targeted state and numerous
individuals and groups have appealed to Kofl Annan and the UN
to do something to stop the openly announced planned aggression
by the pitbull. They have pointed out that the UN was organized
to prevent "the scourge of war" by "effective collaborative
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace"
(Preamble and Article 1, 1 of the UN Charter) and that the UN
Charter condemns unilateral attacks across borders not justified
by self-defense. Such attacks constitute aggression, "the
supreme international crime," as noted by the UN representative
at the Nuremberg trials, Robert Jackson.
But in the New World Order, as in the
old, these rules are only applicable to small countries, and even
then only when acceptable to the pitbull. They can never apply
to actions of the pitbull. Thus, as he wishes to commit aggression
against Iraq, Kofi Annan and the world community agree with him
that his aims are noble, his cause just, but that he should go
through the proper channels to commit aggression. Hence the new
inspection regime, with endless requirements that the target must
meet in detail or be subject to attack. In short, it is up to
the victim to prevent aggression against itself; it is not the
responsibility of the international community to prevent aggression.
As Kofi Annan stated on November 25 in Paris, "I hope the
government of Iraq will fully cooperate with the inspectors and
respect its obligations unreservedly. This is the only way to
avoid conflict in the region. "
As in 1954, the pitbull is pledged to
"consult," but he has already announced that he is going
to invade Iraq anyway, and he is spending all his energy organizing
for war and negotiating who will get what part of the loot from
the victim, while some of his poodles inspect and pretend to have
brought the pitbull back into the world of civilized behavior.
While the similarities to 1954 are great, there are differences,
and there has been a Kafkaesque kind of "progress"-in
1954 the UN was simply immobilized by U.S. power, whereas today
the UN, after lending its authority to a sanctions regime that
has killed over a million Iraqi civilians, is now facilitating
a planned U.S. aggression. It is doing this by accepting as legitimate
the pitbull's claim that the crushed Iraq poses a grave threat,
and by putting up an inspection regime that will easily give the
pitbull his excuse to do what he has already announced he will
do anyway: commit aggression against a country that has done him
no injury and poses no threat to him.
In his 1956 book, The Fable of the Shark
and the Sardines, the first president of Guatemala during the
democracy decade, Juan Jose Arevalo, wrote, "Sharks will
eat sardines forever and ever. But they should eat them plain,
without doctrinal oil, without legal jelly, without the cellophane
wrapping paper." But Arevalo overlooked the fact that, unlike
sharks, the pitbull needs that doctrinal oil, legal jelly and
cellophane wrapping. Without them how would he be able to give
his public and poodles the moral cover they require for the ruthless
exercise of power?
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