
Against the Workers
How IMF and WorId Bank Policies
Undermine Labor Power and Rights
by Vincent Lloyd and Robert Weissman
Multinational Monitor magazine, September 2001

After a decade of economic "reform" along lines
advised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank,
Argentina has plunged into a desperate economic crisis.
The economy has been contracting for three years, unemployment
is shooting up, and the country is on the brink of defaulting
on its foreign debt payments.
To avoid default, Argentina has negotiated for a new infusion
of foreign funds to pay off the interest on old loans and obligations,
and to forestall a pullout by foreign investors.
Traveling down that road took Argentina to the gatekeeper
for such loans: the IMF. In August, the IMF agreed to provide
a new $8 billion loan for Argentina, intended to forestall default.
That followed a nearly $40 billion January bailout package with
a $14 billion IMF loan as its centerpiece.
But like the loans Argentina has negotiated with the IMF and
World Bank over the last decade-and like all other such loans
from the IMF and Bank-the new monies came with conditions.
Among them are requirements that Argentina: promote "labor
flexibility"-removing legal protections that inhibit employers
from firing workers; revamp its pension system to generate "new
savings" by cutting back on benefits for retired workers;
slash government worker salaries; privatize financial and energy
operations of the government.
These requirements, and others, infuriated the Argentine labor
movement, which responded in March with general strikes that stopped
economic activity in the country. In August, with the latest loan
package, tens of thousands of workers took to the streets in protest.
That the IMF would demand such terms is no surprise. A Multinational
Monitor investigation shows that the IMF and World Bank have imposed
nearly identical mandates on dozens of countries. Based on reviews
of hundreds of loan and project documents from the IMF and World
Bank, the Multinational Monitor investigation provides detailed
evidentiary support for critics of the international financial
institutions who have long claimed they require Third World countries
to adopt cookie-cutter policies that harm the interests of working
people.
Multinational Monitor reviewed loan documents between the
IMF and World Bank and 26 countries. The review shows that the
institutions' loan conditionalities include a variety of provisions
that directly undermine labor rights, labor power and tens of
millions of workers' standard of living. These include:
* Civil service downsizing;
* Privatization of government-owned enterprises, with layoffs
required in advance of privatization and frequently following
privatization;
* Promotion of labor flexibility-regulatory changes to remove
restrictions on the ability of government and private employers
to fire or lay off workers;
Mandated wage rate reductions, minimum wage reductions or
containment, and spreading the wage gap between government employees
and managers; and
* Pension reforms, including privatization, that cut social
security benefits for workers.
The IMF and Bank say these policies may inflict some short-term
pain, but are necessary to create the conditions for long-term
growth and job creation.
Critics respond that the measures inflict needless suffering,
worsen poverty and actually undermine prospects for economic growth.
The policies reflect, they say, a bias against labor, and in favor
of corporate interests. They note as well that these labor-related
policies take place in the context of the broader IMF and World
Bank structural adjustment packages, which emphasize trade liberalization,
orienting economies to exports and recessionary cuts in government
spending-macroeconomic policies which further work to advance
corporate interests at the expense of labor.
THE INCREDIBLY SHRINKING GOVERNMENT WORKFORCE
Perhaps the most consistent theme in the IMF/World 1 Bank
structural adjustment loans is that the size of government should
be reduced.
Typically, this means that the government should spin off
certain functions to the private sector (by privatizing operations),
and that it should cut back on spending and staffing in the areas
of responsibility it does maintain.
The IMF/Bank support for government downsizing is premised,
first, on the notion that the private sector generally performs
more efficiently than government. In this view, government duties
should be limited to a narrow band of activities that either the
private sector cannot or does not perform better, and to the few
responsibilities that inherently belong to the public sector.
In its June draft "Private Sector Development Strategy,"
the World Bank argues that the private sector does a better job
even of delivering services to the very poor than the public sector,
and that the poor prefer the private sector to government provision
of services.
A second rationale for shrinking government is the IMF and
Bank's priority concern with eliminating government deficits.
The institutions seek to cut government spending as a way to close
and eventually eliminate the shortfall between revenues and expenditures,
even though basic Keynesian economics suggests that slow-growth
developing nations should in fact run a deficit to spur economic
expansion.
In most countries, rich and poor, the government is the largest
employer. In poor countries, with weakly developed private sectors,
the government is frequently the dominant force in the nation's
economy. Sudden and massive cuts in government spending can throw
tens or hundreds of thousands out of work, and contribute to a
surge in unemployment, and to a consequent reduction in the bargaining
power of all workers.
In Nicaragua, for example, the Chamorro administration that
followed the revolutionary Sandinista government worked with the
IMF to slash the public sector. In the first three years of the
new regime, the number of government employees plummeted from
290,000 to 107,000 (resulting in loss of employment for more than
9 percent of the Nicaraguan labor force). Through 1999, the government
eliminated more than 18,000 additional jobs.
The closure or downsizing of state-owned banks "yielding
a total reduction from 9,100 employees in 1990 to 3,500 in 1993"
was the first in a series of financial sector reforms resulting
in smaller government payrolls and greater foreign ownership of
Nicaraguan businesses, according to a Nicaraguan report to the
IMF.
The dramatic two thirds reduction in the size of government
was driven in part by a concerted government effort "to strip
out the Sandinistas from government jobs," according to Marie
Clarke of the Quixote Center, but was also directed and required
by the IMF and World Bank in a series of loan agreements through
the 1990s and in the present decade. A 1991 World Bank Economic
Recovery Credit was designated to assist with "downsizing
and restructuring the public sector." Continually reducing
the size of government has been a consistent benchmark criteria
included in IMF and World Bank loans, with specific cutbacks designated
as evidence of Nicaragua's adherence to structural adjustment
conditions.
Nicaragua is presently undergoing a "second generation"
of structural reform programs, including yet another round of
government cutbacks. Unemployment now stands at 14 percent, but
combined unemployment and rampant underemployment totals 50 percent.
Other countries have witnessed similar emaciation of the public
sector under IMF and World Bank tutelage:
* In Kenya, the government plans to cut nearly 50,000 employees
from 2000-2002.
* In Uganda, by early 1997, the size of the civil service
was cut in half to 150,000, and the government set a target of
58,100 by June 1997.
* In Yemen, a 1999 IMF document reported plans for a civil
service reform initiative expected to reduce public payrolls by
20 percent.
* In Zambia, 20 percent of the public sector was laid off
in 1998 and 1999. IMF loan documents set a goal of reducing government
employment from 110,000 (in year 2000) to 10,000 to 12,000.
PRIVATIZE, PRIVATIZE, PRIVATIZE
The civil service downsizing included in IMF and World Bank
conditionalities is frequently bound up with privatization plans:
under IMF and Bank instruction, governments agree to lay off thousands
of workers to prepare enterprises for privatization. But privatization
itself is frequently associated with new rounds of downsizing,
as well as private employer assaults on unions and demands for
wage reductions.
Privatization is a core element of the structural adjustment
policy package. Blanket support for privatization is an ideological
article of faith at the IMF and Bank.
The range of IMF and Bank-supported or -mandated privatizations
is staggering. The institutions have overseen wholesale privatizations
in economies that were previously state-sector dominated-including
former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well
as many developing countries with heavy government involvement
in the economy-and also privatization of services that are regularly
maintained in the public sector in rich countries, such as water
provision and sanitation [see "Privatization Tidal Wave,"
page 14], healthcare, roads, airports and postal services:
* In Argentina, according to the World Bank, "virtually
all public services and federally owned enterprises" have
been privatized, including postal services.
* In Ecuador, the government reports that bids have been or
are being invited for private operation or ownership of urban
sewage and water systems, seaports and oil refineries, among other
facilities.
* In Malawi, a massive privatization effort has included the
"outsourcing, privatization or liquidation of specific services
and agencies of the four largest ministries (Health and Population,
Education, Transport and Public Works, and Agriculture and Irrigation,"
according to a government submission to the IMF, and "the
government also intends to increase private sector participation
in the roads sector."
* In Nigeria, public enterprises set for the auction blocks
have included the national airways, power generators, and oil
refiners. In a 1999 IMF document, the government stated it would
study privatization of customs clearance at major ports.
* In Uruguay, ports and roads have been privatized.
Labor unions do not offer blanket opposition to all privatization.
Particularly in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, but also
in many developing countries, unions have agreed that privatization
of some government operations may be appropriate. But they have
insisted on safeguards to ensure that privatization enhances efficiency
rather than the private plunder of public assets, and insisted
that basic worker rights and interests also be protected.
But those safeguards by and large have not been put in place.
"Unfortunately, trade unions' proposals regarding the
form of privatization, the regulatory framework and treatment
of workers were usually not listened to during the massive privatization
wave in Central and Eastern Europe," notes the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in a report published
in advance of the fall 2001 IMF and World Bank meetings. The IMF
and Bank acknowledge some of their mistakes in Central and Eastern
Europe, ICFTU notes, but "similar mistakes may well be repeated
in Central and Eastern Europe and in other regions. "
The ICFTU report highlights the case of Pakistan, where the
military government is planning, with World Bank assistance, a
major privatization initiative. The Bank's support for the initiative
comes "despite the potential for abuse in privatizing natural
monopoly services, especially given the lack of democratic control,
and the refusal of the authorities to negotiate with trade unions
affected by the privatization program," ICFTU notes. The
Bank "does candidly admit that a risk exists that Pakistan's
economic reform and devolution plan 'could be hastily implemented
and captured by powerful interest groups,' but makes no suggestion
as to how to avoid such an eventuality."
THE FREEDOM TO FIRE
Another core tenet of IMF and Bank lending programs is the
promotion of "labor flexibility" or "labor mobility,"
the notion that firms should be able to hire and fire workers,
or change terms and conditions of work, with minimal regulatory
restrictions.
The theory behind labor flexibility is that, if labor is treated
as a commodity like any other, with companies able to hire and
fire workers just as they might a piece of machinery, then markets
will function efficiently. Efficient functioning markets will
then facilitate economic growth.
Critics say the theory does not hold up. Former World Bank
chief economist Joseph Stiglitz described the problem to Multinational
Monitor: "As part of the doctrine of liberalization, the
Washington Consensus said, 'make labor markets more flexible.'
That greater flexibility was supposed to lead to lower unemployment.
A side effect that people didn't want to talk about was that it
would lead to lower wages. But the lower wages would generate
more investment, more demand for labor. So there would be two
beneficial effects: the unemployment rate would go down and job
creation would go up because wages were lower."
"The evidence in Latin America is not supportive of those
conclusions," Stiglitz told Multinational Monitor. "Wage
flexibility has not been associated with lower unemployment. Nor
has there been more job creation in general." Where "labor
market flexibility was designed to move people from low productivity
jobs to high productivity jobs," according to Stiglitz, "too
often it moved people from low productivity jobs to unemployment,
which is even lower productivity."
Indeed, some of the IMF and Bank documents treat labor flexibility
almost as code for mass layoffs. For example, a "structural
benchmark" in Nicaragua's dealings with the IMF is that the
country "continue to implement a labor mobility program aiming
at reducing public sector positions."
But the essence of the problem from the point of view of labor
is that the IMF and Bank's version of labor flexibility is synonymous
with stripping away legal protections for workers. In Honduras,
more labor flexibility is being introduced because "collective
contracts at large enterprises often act as straight jackets,"
according to a World Bank document. In Ecuador, the use of temporary
contracts is touted in an IMF document as a means to improve labor
flexibility.
In its recommendations to the new Mexican government of Vicente
Fox, the World Bank has spelled out just how far-reaching its
promotion of labor flexibility is. The Bank encourages Mexico
to phase out a wide array of worker rights and protections: "the
current system of severance payments; collective bargaining and
industry-binding contracts; obligatory union memberships; compulsory
profit-sharing; restrictions to temporary, fixed-term and apprenticeship
contracts; requirements for seniority-based promotions; registration
of firm-provided training programs; and liability for subcontractors'
employees."
SPREADING THE WAGE GAP
Few things more clearly run contrary to workers' interest
than wage reductions. Wage freezes, wage cuts and wage rollbacks
are all commonplace in IMF and World Bank lending programs, as
is "wage decompression"-increasing the ratio of highest
to lowest paid worker.
These initiatives usually occur in the public sector, where
the government has authority to set wages and salaries, and where
the rationale is to reduce government expenditures. (A different
logic is applied to managers, however, where the assumption is
that higher salaries are needed to attract quality personnel and
to provide incentives for hard work.)
Sometimes the IMF and World Bank-associated wage freezes or
reductions do apply to the private sector, as in cases where the
minimum wage is frozen or reduced.
Sometimes the overarching policy is referred to as "wage
flexibility" and is undertaken in connection with labor market
reforms.
* In Argentina, the August 2001 bailout monies was conditioned
on a 13 percent wage reduction in the public sector.
* In Belarus, according to IMF documents, the government is
working at "liberalizing" the labor market in order
to "increase the flexibility" of wages, particularly
at state-owned enterprises.
* The Nigerian government reported in an 1999 IMF document
that 1998 wage increases "had been partially rolled back."
* In Turkey, the government agreed in 1999 IMF loan documents
to work to limit public sector and minimum wage increases to the
inflation rate. This position was reiterated in 2000 and 2001.
Wage decompression is pervasive in IMF and Bank loan documents,
and has been a condition applied in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia,
among many others. In Mozambique, under IMF guidance, the government
highest-to-lowest government salary ration went from 9.6:1 in
April 1998 to 13.2:1 in August of that year, and the government
announced plans to "top up" civil service salaries and
expand the ratio to 17:1.
The institutions have elaborate justifications for opposing
wage supports. An April 2001 World Bank policy working paper,
for example, concludes that minimum wages have a larger effect
in Latin America in the United States-including by exerting more
upward influence on wages above the minimum wage-and promotes
unemployment.
PENSIONS: WORK LONGER, PAY MORE, GET LESS
Pension and social security reform has emerged as a high 1
priority of the IMF and Bank in recent years, with the World Bank
taking the lead.
The thrust of the World Bank and IMF's proposals in this area
has been for lower benefits provided at a later age, and for social
security privatization.
In Nicaragua, for example, one of the performance criteria
for continued IMF support has been the adoption of drastic pension
reforms, including raising the retirement age, increasing the
minimum contribution period to receive benefits, and upping the
level of employee contributions.
A 1999 informal World Bank report on Nicaragua's social security
system concluded, "The parameters of the system need to be
re-defined and a mandatory, defined contribution system based
on individual capitalization accounts introduced." The Bank
recommended these accounts be managed by private companies determined
through an "international competitive bidding process."
Drawn up under World Bank supervision, Nicaragua's new pension
system is designed to "increase contribution rates, raise
the retirement age, standardize eligibility requirements, reduce
replacement rates, increase collection efficiency and tighten
eligibility for disability benefits." Under the new system,
Nicaragua has satisfied its IMF performance criteria: payroll
contributions have nearly doubled, mandatory length of service
to receive a pension has been increased by nearly 10 years, and
the retirement age has been raised by nearly a decade.
Again, the policies foisted on Nicaragua have been pushed
around the world:
* In Bolivia, under World Bank instruction, the government
in 1996 privatized its pension system, replacing a defined benefit,
publicly managed system with a defined-contribution, privately
managed system of individual capitalized accounts.
* A 1998 IMF document stated that in Turkey "a sweeping
reform of the social security system is obviously needed,"
and detailed Turkish plans to raise the minimum age for retirement,
extend the minimum contribution period to receive a pension, and
increase the level of contributions required. In a 1999 IMF report,
Turkey indicated its new social security law achieved all of these
goals, surpassing even the proposals in the 1998 document. The
2000 report announced a plan to undertake a new round of reforms,
involving social security privatization.
The ICFTU reports that the World Bank has been involved in
pension reform efforts, increasingly driving toward privatization,
in over 60 countries during the past 15 years.
Dean Baker, co-director of the Washington, D.C.-based Center
for Economic and Policy Research, says the Bank's support for
social security privatization is not based on the evidence of
what works efficiently for pension systems. "The single-mindedness
of the World Bank in promoting privatized systems is peculiar,"
he says, "since the evidence- including data in World Bank
publications-indicates that well-run public sector systems, like
the Social Security system in the United States, are far more
efficient than privatized systems. The administrative costs in
privatized systems, such as the ones in England and Chile, are
more than 1500 percent higher than those of the U.S. system."
Baker adds that "the extra administrative expenses of
privatized systems comes directly out of the money that retirees
would otherwise receive, lowering their retirement benefits by
as much as one-third, compared with a well-run public social security
system. The administrative expenses that are drained out of workers'
savings in a privatized system are the fees and commissions of
the financial industry, which explains its interest in promoting
privatization in the United States and elsewhere."
WITHER LABOR RIGHTS?
Few labor advocates argue that privatization should never
occur, or that no government lay off is ever necessary, though
many would argue in almost all cases against certain IMF and Bank
policies, such as reductions or mandated freezes on the minimum
wage, and privatization of Social Security.
But among the most striking conclusions from the Multinational
Monitor investigation of IMF and World Bank documents is the near-perfect
consistency in the institutions' recommendations on matters of
key concern to labor interests.
None of the documents reviewed by the Monitor show IMF or
Bank support for government takeover of services or enterprises
formerly in the private sector; they virtually never make the
case for raising workers' wages (except for top management); they
do not propose greater legal protections for workers.
And on-the-ground experience in countries around the world
shows little concern that implementation of policies sure to be
harmful to at least some significant number of workers in the
short-term is done with an eye to ameliorating the pain. Worker
safeguards under privatization, for example, repeatedly requested
by labor unions around the world, are rarely put into force.
For former Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, as well as
unions and worker advocates, the IMF/Bank record makes it imperative
that basic worker rights be protected. If there are to be diminished
legal protections and guarantees for workers, and if IMF and Bank-pushed
policies are going to run contrary to worker interests, they say,
then workers must at the very least be guaranteed the right to
organize and defend their collective interests through unions,
collective bargaining and concerted activity.
But the Bank has stated that it cannot support workers' freedom
of association and right to collective bargaining.
Robert Holzmann, director of social programs at the World
Bank, told a seminar in 1999 that the Bank could not support workers'
right to freedom of association because of the "political
dimension" and the Bank's policy of non-interference with
national politics.
Holzmann also raised a second "problem" with freedom
of association. "While there are studies out-and we agree
with them that trade union movements may have a strong and good
role in economic development-there are studies out that also show
that this depends. So the freedom by itself does not guarantee
that the positive economic effects are achieved."
Shortly after the 1999 seminar, labor organizations met with
the World Bank and IMF. According to a report from ICFTU, World
Bank President James Wolfensohn reiterated Holzmann's point, saying
that while the Bank does respect three out of the five core labor
rights (anti-slavery, anti-child labor and anti-discrimination)
it cannot respect the other two (freedom of association and collective
bargaining) because it does "not get involved in national
politics."
ICFTU reports that "this statement was greeted with stunned
disbelief by many present."
Vincent Lloyd is an intern with Multinational Monitor. Robert
Weissman is the magazine's editor.
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