The Crime of War: From Nuremberg
to Fallujah
A review of current international
law regarding wars of aggression
by Nicolas J. S. Davies
Z magazine, February 2005
In September, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan told the BBC that the U.S./British invasion of Iraq was
illegal under international law. The following week, he dedicated
his entire annual address to the UN General Assembly to the subject
of international law, saying, "We must start from the principle
that no one is above the law and no one should be denied its protection."
So how was the invasion of Iraq illegal? How does that affect
the situation there today? And what are the practical implications
of this for U.S. policy going forward, in Iraq and elsewhere?
The Secretary General presumed what the
world generally accepts-that international law is legally binding
on all countries. In the United States, however, international
law is spoken of as a tool that our government can use selectively
to enforce its will on other nations or else circumvent when it
conflicts with sufficiently important U.S. interests. Let me preface
a review of war crimes in Iraq with a look at the legal status
of international law.
When the president of the United States
signs a treaty and it is ratified by the U.S. Senate, our country
is making a solemn undertaking. The seriousness of such commitments
is exemplified by the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials and subsequent
international trials in which individual national leaders have
been held criminally responsible for treaty violations and, when
convicted, have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment or
even death by hanging. In our own constitutional system, Article
VI Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the Supremacy
Clause, grants international treaties the same "supreme"
status as federal law and the Constitution. It reads: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
You can visit the State Department website
to find a complete list of the international treaties to which
our country is a signatory, under Treaties in Force. These treaties
are enforceable by national court systems in each country, but,
without an international court system to ensure universal enforcement,
the real consequences of violating international law are often
political, economic, and diplomatic rather than judicial. As we
are finding in Iraq, these consequences can be substantial.
It is important to understand that war
crimes fall into two classes: (1) war crimes relevant to battlefield
conduct; (2) waging a war of aggression. To explain what was at
that time an unprecedented focus on the second kind of war crime,
war of aggression, the Nuremberg Judgment included the following
statement: "The charges in the indictment that the defendants
planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity.
War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined
to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To
initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
evil of the whole."
The treaty that outlawed the waging of
aggressive war was the General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War, otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Pact of
Paris. It was named for U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg
and the French statesperson Aristide Briand. It was signed by
President Coolidge in 1928 and duly ratified by the U.S. Senate.
It was the result of a decade of negotiations and lesser diplomatic
achievements to prevent war and was motivated by the horror and
tragedy of World War I. In 1932, the new Secretary of State, Henry
L. Stimson, made the following statement regarding its significance:
"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of
the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become throughout
practically the entire world... an illegal thing. Hereafter, when
engaged in armed conflict, either one or both of them must be
termed violators of this general treaty law .... We denounce them
as law breakers."
The convictions of German leaders at Nuremberg
for the crime of waging aggressive war were based entirely on
the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the history of lesser treaties that
led up to its signing. The Nuremberg Judgment states: "The
question is, what was the legal effect of this pact? The nations
who signed the pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned
recourse to war for the future as an instrument of policy, and
expressly renounced it. After the signing of the pact, any nation
resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the
pact. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation
of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves
the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law;
and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable
and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing."
In 1945, the United Nations Charter, Article
2 Clause 4, reiterated the principles of the KelloggBriand Pact,
stating, "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state." Article
39 established the authority of the Security Council to "determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression" and to "decide what measures shall
be taken."
The U.S. Supreme Court was asked in Mora
v. McNamara (1967) to rule on the case of a conscientious objector
who claimed that the U.S. war against Vietnam was an illegal war
of aggression. In this case, the court cited only the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, Article 39 of the UN Charter, and the London Treaty (which
established the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal) as the relevant
body of international law regarding cases of aggressive war, so
it is reasonable to examine the legitimacy of the war in Iraq
based on those same treaties.
President Bush has avoided citing legal
principles in defense of the war, but he has given three quasi-legal
justifications at different times in political speeches. These
would seem to be his arguments: preemptive self-defense; enforcement
of Security Council 1441, which threatened "serious consequences"
for Iraq's alleged failure to disarm; enforcement of past Security
Council resolutions, going back to 1990. A mutable combination
of all three has worked well for him with U.S. public opinion
as a political justification for war, but does any one of them
actually justify the war under international law?
There is actually an internationally accepted
standard in international law for "preventive" or "preemptive"
military action, known as the Caroline case. In 1837, an insurgency
was raging, not in Iraq, but in Canada. A small, U.S.-owned steamer
named the Caroline was being used to smuggle anti-British insurgents
and shipments of arms across the Niagara River. One night, British
forces crossed the river in small boats and attacked the Caroline
as it was moored on the American side of the river, killing many
of its passengers and crew and setting the ship on fire. The British
then towed the Caroline away from the shore and set it adrift
to plunge over Niagara Falls in a fiery spectacle.
This incident raised warlike passions
on both sides of the border. Americans regarded it as an act of
aggression while the British argued that it was an act of preemptive
self-defense. The matter was eventually resolved peacefully after
an exchange of letters between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster and British Foreign Secretary Lord Ashburton in which
both countries accepted the principle, "Respect for the inviolable
character of the territory of independent nations is the most
essential foundation of civilization," and that this can
only be legally overridden by "a necessity of self-defense,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation," and "the act... must be limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it."
This became the accepted international
standard for preemptive military action, and was cited as such
by the judges at Nuremberg using Webster's precise wording. The
German defendants at Nuremberg defended their invasion of Norway
on grounds very similar to those cited by President Bush today,
claiming a reasonable fear that Norway would become a base for
an Allied attack on Germany. The judges rejected this argument,
writing that the plans for an attack on Norway "were not
made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing,
but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation
at some future date." The court likewise rejected German
claims that "Germany alone could decide... whether preventive
action was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment
was conclusive," ruling that this "must ultimately be
subject to investigation and adjudication if international law
is ever to be enforced."
Based on the principles established by
the Caroline case and cited at Nuremberg, preventive or preemptive
self-defense was not a legitimate rationale for invading Iraq,
which posed no imminent threat to the United States. The fact
that no "weapons of mass destruction" were found, and
that their absence was suspected all along within the U.S. government,
serves to demonstrate the sound rationale behind these principles.
Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously
by the UN Security Council in November 2002 precisely because
it kept the Security Council firmly in charge of the international
response to the U.S.-Iraq crisis and because it did not authorize
the use of force. The resolution "recalls" previous
warnings that Iraq would face serious consequences if it continued
to violate its obligations, but it does not threaten "all
necessary means" or any other diplomatic term for military
force.
This brings us to the whole history of
UN Security Council Resolutions dealing with Iraq. Resolution
678 (1990) authorized "Member States co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait... to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area,"
an explicit authorization for the use of virtually unlimited military
force to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. This sweeping authorization
was terminated four months later when SC Resolution 687 (1991)
declared a formal cease-fire. Unlike Bush II, British Prime Minister
Blair was forced to make a legal justification for the second
war on Iraq. While its text has been kept secret, it was apparently
based on the tenuous argument that Iraq's alleged non-compliance
with other provisions of SC Resolution 687 (1991) could be viewed
as voiding the cease-fire, so that any of the members allied with
Kuwait 13 years earlier could now use "all necessary means"
against Iraq at their own discretion and for a different purpose.
Britain's Attorney General Lord Goldsmith
had initially ruled that a new Security Council resolution that
explicitly authorized the invasion of Iraq would be required under
international law. When it became clear that there would not be
one, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the chief of the British Defense
Staff, told the prime minister that he could not order his troops
into Iraq without a written document stating that this was legal
under international law. His forces then waited in limbo on the
Iraq-Kuwait border for five full days before he received a single
paragraph from Lord Goldsmith giving him the green light, and
the rest is history.
It is now clear that those were five very
strange days for the British government, as no one within the
government, either in the attorney general's office or at the
Foreign Office, was prepared to reverse the earlier ruling. The
impasse was finally broken when Blair turned to a London School
of Economics law professor, who was known to favor war, to write
a new opinion that contradicted every legal expert within the
government. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the deputy legal advisor at
the Foreign Office, resigned, together with two of her colleagues,
and she has since stated publicly that the war is illegal.
A number of court-cases have sought to
uncover Blair's secret rationale for war. In one of them, Katharine
Gun, a whistleblower at Britain's GCHQ, its intelligence headquarters,
had leaked a memo to the press that exposed the U.S. National
Security Agency wiretapping of Security Council diplomats. She
was arrested and tried under Britain's Official Secrets Act and
could have faced a long term in prison. However, as soon as her
lawyers announced their intention to challenge the legality of
the war in her defense and to call Lord Goldsmith as a witness,
the government dropped its case against her.
A précis of the government's case
was revealed in a specific answer to a question in Parliament.
It does indeed seem to hinge on the notion of a breach of the
1991 cease-fire resolution. Crucially, the breach in question
is the specific allegation that Iraq had not fulfilled "its
obligation to disarm." As former Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook wrote in the Guardian on October 15, "There is a logical,
inescapable conclusion from this chain of reasoning. If Iraq had
in reality fulfilled its disarmament obligation, there was no
legal authority for the invasion."
Clearly the force of current international
law on aggression leaves little doubt that our country is guilty
of a serious international crime. In the course of waging this
illegal war, the United States has also violated specific provisions
of other treaties, in particular the Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, also called
the Fourth Geneva Convention. This treaty was drafted in 1949,
with the benefit of recent memory of the German and Japanese occupations
of Europe and Southeast Asia, and it very specifically catalogs
and outlaws many of the tactics that can be used to bend a hostile
civilian population to the will of a military occupation force.
For example, it contains detailed rules
to prevent the abuse of detainees and prisoners; and it bans reprisals,
intimidation, and collective punishment (Article 33); the destruction
of property (Article 53); creating unemployment (Article 52);
and the recruitment of local armed and auxiliary forces (Article
51). The United States has nevertheless employed all these methods
in Iraq and President Bush has even cited the recruitment and
training of armed forces to fight alongside U.S. forces or in
place of them as a centerpiece of his strategy. The illegality
of so much of what the U.S. is doing in Iraq is a direct consequence
of the illegality of the occupation.
If President Bush were to seek a new,
more rational and law-abiding policy, what steps would international
law actually require him to take? How could he actually bring
legitimacy to this situation? The U.S. government has already
gone through a sort of parody of what would be required in the
form of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004). However, while
this resolution represents a good faith effort on the part of
the international community to provide for the welfare of the
Iraqi people and for their political future in the face of U.S.
determination to "stay the course," it has succeeded
in prolonging the war by failing to address the fundamental illegitimacy
of the U.S. and British position.
The "Interim Government of Iraq"
endorsed in the resolution had no credibility or popular constituency
within Iraq and was headed by an acknowledged agent of the CIA
who was flown in with the invasion forces. The "multinational
force" entrusted with "promoting security and stability"
is the same force that unleashed this war on Iraq in the first
place and continues to wage it today. The condemnation of terrorism
in Article 17 does not, and legally cannot, deprive the Iraqi
Resistance of the fundamental right to resist the invasion and
occupation of their country that is guaranteed by Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. By its refusal to turn over any real
power to legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people or to
the UN, the Bush administration has squandered the legitimacy
it sought to gain by this resolution as well as precious time
and many more lives.
The reality is that for 21 months the
United States has been engaged in an unsuccessful war to gain
control of Iraq and that U.S. military operations are killing
2 or 3 times as many Iraqi civilians as the Iraqi Resistance and
foreign "terrorist" groups put together. In any case,
as the aggressors in this conflict, the United States and the
United Kingdom are ultimately responsible for "the accumulated
evil of the whole."
Legitimacy is not something that can be
conjured out of illegality by finding the right political or military
strategy. International law requires us to end our offensive military
operations and to submit the crisis we have created to the UN
Security Council without prejudice, not to win approval of a new
U.S. plan for Iraq, but so that we can withdraw our forces, Iraq
can regain true sovereignty, and the UN can offer its assistance
as needed or requested by the Iraqis. The legitimate ongoing role
of the United States in this process would be the payment of reparations
to enable the Iraqi people to recover from the war and to rebuild
their country.
The principal lesson for future U.S. foreign
policy is that the many diplomats and lawyers who worked so hard
to create the current framework of international law deserve our
profoundest deference and respect. Our predecessors bequeathed
us an international legal code that embodies great wisdom forged
from bitter experience in times at least as difficult and dangerous
as our own. We can begin to unwind this spiral of uncontrollable
violence by renewing our own commitment to international law,
by supporting efforts to strengthen judicial enforcement of its
provisions in both national and international courts, and by insisting
that military and international lawyers be consulted in the formulation
of U.S. defense policy.
Nicolas .I. S. Davies lives in Miami,
Florida and is a student of history and U.S. foreign policy. This
article was first published in Online Journal.
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