Terror as an Integral Feature of the National
Security State
excerpted from the book
The Real Terror Network
by Edward S. Herman
South End Press
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that terror is a built-in
feature of the NSS, firmly grounded in its ends and in the objective
situation with which it was designed to cope. ... its objectives
are those of a small elite minority, who need and use the NSS
to implement a system of permanent class warfare. The economic
model of Third World development favored by the west does not
say "use terror," but the policies that are favored,
which would encourage foreign investment and keep wages and welfare
outlays under close control, could often not be put into place
without it. Privilege cannot be maintained and enlarged from already
high levels if "the people" are allowed to organize,
vote, and exercise any substantial power. As was pointed out by
Martinez de Hoz, the top financial minister of the Argentine military
government, in arguing for his 1976-1977 economic plan, "We
enjoy the economic stability that the Armed Forces guarantee us.
This plan can be fulfilled despite its lack of popular support.
It has sufficient political support...that provided by the Armed
Forces."
With undeviating regularity, the imposition of a NSS is accompanied
by a rapid dismantling, or other mode of neutralization-frequently
by killing, imprisoning or exiling the leadership-of working class
and peasant organizations, like unions, cooperatives, leagues,
and political groupings. The heart of NSS economics is wage control,
and the introduction of each NSS has been followed by a sharp
fall in real wages and dramatic increase in the rate of unemployment.
This is one of those special Freedoms brought by machine guns,
which has its own Orwellian Chicago School designation in the
NSS: Thus in explaining the shooting of a trade union leader speaking
in favor of a strike, an Argentine army communiqué of 1977
stated that "the legal forces acted in accordance with orders
designed to guarantee freedom of employment." In addition
to Freedom of Employment there is also a rapid transformation
of the government budget, enlarging "security" expenditures,
tax incentives and infrastructure investments that serve the joint
venture partners, and a contraction of public outlays for the
majority. This could not be accomplished without force and violence.
A primary characteristic of the NSS is, therefore, exceptional
numbers, activities, power and rewards of the military and police
establishments. The Brazilian military tripled its real budgetary
allocations in the decade following the coup of 1964, and the
Brazilian generals live well, with butlers, chalets, expense accounts,
and substantial returns from their public salaries and private
business participations. In Uruguay, the coming of the NSS resulted
in a fall in educational outlays from 21% of the national budget
in the early 1960s to little more than 13% in 1980. Military expenditures
jumped sharply to over half the national budget, and by 1980 one
of every 30 citizens of Montevideo was employed in the National
Security apparatus.
With the coming into power of forces that explicitly set aside
the rule of law in favor of a "state of siege," the
potential for serious terror is high. The military-security presence
is felt by the population of the NSSs in a pervasive use of informers
and by the application of violence that has gone beyond the traditional
brutalities of Latin America in both scope and quality. It varies
partly in accordance with the level of violence needed for the
proper degree of intimidation. But this level is often exceeded
by the fanaticism and self-interested bureaucratic desires of
the newly dominant "security" forces. In Chile, where
class conflict was sharp, and ideological frenzy in the military
was deliberately intensified by extreme right factions and the
CIA, exceptional violence was unleashed. In Argentina and Uruguay,
also, fanaticism and self-interest give NSS violence special momentum.
The security forces of the NSSs are given a dirty job, and it
frequently grows on them.
In performing their function of returning the majority to
a state of apathy, and keeping them there, it is possible that
once the leadership of popular organizations is decimated and
an environment of fear and hopelessness is created through years
of direct violence, that tacit threats alone will suffice. If,
however, the very logic of the system is to depress the masses-politically
and economically-to allow unconstrained pursuit of elite benefits,
to protect an increasing income gap, and to keep costs down in
a competitive world, permanent immiseration and permanent repression
may be required. This would seem to be implicit in a development
model which "creates a revolution that did not previously
exist;" that is, which has a special capacity to generate
misery and protest which will necessitate repression. Furthermore,
where the NSS managers are ideologically conditioned to regard
all dissent, protests and lower class (majority) organizational
efforts as Communist subversion, a self-perpetuating mechanism
of permanent terror is built-in.
... the scope and quality of intimidation under NSS conditions
... quickly overwhelms the reader by the horror of the multitudinous
details of pain or the incomprehensibility of the aggregates of
numbers tortured, killed and frightened into silence. It is important
to understand that the NSS unleashed more sophisticated forms
of violence, beyond traditional bloodbaths and intimidation, based
on more modern technologies and theories and ideologies of counterinsurgency
and Communist omnipresence and total evil, that made for uglier
and more ruthless forms of terrorization.
Human torture, for example, only came into widespread and
institutionalized use as the NSSs emerged and matured in the 1960s
and 1970s. By institutionalized I mean employed as standard operating
procedure in multiple detention centers (as many as 60 in Argentina,
33 in Colombia), applicable to hundreds of detainees, and used
with the approval and intent of the highest authorities. ... 14
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as a dozen
other countries in the U.S. sphere of influence, were using torture
as a mode of governance, on an institutionalized and administrative
basis, in the early 1970s. The extent of concentration of this
violence in the NSSs of Latin America is evidenced by the fact
that 80% of Amnesty International's "urgent cases" of
torture by the mid-1970s were coming out of these states. As torture
spread through the NSS system a fairly standardized core of electronic
and medical technology was used that allowed the victims to be
carried to a more severe state of pain and dehumanization just
short of death. The fearfulness of the violence imposed on the
tortured thousands in the NSSs has been documented extensively,
although, ... this evidence has been muted by the Free Press.
*****
The numbers that have been subjected to torture in the NSSs
is, of course, impossible to determine with even approximate accuracy,
and it varies in severity. Detainees have been subjected to torture
ranging from brief and slight to a long and intense use that is
continued till death. Frequently torture has been applied automatically
to virtually all political prisoners (as in Argentina and Chile
immediately after their military coupe), but this is not always
the case. Al describes it as used in "the majority of interrogations"
in post-1964 Brazil; Zelmar Michelini estimated that of 40,000
political prisoners in Uruguay up to 1974, only 5000 were tortured
(although he may have meant tortured severely). A more recent
witness, Victor LaBorda Baffico, a defecting military officer,
reported in 1981 that everyone detained in Uruguay regardless
of age, sex, or crime is routinely tortured. (Baffico, the fourth
such defector-witness from Uruguay in the last year or two, has
not yet attracted the attention of the Free Press.)
The numbers imprisoned for political reasons in the NSSs of
Latin America, if we include all who are picked up and taken to
police stations for "questioning," probably greatly
exceeded a million for the period 1960-1980. In Sao Paulo, Brazil,
28,000 were picked up for questioning as possible subversives
in the year 1977 alone. Over 100,000 were detained for political
reasons in Chile during the post-coup period of 1973- 1976. Of
these, a large fraction were killed (over 20,000), and a still
larger fraction were subjected to torture. Given the high rates
of torture of political prisoners in the larger states like Brazil,
Argentina and Chile, the numbers tortured in the NSSs, 1960-1980,
run into the hundreds of thousands.
This is terrorism in a form that retail terrorists cannot
duplicate. Applicable as a mode of governance in more than a dozen
NSSs, it is an important part of a real terror network that the
Free Press pretends does not exist.
*****
The "death squad" has been an equally noteworthy
aspect of NSS terror, complementing the seizure, torture and killing
activities by the regular police, army and security forces(As
can be seen on Table 3-3,)death squads came into existence in
ten separate states of Latin America during the past two decades.
Usually they are composed of regular military, police and intelligence
personnel working in "off-duty" functions. According
to AI, in Argentina:
Each sector of the armed forces has established a small operational
force for this specific purpose [the eradication of "subversion"].
To carry out the kidnappings, they use stolen vehicles; to evade
detection they have false identity papers; and although they can
act with autonomy, they have to make daily reports to their superiors
about the prisoners they have taken. At times these groups indulge,
for personal gain, in kidnappings for ransom.
In other NSSs, while the death squads are often official personnel
working secretly, sometimes they are made up of former police
or military personnel; or they may be mainly civilian paramilitary
right-wing groups who kill people the NSS wants, or doesn't mind
being, killed. In almost all cases the activities of death squads
are under the direct supervision of the authorities in their political
kidnapping and murder activities. In Central America, paramilitary
groups of the extreme right are more common than in South America,
but even here they are often organized by the official forces
(as with Orden in El Salvador) and, "Despite protests to
the contrary by the governments concerned, they operate with impunity,
outside the law but fully integrated into the regular security
network."
The idea that the "death squads" are "out of
control" is, of course, part of the NSS apologetics and part
of the reason for the very existence of the death squad. Its separation
from the regular forces allows systematic murder to be carried
out for which the state may wish to deny knowledge and responsibility.
A corollary is that its allies abroad who like the NSS, and their
mass media parrots, will also be able to use "plausible denial"
as a defense. It is not very plausible, but Jeane Kirkpatrick
waxes indignant at the outrageous notion that the governments
of the NSSs condone the nasty doings of the death squads!
The NSSs exterminate a great many dissident guerrillas; i.e.,
a left "out of control." That right-wing killers out
of control could not be similarly exterminated if they were felt
detrimental seems unlikely. That they have emerged "out of
control" so regularly is also remarkable. That they are composed
of people who, either right now or in the past were "under
control," that they kill the same kind of people as the official
forces of the NSSs, that they operate in broad daylight and are
never apprehended-all suggest a simpler hypothesis-that the death
squads are under good control and do what the leaders of the NSSs
want done. As indicated above, there is a great deal of evidence
that they are usually quite definite parts of the organized military
forces; where they are not, they are usually still under official
control.
Death squad murders in Latin America have been a daily occurrence
now for several decades. In the Dominican Republic where the La
Banda death squad was "openly tolerated and supported by
the National Police" in the early 1970s, there was an average
of one disappearance per day. In Argentina, after the 1976 coup
the daily average of disappearances was five or more for an extended
period. In Guatemala death squad murders averaged almost ten a
day through the first half of the 1970s. The total numbers kidnapped
and murdered by NSS death squads over the past two decades is
not known, and is somewhat ambiguous as the distinction between
regular force/death squad abductions and murders is vague, possibly
untenable. A sizable fraction of the "disappeared" have
been victims of death squads but many death squad victims have
not disappeared. The estimate of numbers of disappeared in Latin
America given at the First Congress of Relatives of the Disappeared,
90,000, is nevertheless a rough order of magnitude figure for
death squad victims, comparable to estimates that can be built
up from individual country values.
Important characteristics of death squad activities in Latin
America, which bear on the nature and purposes of the NSS have
been their sadism and their tie-in with ordinary illegal activities
like theft, kidnappings for ransom and the drug trade. They are
serviced by thugs. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and
Guatemala death squads rarely just kill; they rape, torture and
mutilate. Al mentions the fact that the security operations of
Paraguay are "carried out by teams whose members include
the mentally deficient and the sexually disturbed." And fanaticism
and pathology are evident throughout the NSS system in the cigarette
burnings, amputations, and sexual violence and mutilations. Al
notes, for example, that "It is invariably reported in the
Guatemalan press that [death squad victims] show signs of having
been tortured and mutilated before death. Raids by death squads,
and for that matter regular security forces, are very often looting
expeditions in the NSSs, and there have been numerous cases of
kidnappings quite plainly for pure ransom. Lernoux quotes the
head of a large U.S. subsidiary in Buenos Aires, acquainted with
a jeweler whose daughter was abducted while the "security
forces" ransacked his apartment for money and jewels, who
told Penny Lernoux that "stealing is officially approved
as a means of encouraging these thugs.''
The thugs have a role to play in the NSS-they eliminate "subversives"
and intimidate and create anxiety in the rest of the population,
all potential subversives.
Real
Terror Network