Class & Poverty in the Maquila Zone
by Avery Wear
International Socialist Review, May-June 2002
The term "maquiladora" is used today to describe
factories that employ sweatshop labor from Central America to
the Far East. But the original maquiladoras were set up along
the U.S.-Mexico border more than 20 years ago by U.S. (and later
other) multinational corporations seeking lower labor costs. In
Mexico, corporations pioneered a return to 19th-century working
conditions. That such conditions are growing fast on a worldwide
scale is increasingly common knowledge, fueled in part by the
movements against corporate globalization. Due to its location
on the threshold between the rich and the poor countries, the
original, Mexican maquiladora zone still has a great significance
as a strategic testing ground for labor and social movements to
develop the concrete internationalism necessary to challenge corporate
globalization. Workers in the maquiladora zones on the U.S.-Mexican
border have been hit hard by the current recession, and this has
had both negative and positive impacts on organizing efforts.
The Border Industrialization Program The Mexican government
launched the Border Industrialization Program (BIP), better known
as the Maquiladora Program, in 1965, less than a year after the
termination of the 23year Bracero Program, a U.S. government program
aimed at attracting cheap, temporary, migrant Mexican labor to
work in the booming U.S. agricultural sector.' Part of the justification
for the BIP was that returning braceros would find otherwise scarce
jobs in foreign factories near the border. But it is doubtful
that many of the 4 million braceros, who were almost entirely
male, found work in the mostly female-employing maquilas. The
maquiladora system was, in essence, the extension of the Bracero
Program to the industrial sector. The BIP exempted machinery,
raw materials, parts, and components from import duties within
100 kilometers of the border. After assembly or processing, these
materials could then be re-shipped to the United States with duties
assessed only on value added.
Companies were also exempt from local taxation. The BIP provided
foreign, and particularly U.S., corporations access to low-wage,
comparatively unregulated conditions in Mexico without traditional
trade barriers. "Maquiladora" means "apparel for
export," reflecting the early assumption that most factories
would produce textiles. The new setup represented a departure
from Mexico's postwar policy of national economic development
through import substitution and the beginnings of its opening
up to free trade, privatization, and foreign investment.
By 1976, 448 maquilas employed 74,500 workers. In 1986, 865
maquilas employed 227,900 workers. By 1998, 3,051 maquilas employed
1,035,957 workers. Administrative employees constituted 7 percent
of the workforce; technicians, 12 percent; production workers,
81 percent. Fifty-six percent of production workers were female.
(The proportion of male workers had grown over the years, due
to chronic labor shortages.) Only 20 percent of factories produced
textile products by this time; thirty-six percent produced electronic
equipment; 18 percent, construction equipment; 14 percent, other
products. Japanese, South Korean, and European capital have increasingly
joined U.S. firms.
While the BIP originally limited preferential conditions to
the frontier strip, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) signed by the U.S. and Mexico opened the Mexican interior
for maquiladora construction. Twenty-seven of Mexico's 32 states
(all except Nayarit, Colima, Chiapas, Tabasco, and Campeche) had
plants in 1998. Still, 75 percent of maquila factories, employing
79 percent of the workers, remained in the border region. Tijuana
had the largest number of maquiladoras, with 681. Ciudad Juarez,
however, had the largest maquiladora workforce, with 210,650 workers.
Last year, NAFTA erased special tariff exemptions for maquiladoras.
In 2001, the BIP contracted for the first time. Nearly 350
plants shut down, and 238,000 jobs were destroyed. The number
of maquiladora workers has now returned to near the 1998 level,
and production is down 9.2 percent from the 2000 level. Baja California,
whose maquiladoras produce mostly toys and consumer electronics,
lost 88 factories and 61,653 jobs. The U.S. economic recession
was the biggest cause of this downturn, though the strong peso
helped to drive up costs and cut into sales. Some plants have
packed up and moved to the even lower-wage regions of Asia and
Central America.
Conditions in the maquiladora zone
Poverty is the defining feature of life for the new industrial
armies living in the colonias (neighborhoods) around the maquiladoras.
In 1994, the average maquiladora worker had to work two hours
to buy a gallon of milk. Then, in December of that year, the peso
crashed. Wages across Mexico, including in the maquiladoras, lost
half their purchasing power overnight. Today, the average maquiladora
wage is around $ 1.00 per hour, well below the average for manufacturing
in Mexico as a whole. This money does not go much further for
maquiladora
workers in Mexico than it would in the U.S., since "the
Cost of living in Mexican border towns is comparable to that in
the United States." Now, for the first time, unemployment
has become a major problem for maquiladora workers as well. Under
Mexican law, companies are supposed to provide four months of
severance pay to laid-off workers, so there is no government unemployment
insurance. Unfortunately, the severance pay often doesn't materialize.
***
Conditions in the colonias
Perhaps even more appalling than conditions inside the factories
are those in the surrounding colonias. The companies are not required
to pay any local taxes, so the cities have no funds for basic
residential infrastructure. The companies and the local government
provide no necessary social services of any sort to the workers
they exploit. Workers, whose wages are already impossibly low,
are forced to fend for themselves in every way, from child care
to housing to garbage disposal.
In Tijuana, the first generation of maquilas opened near the
downtown area. But since the start of the 1980s, companies have
shifted construction to the undeveloped mesas on the eastern end
of the city. Makeshift residential districts have sprung up in
the canyons between these mesas. Workers have been forced to build
the colonias themselves, often on undeeded land. Residents of
those colonias that exist without legal proprietorship have been
subject to expulsions and persecution. This has led in some cases
to militant community defense, as in the Maclovio Rojas community
outside eastern Tijuana. Other colonias, such as another Tijuana
community led by the Comite Urbano Popular, have fought for and
won basic services such as water and electricity from the government.
The colonias in Tijuana, many now more than a decade old,
still resemble vast temporary camps. Families cram into single-room,
wooden shacks. Dirt floors seem to be the norm, and some lack
roofs. Homes lack indoor plumbing or electricity. Badly rutted
dirt roads wind through hot, dusty communities without parks,
sidewalks, or any recreational facilities. The city doesn't pick
up the garbage, so it is dumped haphazardly and strewn on nearby
hillsides.
***
Workers' struggles
Today, as is typical of "global assembly line" sweatshops
throughout developing countries, no authentic unions hold contracts
in the maquiladoras. Rather, many maquiladoras operate under the
"protection contract" system. In this system, plant
owners sign "union" contracts with Mexico's government-tied
union federations-the Mexican Workers' Confederation (CTM), Revolutionary
Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC), or the Revolutionary
Workers' Confederation (COR)-without the knowledge of the workers.
Known as charro unions in Mexico, after the autocratic and conservative
leaders who rule them, these federations operate openly, and sometimes
even lead real struggles, in some parts of Mexico. But in the
maquiladoras, they are strictly at the service of the employers.
"We call the official unions in the maquiladoras sindicatos
61ancos [white unions]. They are worse than the charro unions-they
are like no union at all," says ex-maquiladora worker Mauricio
Higinio.
***
Unorganized, the maquiladora working class is a dagger in
the heart of organized labor across the hemisphere. Bosses in
the U.S. hold them up as a standing threat to workers resisting
their austerity. Their low wages undercut those of other industrial
workers in Mexico. Across Latin America, few groups of factory
workers are so completely deprived of unionization. When these
workers free themselves, they will change the psychology of the
labor movement North and South. They will undermine the historic
xenophobia of much of the U.S. working class and their unions.
They will inspire workers on the global assembly line from Honduras
to Haiti and beyond. The maquiladora working class will need international
solidarity in order to rise to organization. But when they do
this, internationalism may well flower tenfold.
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