Reining in the IMF
by Marijke Torfs
Multinational Monitor magazine, January / February
1998
After decades of operating in relative obscurity, the IMF
is taking center stage of public debate in the United States and
throughout the world. Frantically running to the rescue of the
recently beleaguered Asian economies, the IMF is throwing around
unprecedented amounts of public money, bailing out rich country
banks and imposing its traditional austerity programs upon 350
million people in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and South
Korea.
Coming on the heels of the Mexican bailout of 1995, the IMF's
central role in the Asian financial drama represents a substantial
expansion of the Fund's mandate and power. Originally conceived
as an entity to provide temporary financing assistance to Western
countries having trouble sticking to the fixed exchange rates
of the post-World War II era (currencies then had a set value
relative to the U.S. dollar, which was redeemable for a set amount
of gold), the IMF redefined itself in the 1970s. It began providing
short-term balance of payment assistance (aid when money is flowing
out of a country at unsustainable rates compared to the incoming
rate) to developing countries, in exchange for their imposition
of strict "structural adjustment"-budgetary and monetary
programs of austerity, combined with economic deregulation. Now
the Fund is carving for itself an additional role as guarantor
of the private international financial system, a de facto insurer
of loans and foreign investment to industrializing countries.
The insurance comes free for lenders, but the traditional high
payment of austerity measures is exacted from debtor countries
having trouble repaying loans.
To fill this new function, the IMF needs more resources. During
its last annual meeting, the IMF's board of governors agreed upon
a 45 percent quota increase, adding $90 billion to its $200 billion
budget. The U.S. share of the $90 billion is $14.5 billion.
But even as the IMF and its U.S. allies misleadingly claim
that the Asian crisis makes it urgent that the Fund quickly receive
an infusion of new capital, U.S. lawmakers are raising serious
questions about the IMF's lack of clear purpose, its counterproductive
adjustment programs, its penchant for bailing out big international
banks and its excessive secrecy. (The urgency claim is misleading
because the IMF already has allocated monies to Asia from existing
resources, because the IMF has plenty of capital on hand and can
raise more, and because the money from quota increases would go
for purposes other than financial bailouts.
The increasing volume of criticism from Congress, the mainstream
media and establishment economists follows almost two decades
of condemnation of IMF austerity from labor organizations, environmentalists,
poverty groups, church organizations and sustainable development
advocates, as well as more recent criticism from right-wing groups
which denounce financial bailouts as an improper interference
in the market economy. Rising criticism of the IMF is leading
some IMF backers to offer to "condition', U.S. money for
the Fund, and some opponents seem satisfied that :conditions can
satisfactorily reform the IMF. There is a decade of experience
that suggests otherwise, however.
Muted voices, Neglected vote
Since 1989, Congressional approval of funding for the IMF
has been linked to legislative language requiring the U.S. executive
director to the IMF to use "voice and vote" in order
to promote specific policy and procedural changes at the institution.
In 1989, the Congress urged the U.S. executive director to promote:
1) the addition to the Fund's staff of natural resource experts
and development economists trained in analyzing the linkages between
macroeconomic conditions and the short- and long-term impacts
on sustainable management of natural resources; 2) the establishment
of a systematic process to review in advance, and take into account
in policy formation, projected impacts of each IMF lending agreement
on the long-term sustainable management of natural resources,
the environment, public health and poverty; and 3) the creation
of criteria to consider concessional and favorable lending terms
to promote sustainable management of natural resources. This last
requirement specifically refers to the reduction of the debt burden
of developing countries in recognition of domestic investments
in conservation and environmental management.
In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed even more comprehensive
legislation demanding the U.S. executive director regularly and
vigorously in program discussions and quota increase negotiations
promote the following:
* Programs to alleviate poverty and reduce barriers to economic
and social progress, and to incorporate environmentally sound
policies into Fund-promoted government programs;
* Policy audits;
* Policy options that increase the productive participation
of the poor; and
* Procedures for public access to information.
In order to prevent any ambiguity about the interpretation
of these overall objectives, the 1992 legislation provides a detailed
list of specific policy recommendations. Among the policy changes
were:
* All IMF programs should consider poverty alleviation and
the reduction of barriers to economic and social progress;
* All Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) should articulate the
principal poverty, economic, and social measures that borrowing
nations need to address;
* The IMF should incorporate environmental considerations
in all of its programs;
* The IMF should encourage nations to implement systems of
natural resource accounting in their national income accounts;
* The IMF should assist and cooperate fully with the statistical
research being undertaken by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development and the UN in order to facilitate development
and adoption of a generally applicable system for taking account
of the depletion or degradation of natural resources in national
income accounts;
* The IMF should conduct periodic audits of all its programs,
on a country-by-country basis, to determine whether the IMF's
objectives were met and to evaluate social and environmental impacts;
and
* PFPs and the supporting documents prepared by the IMF's
mission to a country, among other documents, should be made public
at an appropriate time and in appropriate ways.
While both laws were very specific in their policy recommendations
and reporting requirements, this important congressional action
did not lead to any real changes of IMF operations or policies.
The only noticeable shift was reflected in the IMF's managing
director's rhetoric, emphasizing the importance of achieving high
quality growth without hurting people or the environment in all
IMF programs. The IMF also changed the job description of one
of its senior economists, Ved Ghandi, to include environmental
issues.
Having an environmental expert at the Fund did not benefit
the environment in any discernible way, either. In fact, Ghandi's
main tasks seem to focus on writing papers explaining why the
IMF should not be concerned about or engaged in environmental
issues. After two years of analysis, Gandhi concluded that macroeconomic
stability would lead to environmental stability but that sustainable
environmental management was not critical for macroeconomic stability.
In other words, in a well-managed economy, the environment will
take care of itself; and taking care of the environment is irrelevant
to economic well-being. While Gandhi has shifted from this position,
the IMF continues to support the notion that microeconomic policies,
such as environmental resource management policies, do not affect
the macroeconomic outlook of a country.
Two years later, the experience was replicated in the area
of labor rights. In 1994, the U.S. Congress attached the Sanders-Frank
Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill, requiring
U.S. executive directors to use voice and vote to urge international
financial institutions, including the IMF, to:
* Adopt policies to encourage borrowing countries to guarantee
internationally recognized worker rights;
* Promote compliance with key International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions, including those guaranteeing the right of association,
the right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibitions against
forced labor, a minimum wage, maximum hours of work and occupational
safety and health protections; and
* Establish formal procedures to screen projects and programs
funded by the institutions for any negative impacts on key labor
rights.
The Treasury Department was supposed to report on its progress
in promoting these reforms at the international financial institutions
after one year. It took almost three years for the Treasury to
send its report to the Congress. Instead of explaining why the
U.S. executive directors had failed to promote any of the legislative
requirements, the report offered ideas on how to begin the process
of implementing the Sanders-Frank amendment. For example, the
report provided an outline of what a possible screening process
could look like. It also cited general steps the international
financial institutions have undertaken to reform labor markets
as evidence of efforts to guarantee internationally recognized
labor rights.
It is hard to imagine a more cynical response from the Treasury
Department. "Not all labor market reforms have to do with
improved labor rights," notes Terry Collingsworth, general
counsel of the Washington, D.C.-based International Labor Rights
Fund. "Instead, many of these reforms contribute to the denial
of labor rights."
Collingsworth summarizes the report as "lacking in any
real, substantive action or assessment that address the express
requirements of the law."
Money Talks
Something fundamentally different took place in 1994, the
same year the Sanders-Frank amendment was passed, however. Frustrated
with the lack of IMF responsiveness, the U.S. Congress cut the
proposed $100 million U.S. contribution to the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) by $75 million.
In a conference report attached to the bill, members of Congress
expressed their hope that the IMF and its member countries would
work with the U.S. government to open up the IMF to more public
scrutiny. Congress urged the U.S. Treasury Department to push
for reform of the IMF's disclosure policies. Congress asked for
the release of several IMF documents to the public including the
Recent Economic Developments and program documents. Other IMF
documents are owned by the countries themselves, and their publication
depends on the willingness of the national government. But since
most of these documents are prepared by IMF staff and are critical
for understanding of Fund programs, the legislation required the
IMF to strongly encourage governments to make these documents
available to the public. These documents include: Article IV Consultations,
Letters of Intent and Policy Framework Papers.
But the conference report did more than just urge these reforms.
It strongly suggested that future funding for ESAF would be withheld
until the IMF made the desired reforms. "To determine when
and whether to recommend the remainder of the $100 million requested
by the Administration for ESAF, consideration will be given to
the progress made on the disclosure of the above information.
In contrast to all previous legislative efforts, the 1994
legislation did result in identifiable reforms. The IMF made the
REDs publicly available and began posting summaries of the Article
IV consultations on the Internet. IMF management also agreed,
in 1997, to an independent review of ESAF programs to be conducted
parallel to the IMF's own ESAF review. While the independent review
has not yet been published, early statements of the reviewers
have been critical and IMF management has promised to release
an uncensored version of the reviewers' report.
The disclosure reforms have been progress, but not a panacea.
While these documents provide a flavor of the nature of the program,
even economists such as Jeffrey Sachs are unsatisfied with the
progress. In one of the many editorials written by Sachs related
to the Asia crisis, he states that the IMF is only paying lip
service to "transparency." Sachs complains that the
IMF provides virtually no substantive documentation of its decisions
as the documents are shorn of the technical details needed for
serious professional evaluation of the programs.
Curbing the cash
Many, not least those in IMF managerial positions, have criticized
the legislative strategy to change the IMF. Opponents argue that
the IMF is a multilateral institution which has to reflect the
priorities of all of its member countries. It is not appropriate,
the argument runs, to use the U.S. legislative process to open
up the IMF to public scrutiny or to force it to deal with social
and environmental issues.
Unfortunately, the IMF has not given the public any other
choice. People in borrowing countries do not have the same opportunity
to influence the Fund, and neither do their elected governments.
Meaningful public participation in shaping borrowing country
programs is currently not possible. The IMF's Articles of Agreement
state that IMF mission people shall only interact with representatives
from finance ministries or central banks. Even if finance ministries
allow public consultation, crucial details of IMF programs remain
confidential. With limited knowledge of the program details, the
population in borrower countries-the ones to affected by IMF-imposed
policies-cannot seriously participate in policy formation. In
most cases, even national parliaments have little choice but to
"endorse" an IMF agreement without serious discussion,
input or understanding of the programs.
The enormous leverage of the IMF over democratic institutions
in borrowing countries was made plain in South Korea's presidential
elections late last year, as the Fund insisted that all presidential
candidates endorse the IMF bailout agreement.
In the United States, but also in a growing number of other
industrialized countries, the public does have a voice in and
can affect policy decisions of their governments. The United States
is one of the few countries that offers public hearings on the
operations of all multilateral institutions financed by the public.
During these hearings, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from
around the world have testified about the devastating impact of
IMF programs. At the request of U.S. members of Congress, NGOs
have provided input in the development of IMF reform language.
These IMF reform initiatives reflect the concerns of people around
the world.
If the IMF would provide serious avenues of communication
with the public, perhaps advocacy groups would not have to resort
to the legislative strategy of denying the Fund money. Until then,
curbing the cash is the only way the public can be heard.
Marijke Torfs is director of the international department
at Friends of the Earth, U.S.
IMF,
World Bank, Structural Adjustment