Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein:
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984
National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 82
Edited by Joyce Battle
February 25, 2003
http://hermes.circ.gwn.edu
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one
of a series of crises during an era of upheaval in the Middle
East: revolution in Iran, occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran
by militant students, invasion of the Great Mosque in Mecca by
anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan,
and internecine fighting among Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians
in Lebanon. The war followed months of rising tension between
the Iranian Islamic republic and secular nationalist Iraq. In
mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked, in the mistaken belief that
Iranian political disarray would guarantee a quick victory.
The international community responded
with U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire
and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing
in any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing
the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to Iraq, its ally under
a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries resumed in 1982). The U.S. had
already ended, when the shah fell, previously massive military
sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations
with Iran because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis; Iraq had
broken off ties with the U.S. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding
the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran
depended on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought them from
Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq started the war
with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed additional weaponry
as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian
territory, but was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq
was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S.,
having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests,
began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq
relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits,
and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its
list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been
included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian
nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda.
Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa,
was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's
Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination
of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive.
Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf
states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The
White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank
to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing
and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial
institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed
loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction
of U.S. grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with
Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier,
to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret
and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance
with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were
prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum
(NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle
East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983,
is available only in a highly redacted version [Document 21].
It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South
Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and
the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic
and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability."
It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation
with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for
action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting
policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of
the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting
Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva
protocol requires that the international community respond to
chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received
only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified
its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked
for a United Nations Security Council investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments
in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence
confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost
daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy
review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24].
The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against
"Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].
What was the Reagan administration's response?
A State Department account indicates that the administration had
decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program
to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf
war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving
desired results." But the department noted in late November
1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms,
Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built
up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation
to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW,
particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in
a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department
argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain
the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare,
and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the
issue.
Following further high-level policy review,
Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S.
policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's
priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation
to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military
capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries
of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area.
It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact
of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the
international economic system, we must assure our readiness to
deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic."
It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who
had served in various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations,
including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this time
headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle &
Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy.
His December 1983 tour of regional capitals included Baghdad,
where he was to establish "direct contact between an envoy
of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while
emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president
[Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed
regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran
and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to
transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been
shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline
that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made
no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes
on the meeting [Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared
many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's
"willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war,
but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited
by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use
of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human
rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document
32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section
that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased"
with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his
way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document
37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March
1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical
weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that
the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq
used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's
meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since
his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because
"bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5
condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings
that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48].
Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's
hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq,
the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports
to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's
companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member
Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel
to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred
the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently
provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April
1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised
of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters
to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for
military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian
subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned
down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes
helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State
Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983
(when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks
recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State
Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's
intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered
policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program,
and its "preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade
to include Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document 57]. Several
months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that
even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to
develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and
probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is
situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled
a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure.
Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan
administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's
nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons
capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally
mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's
massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for
its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting
a major Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide
capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq possesses
this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41]. On March 3,
the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from
shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons
precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section
to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation
of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and
that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire
the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical
weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts
to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document
42].
The public condemnation was issued on
March 5. It said, "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons
use . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's
intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating
the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent
with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral
and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department
briefed the press on its decision to strengthen controls on the
export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response
to intelligence and media reports that precursors supplied to
Iraq originated in Western countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s
conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any
effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships
with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open
diplomatic relations," the department's spokesperson said
"No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested
in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document
52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution
asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S.
delegate to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations
in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision"
on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate
was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint"
in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of both
France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated
in a fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented
"Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical
weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn
Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public
statements to this effect" [Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon
met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March
29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council
presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted the response
to refer to former resolutions on the war, progress toward ending
the conflict, but to not identify any specific country as responsible
for chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi
proposals if the Security Council went along. He asked for the
Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]"
but also noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to
dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council
issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical
weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State Department
memo circulating the draft text observed that, "The statement,
by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document
51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued
another presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S.
objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf
region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and
the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering
capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans
"to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said
that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation
of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the
caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent
need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane
tactics which have characterized recent offensives." The
directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical
warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S.
support for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated
November 16, 1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons
after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed
their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the
U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with
Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned
to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied
that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability
is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed
thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales to
Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry"
assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent,
"remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important
factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document
60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses
Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading
a skeptical world that a preemptive and premeditated attack on
Iraq could and should be supported as a "just war."
The documents included in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik
that determined this country's policies during the years when
Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than
rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently not perceived
to serve U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan administration did
not deviate from its determination that Iraq was to serve as the
instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was
viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem
that complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi government's
repressive internal policies, though well known to the U.S. government
at the time, did not figure at all in the presidential directives
that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S.
was concerned with its ability to project military force in the
Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing
book, in its broad outlines, has been available for years. Some
of it was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few investigative
reporters uncovered much more - especially after Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed to the late representative
Henry Gonzales (1916-2000), Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively
investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the 1980s and who
would not be deterred from making information available to the
public [Note 2]. Almost all of the primary documents included
in this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive
through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995
[Note 3].
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader
to view.
Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey
Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the Department of State. "Back
Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq," November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq
war, the U.S. embassy in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have
a backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to Iraq, and that a
substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for "Islamic
belligerents," including Israeli chemical products for Iran.
It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both Iran
and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis
and Iranians, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties
and immense material damage. It was sustained by an arms bazaar
made up of a broad spectrum of foreign governments and corporations:
British, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean,
Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African, Eastern European,
Israeli, American, etc., who found both combatants eager consumers
of weapons, ammunition, and military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin
weapons compatible with the military infrastructure created by
the U.S. during the shah's reign, could not buy them directly,
and had to rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel
Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the Department of State. "Conversation
with [Excised]," December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from
selling arms to Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran,
but that European arms dealers were providing it with weapons
with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S.
embassy in Tehran in September 1979 to protest the admission of
the exiled shah to the U.S. for medical treatment, and held 52
Americans hostage. In response, the Carter administration froze
Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The hostages were
not released until January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of newly
elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 3: Department of State Cable
from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern and South Asian
Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for Iran and Iraq,"
February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official
U.S. arms export policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early
1981: the "U.S. position has been to avoid taking sides in
an effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an end to the
fighting and restore stability to the area."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 4: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary]
Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4, 1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the
U.S. and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations at this
time - they were restored in November 1984 - they were represented
in each other's capitol by interests sections) says that the U.S.
now has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than
at any time since the revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis overthrew
the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under
British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris
Draper is to visit Baghdad, "the first visit by a senior
department official since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 5: Department of State Cable
from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi Foreign Minister,"
April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends
a personal message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi,
noting that it is important that "our two countries be able
to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis," paving
the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's meetings
in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 6: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,"
April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues
efforts to improve relations with Iraq, the U.S. interests section
in Baghdad asks for more information from Washington "so
as to be able to take up with the Iraqis on suitable occasions
a wide array of issues of mutual interest."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister
for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper],
April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun
Hammadi thanks Secretary of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary
Draper's visit, supports discussion of strengthened trade relations,
and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 8: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious
letter" from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary
of State Haig, the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with
foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way
correspondence had been established between the U.S. and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable
from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in
the United States. "Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar"
[For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary
Draper assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he
was extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects
for improved relations and increased trade. He takes the opportunity
to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S. company bidding
on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 10: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State.
"Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28, 1981.
Following consultations in Washington,
the head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad, William Eagleton,
meets with Revolutionary Command Council representative Tariq
Aziz, the "highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad
mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations."
Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's satisfaction
with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After the
meeting, he tells Washington that "we are in a position to
communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive
or particularly important message to convey."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 11: Department of State Cable
from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq
and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section
in Baghdad that it "has no specific information" regarding
Iran's reported acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and
asks the interests section head to assure Iraqi officials that
"the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales
to Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 12: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable to the Department of State. "Staffdel [Staff
Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad," September 27,
1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring
the Middle East on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits
Iraq's parliament, and has discussions during which "the
atmosphere was pleasant and friendly," reflected in expressions
of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 13: Department of State Cable
from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section
in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq as Supporter of International
Terrorism," February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance
to regional missions regarding removal of Iraq from its list of
countries that support international terrorism. The guidance says
that the decision has no implications for U.S. policy toward the
Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 14: National Security Study Directive
(NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Strategy for the
Near East and Southwest Asia," March 19, 1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of
policy for the Middle East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions
regarding procurement, arms transfers, and intelligence planning.
Revised guidelines are needed because of regional diplomatic and
global oil market developments.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 15: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of Commerce. "Helicopters and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry
of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform," September 20, 1982.
Iraq's director of agricultural aviation
invites U.S. crop-spraying aircraft manufacturers to provide information
about helicopters and pilot training, noting problems with its
existing equipment because pilots have been inhaling insecticide
fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use
against its forces by this time. According to a 1991 article in
the Los Angeles Times, American-built helicopters were used by
Iraq for some of its chemical weapons attacks; according to the
Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq experimented with using commercial
crop sprayers for biological warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 16: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in
Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister," January 15,
1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests
section in Baghdad to inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of
State George Shultz would welcome a visit by Foreign Minister
Saadoun Hammadi, but notes congressional criticism of Iraq and
the "sensitivity of the terrorism issue" (Iraq supported
several Palestinian nationalist factions.) The department suggests
Iraq "contribute to the positive atmosphere of the visit"
by curtailing its support for terrorism, mentioning specifically
the Palestinian groups Black June and May 15.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 17: Department of State, Office
of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George P. Shultz to the
Department of State. "Secretary's May 10 Meeting with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11, 1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq
war to end. He says that the U.S. is neutral toward the war but
observes that Aziz knows that "we had been helpful to Iraq
in various ways."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 18: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in
Iraq. "Message from the Secretary for FON MIN Tariq Aziz:
Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes
to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, commenting on the "very
important common interests" between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz
obliquely encourages Iraq to disassociate itself from the Palestinian
groups it supports by evoking conservative Shiite militants opposed
to both the U.S. and to Iraq's secular government: it "appears
that at least the inspiration for certain terrorist acts against
Iraq and against the U.S. emanates at times from the same sources.
By working together to combat terrorism, our efforts should be
more effective. In observing Iraqi policy, it had begun to appear
to me that Iraq was approaching the conclusion that its national
interests are never served by international terrorists."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency,
Directorate of Intelligence Appraisal. "The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress Despite Setbacks," June 1983.
In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program,
the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans
to eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not
identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq "has made
a few moves that could take it in that direction," while
noting the difficulty of clandestine research and development
and procurement of the necessary technology and fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 20: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Bodine to the Department of State.
"Militarization of Hughes Helicopters," June 8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government
official from (presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked
his government to militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold
and delivered earlier in 1983. The request was turned down.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 21: National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Reagan. "United States
Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia" [Attached
to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July 12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies,
and action plans for the Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 22: Department of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum
from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq
War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality,"
October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt"
toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and related practical concerns.
The analysis notes that the U.S. "policy of strict neutrality
has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's
forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We assume that
other actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence,
would continue as necessary.)"
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Transcription. "IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical
Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV," October 22, 1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical
weapons against Iranian troops.
Document 24: Department of State, Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan
T. Howe to George P. Shultz. "Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons,"
November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department's
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that
the department has additional information confirming Iraq's "almost
daily" use of chemical weapons. They note, "We also
know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, presumably
from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary."
The issue is to be added to the agenda for an upcoming National
Security Council meeting, at which measures to assist Iraq are
to be considered. The officials note that a response is important
in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on chemical
warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 25: Department of State, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
"Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" [Includes Cables Entitled
"Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons" and "Background
of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons"], November 21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing
the use of chemical weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order
to deter further use and "to avoid unpleasantly surprising
Iraq through public positions we may have to take on this issue."
A background cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons
in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and
August 1983 "and more recently against Kurdish insurgents."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 26: National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan. "U.S. Policy
toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26, 1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations
begin with regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S.
on measures to protect Persian Gulf oil production and its transshipment
infrastructure. The U.S. will give the highest priority to the
establishment of military facilities allowing for the positioning
of rapid deployment forces in the region to guard oil facilities.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 27: Department of State Cable
from Kenneth W. Dam to the United States Interests Section in
Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7, 1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to
visit Iraq during his tour of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy
for President Reagan, but notes that he does not think his visit
will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam Hussein.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 28: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State [et al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December
10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section
in Baghdad tells Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that
"perhaps the greatest benefit" of Donald Rumsfeld's
upcoming visit to Baghdad "will be the establishment of direct
contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam
Hussein." The planned topics of discussion are the Iran-Iraq
war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any other
issues that the Iraqis might want to raise.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 29: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United States
Embassy in Jordan. "Talking Points for Amb. [Ambassador]
Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein," December
14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that
presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be
Saddam Hussein's first with a representative of the U.S. executive
branch; therefore, a major goal will be "to initiate a dialogue
and establish personal rapport." In the meeting, "Rumsfeld
will want to emphasize his close relationship with President Reagan
. . ." Talking points for the meeting include the Iran-Iraq
war (the U.S. "would regard any major reversal of Iraq's
fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West"), expansion
of Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon, Syria, strengthening of
Egyptian and Iraqi ties, and the threat of terrorism, which targets
both countries.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 30: United States Embassy in
Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld's
Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign
Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19," December 20,
1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that
the U.S. and Iraq have both differences and "a number of
areas of common interest." Aziz says that he was heartened
by a line in President Reagan's letter to Saddam Hussein stating,
"The Iran-Iraq war could post serious problems for the economic
and security interests of the U.S., its friends in the region
and in the free world."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 31: United States Embassy in
United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department
of State. "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld,
Saddam Hussein evinces "obvious pleasure" at a letter
Rumsfeld brought from President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss
common U.S.-Iraqi interests, including Lebanon, Palestine, opposition
to an outcome of the Iran-Iraq war that "weakened Iraq's
role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran," and U.S.
efforts to cut off arms sales to Iran. Rumsfeld says that the
U.S. feels extremely strongly about terrorism and says that it
has a home - in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and that it is supported
by the Soviet Union. He encourages arrangements that might provide
alternative transshipment routes for Iraq's oil, including pipelines
through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State
Department calls the meeting a "positive milestone."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 32: United States Embassy in
the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department
of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and
Tariq Aziz meet for two and one-half hours and agree that "the
U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests," including peace
in the Persian Gulf, the desire to diminish the influence of Iran
and Syria, and support for reintegrating Egypt, isolated since
its unilateral peace with Israel, into the Arab world. Rumsfeld
comments on Iraq's oil exports, suggests alternative pipeline
facilities, and discusses opposition to international terrorism
and support for a fair Arab-Israeli peace. He and Aziz discuss
the Iran-Iraq war "in detail." Rumsfeld says that the
administration wants an end to the war, and offers "our willingness
to do more." He mentions chemical weapons, possible escalation
of fighting in the Gulf, and human rights as impediments to the
U.S. government's desire to do more to help Iraq, then shifts
the conversation to U.S. opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 33: Department of State, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
"EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq" [Includes
Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated December
24, 1983], December 22, 1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration's
policy of increasing support for Iraq, the State Department advises
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger
to urge the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financial
credits. Eagleburger signs a letter to Eximbank saying that since
Saddam Hussein had complied with U.S. requests, and announced
the end of all aid to the principal terrorist group of concern
to the U.S., and expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), "The terrorism
issue, therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM financing
for U.S. sales to Iraq." The financing is to signal U.S.
belief in Iraq's future economic viability, secure a foothold
in the potentially large Iraqi market, and "go far to show
our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context."
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 34: Department of State Cable
from Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld
Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London," December 23,
1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary
Donald Rumsfeld discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations
with King Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with
Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says they had "more areas
of agreement than disagreement." He also reviews the status
of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project
strenuously for several years during the early to mid 1980s. It
would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba
in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output
that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities
in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that
had transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the
U.S.'s extreme nervousness about threats to the world oil supply
resulting from the Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational
corporations in planning the project. International financier
Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also
a central figure in the proposed deal. (The final report of the
independent counsel for the Iran-Contra "arms for hostages"
scandal cites reports indicating that Rappaport's bank in Geneva
was the recipient of a mysterious $10 million payment from the
Sultan of Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently
disappeared. Rappaport denied this; the final report says that
the issue remained unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999
at a House Banking committee hearing on corruption in Russian
financial transactions, but declined.) The project was complicated
by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security guarantees
from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been vulnerable
to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees
that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage.
All involved had their reasons for at
least hypothetical interest in the project. For Iraq, it would
have been a manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq relations - they
wanted as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the proposed
deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an alternative,
theoretically secure outlet for oil and created a nexus for entangling
Iraqi interests with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with
U.S. plans to create a wider consortium of Arab countries that
would cooperate with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve
the Palestine-Israel dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have
benefited from new oil facilities in its vicinity, and won points
with the Reagan administration. Also, according to internal documents
from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General Edmund
Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his Israeli ties,
payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial guarantee
arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that
would satisfy all parties dragged on, until the several private
companies that had been brought in to plan the project backed
out, questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however, revived
the concept in 2000, presumably for its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 35: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,"
December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under
Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's
visit. Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to coordinate policy toward
the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its campaign to stop
arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq's oil exports increase.
He informs the Iraqi official of the degree of U.S. interest in
Iraq's economic situation, mentioning the "high level policy
review which had established the environment and policy positions
that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's
visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is
both symbolically important and practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 36: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq's Oil
Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's
talks, Tariq Aziz tells William Eagleton that President Saddam
Hussein was pleased with the visit and with the positive atmosphere
it created.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 37: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan,"
January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section
tells Washington, "the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased
with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way
to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 38: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General,
Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran" [Includes
Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts
to curtail arms sales to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export
controls on that country. However, it does not plan to prohibit
U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize
its export policy for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the
export of U.S.-origin armored ambulances, communications gear,
and electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam Hussein's
personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing efforts
to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide financing for Iraq
-- a positive Eximbank determination would improve Iraq's credit
rating and make it easier for it to obtain loans from international
financial institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 39: Department of State, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to George P. Shultz.
"Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq," January 30,
1984.
The State Department presents the case
for relaxing controls on exports to Iraq of militarily useful
items. The department is concerned specifically with an application
to export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to either Iran
or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration Act. Secretary
of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the
United States, Country Risk Analysis Division Memorandum to the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa and Middle East
Division, Board of Directors. "Country Review and Recommendations
for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract; Includes Document Entitled
"Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq
a bad credit risk because of its very high level of indebtedness
and the uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix
lists U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq
if credits were available, including Westinghouse, General Electric,
Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 41: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive," February
22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's
two visits to Iraq to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations
and to identify measures to assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi
military issues a statement declaring that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide
capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses
this annihilation insecticide."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 42: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in
Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq," March 4, 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds
of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because
of "concern over Iraq's possible intention to use the chemical
in the manufacture of chemical weapons." Washington asks
the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern about chemical
weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will publicly condemn
their use in the near future. The interests section is to reiterate
the request that Iraq not use chemical warfare, and to say that
the U.S. opposes Iraq's attempts to acquire chemical weapons related
material from the U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts
to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 43: Department of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Memorandum from James
A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi
Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.
The State Department circulates for review
a draft press statement and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of
Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The statement says that "While
condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . . The United States
finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate
from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government
of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms
of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which
it claims."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 44: Department of State Memorandum.
"Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale," March
5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee
on Foreign Affairs staff member that the department has not objected
to the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were
built in part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York,
and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S. is that it does
not export military related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked
if the trucks were intended for military purposes, the official
responds, "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and
had not asked."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 45: United States Interests Section
in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW
[Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced
the State Department's condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons
use. The U.S. interests section comments that "The Iraqis
apparently have been stunned by our public condemnation."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 46: United States Embassy in
Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of State.
"Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the
State Department that a Belgian laboratory found residual amounts
of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the blood of Iranian war casualties
brought to Vienna for medical treatment.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 47: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office of
the United Nations and Other International Organizations. "U.N.
Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of
Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S.
delegate to the United Nations to get the support of other Western
missions for a motion of "no decision" regarding Iran's
draft resolution condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Failing
that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in
a recent State Department press conference, including the assertion
that "The USG evenhandedly condemns the prohibited use of
chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 48: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing
Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page Missing]," March
24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for
Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress
caused to Iraqi officials by the U.S.'s public condemnation of
Iraq's use of chemical weapons "despite our repeated warnings
that this issue would emerge sooner or later." Most of the
cable is concerned with the Reagan administration's interest in
reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might be available
for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other
U.S. regional interests. The cable notes that Iraqi officials
are "confused" by the administration's "means of
pursuing our stated objectives in the region."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 49: United States Embassy in
Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department of
State. "Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers
to Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of
meetings with officials in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a
list of the countries that the U.S. has approached in order to
persuade them to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 50: Mission to the United Nations
Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. "U.N.
Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration
in Security Council," March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft
a quick United Nations resolution condemning the use of chemical
weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi
chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation by a U.N.
official that "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and
use chemical weapons themselves if international community does
not condemn Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 51: Department of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from
Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United Nations Security Council
Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised
Working Paper], March 30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council
decided to adopt the text of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical
weapons and issue it as a presidential statement. "The statement,
by the way, contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 52: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Lebanon
[et al.]. "Department Press Briefing, March 30, 1984,"
March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has
imposed foreign policy controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of
chemical weapons precursors. It responds to questions from the
press about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and a department
spokesperson says Iraq's chemical weapons use will not change
U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 53: National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan. "Measures to
Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments
in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be
taken to increase U.S. military capabilities and "intelligence
collection posture" in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State
Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Central
Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to prevent
Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure
that the U.S. government's condemnation of the use of chemical
weapons is unambiguous, while placing "equal stress on the
urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and
inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 54: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical
Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge," April 6, 1984.
Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State James Placke discussed a draft United Nations' resolution
on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi interests
section representative Nizar Hamdoon on March 29. Hamdoon said
that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement
to a resolution. Placke indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi
proposals regarding points that should be included in the resolution
if the Security Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would
like the Iraqi government's cooperation "in avoiding situations
that would lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]"
regarding chemical weapons use, but noted that the U.S. did "not
want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to
detract from our common interest to see war brought to [an] early
end."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 55: United States Interests Section.
Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of
State. "Bell Discusses Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq,"
April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad
asks to be kept apprised of developments in ongoing talks between
Iraq and Bell Helicopter Textron about its sale of helicopters
to Iraq's Ministry of Defense that "can not be in any way
configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon
to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell
Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a
letter to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a
deal made by Colonel John Brennan, his former aide and chief of
staff, and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured
military uniforms for export to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S.
companies that had exported weapons-related or dual-use items
to Iraq were conducted after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many of
these companies seemed to have connections with former U.S. government
officials.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 57: Department of State, Special
Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear
Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy.
"U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions" [Includes
Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to Iraq" Dated April
27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates
that the government is reviewing policy for "the sale of
certain categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities,"
and the review's "preliminary results favor expanding such
trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency
Intelligence Report. "Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects
for Iraq," September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses
political, economic, and military conditions in Iraq, predicts
that it will continue to develop its conventional and "formidable"
chemical capabilities, and will "probably pursue nuclear
weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical weapons
against Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that
U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle
East, including its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 59: Department of State, Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal
Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some
time ago that Iraq had used "domestically produced lethal
CW" in the Iran-Iraq war, developed in part through "the
unwitting and, in some cases, we believe witting assistance"
of numerous Western firms. The State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in response
to a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed their use in
February 1984.
Source: Declassified through Congressional
investigation
Document 60: Department of State Cable
from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Iraq. "Memcon
[Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin
[Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.,"
November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with
Tariq Aziz and emphasizes "the U.S. desire to base these
relations on the presumption of equality, mutual respect, and
reciprocity." After Aziz says that Iraq's advantage in weaponry
was enabling it to defend itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz
comments "that superior intelligence also must be an important
factor in Iraq's defense. Aziz acknowledged that this may be true."
(The U.S. had been secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence
support for several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming
the candor of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that
"Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both
the use and production of chemical weapons. This position is not
directed specifically at Iraq . . . "
Source: Declassified under the Freedom
of Information Act
Document 61: United States District Court
(Florida: Southern District) Affidavit. "United States of
America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that
Teledyne Wah Chang Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance,
Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31, 1995.
Former Reagan administration National
Security Council staff member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald
Reagan signed a national security decision directive calling for
the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq's defeat
in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of Central Intelligence William
Casey personally led efforts to ensure that Iraq had sufficient
weapons, including cluster bombs, and that the U.S. provided Iraq
with financial credits, intelligence, and strategic military advice.
The CIA also provided Iraq, through third parties that included
Israel and Egypt, with military hardware compatible with its Soviet-origin
weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course
of one of a number of prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, of U.S. companies charged with illegally delivering
military, dual-use, or nuclear-related items to Iraq. (In this
case, a Teledyne affiliate was charged will illegally selling
zirconium, used in the manufacture of explosives, to the Chilean
arms manufacturer Carlos Industries, which used the material to
manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.) Many of these firms tried
to defend themselves by establishing that providing military materiel
to Iraq had been the actual, if covert, policy of the U.S. government.
This was a difficult case to make, especially considering the
rules of evidence governing investigations involving national
security matters.
Source: Court case
Iraq page
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