Nuclear Hubris
by Richard Alan Leach
Z magazine, April 2003
After the Soviet system imploded, the
US reveled in its role as the worldís sole superpower,
giving many indications that the consequences for the inhabitants
of the periphery were a matter of imperial indifference. Among
the hard lessons learned from the September Suicide Bombings is
that, on this polarized planet, no unbreachable fortresses can
be built, not even a ìFortress America.î It should
come as no surprise, however, that entrenched special interests
still support military boondoggles ó such as the mis-named
ìmissile defenseî system ó and still refuse
to admit that throwing 100 billion dollars at unworkable missile
shields will be economically wasteful and strategically destabilizing.
Unless the ambitions of this influential minority of far rightists
is constrained, a self-defeating focus on remote, high-end threats
such as ballistic missile attacks may also be inimical to self-preservation.
Everybody agrees that we now live in a
new world, but it is important to recall the old one. The pre-September
climate of opinion already feels like ancient history: the worldís
most powerful nation had the luxury of exaggerating ballistic
missile threats solely to divert public funds into a massive welfare
program for aerospace and related industries, and to pave the
way for the weaponization of outer space. Long before the Bush
inauguration in January, analysts pointed out that no designated
ìrogue stateî has the technology to launch intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) against the US, which would leave a
signature and invite the destruction of their countries. From
its inception, the actual motivation behind what the administration
(misleadingly) terms ìmissile defenseî has been to
pursue a costly program of offensive preparations against possible
later challenges from ìstrategic competitorsî like
China, even as China and Russia, along with the majority of US
allies, continue to argue for preserving the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM), while strenuously objecting to national missile
defense (NMD).
The need to shore up the nonproliferation
regime is now more urgent than ever, but an influential number
of would-be nuclear hegemonists are steadfast in their obsession
with building shields to augment the nuclear sword ó and
they now exploit September 11th to justify the scheme. Despite
the likelihood that a shift to misnamed ìdefensesî
will lead to a new arms race, it is a calculated risk which policymakers
remain willing to run. The US is still pressuring allies to withdraw
objections to the US plan to scrap the ABM Treaty. Both national
and global security will be knowingly jeopardized so that the
US can break out of established norms, such as the Outer Space
Treaty (1967).
Before September 11th, the terms ìsecurityî
and ìdefenseî were largely employed as Orwellisms
to justify a buildup in offensive capabilities. The interregnum
between the end of the Cold War and the ìnew warî
sparked by the terrorist attacks provided Americans with a short-lived
window of opportunity (now firmly shut) to recognize the inherent
dynamic of the US military towards ever-greater expansion ó
enemies or no enemies ó with the initial promise of a post-Cold
War ìpeace dividendî long forgotten. Previously,
the menace (or mirage) of ìrogue statesî loomed large
in our consciousness: they have since been supplanted by terrorist
warlords. Yet this more credible threat will now be used to justify
weapons systems that would be useless against them. Meanwhile,
President Bushís showing in the polls over the next eight
months will continue to be better than his advisors ever dreamed,
with Washington capitalizing on the September tragedy to fight
an open-ended ìnew war.î The new GOP agenda will
skewer the Social Security budget to combine a new ìhomeland
defenseî with the same useless ìdefenseî system
proposed in the pre-September climate of nuclear unilateralism.
Instead of heeding the advice of its allies
and abandoning the national missile defense scheme, advocates
now try to capitalize on public fears to sell their agendas. Formerly,
the main argument of pro-nuclear extremists was that a radical
shift to ìdefensesî was necessary to defend the United
States against ìunreliable nationsî or ìroguesî
like North Korea: they now add that missile defenses were not
intended to defend against commercial airliners! True: nor can
NMD defend against nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons,
deliverable in a suitcase or a crop-duster. Given the entrenched
interests represented by Eisenhowerís military-industrial
complex (MIC), actual security or ìdefenseî considerations
still represent only a secondary or tertiary consideration. Pro-nuclear
forces now expect to receive carte blanche for every ìdefensiveî
project from space bombers to unworkable missile shields, and
employ every sophistry at their command to stay the course.
Meanwhile, sanitized reportage in the
newspaper of record continues to hinder Americans from understanding
the issues. The assumption that ìsecurityî considerations
were always the paramount consideration behind missile defenses
remains unquestioned by the media. Today, given the unprecedented
siege mentality prevailing in the United States (with skyrocketing
sales of flags and shotguns) an agenda which provoked partisan
flak before the advent of a ìunited frontî against
terror is being shamelessly exploited. To avoid handing the Defense
Department a blank check for military boondoggles, it is revealing
to review New York Times (NYT) coverage of the missile defense
issue in the months leading up to September, when threats were
invented or exaggerated to sell a scheme which knowingly imperils
US national security, but to which the administration remains
committed (for other reasons).
On September 2nd, the NYT reported that
US policymakers, recognizing the inadequacy of Chinaís
18-20 ICBMs as an effective deterrent against the proposed system,
planned to inform China that they no longer opposed a Chinese
buildup ó if this would overcome their opposition to NMD
(David E. Sanger, ìUS To Tell China It Will Not Object
To Missile Buildup,î NYT, Sept. 2nd 2001). Because the October
summit was imminent, the administration was forced by the calendar
to reveal what it could no longer conceal: that, for hawks in
the State Department and the White House, a halt to the development
of missile defenses represented a worst-case scenario ó
even worse than a new arms race in Asia, spurred by a Chinese
buildup!
The piece implicitly revealed the intention
of the Bush administration to rely on ìpeace through strength,
rather than peace through paper,î in the memorable sound-bite
of Arizona Senator John Kyl. Abrogating its responsibility to
shore up the nonproliferation regime, the White House implicitly
acknowledged its willingness to initiate an open-ended arms race,
telling China, in effect, ìcatch me if you can.î
This news surprised many, including many who should have known
better. All along, the clear pattern has been to postpone such
forthright admissions until the eleventh hour. The Bush administration
expected to provoke widespread protest against its dangerous shift
in nuclear posture, so the strategy has been to release information
in stages, and slowly bring its allies on board ó along
with a bewildered and frightened planet.
Washington immediately attempted to downplay
the report. A ìrestatementî appeared on September
5th, with the administrationís denial, stating that they
would ìnot acquiesceî in a Chinese buildup, while
conceding on background that the effect of ìnot acquiescingî
would be much the same, since the US ìunderstandsî
Chinaís need to test their weapons for safety and reliability
(David E. Sanger, ìUS Restates Its Stand on Missiles in
China,î NYT, Sept. 5, 2001). Such an obliging collusion
between press and state is hardly reassuring.
In the first half of 2001, many slanted
editorials informed us that China and Cuba were against missile
defenses: if they are against it, of course, it must be ìa
good idea.î Long before September, the prerogatives of power
ensured that a ìzero sumî mentality percolated throughout
the political culture. However, this radical shift in nuclear
strategy alarms US allies as much as China and Cuba. Throughout
the year, the mainstream continued to relay the absurd misrepresentation
by hawks that the acquisition of a shield to augment the sword
is merely a ìdefensiveî maneuver which should threaten
no one.
In stark contrast, China echoed the typical
world reaction in a written statement by Jiang Zemin: ìTo
reduce the armaments of others while keeping oneís own
intact, to reduce the obsolete while developing state of the art,
to require other countries to scrupulously abide by treaties while
giving oneself freedom of action, all these acts make a mockery
of international efforts and run counter to the fundamental objective
of disarmamentî (Jiang Zemin, ìThe Way to Get On
With Nuclear Disarmament,î Los Angeles Times, June 16, 1999).
US policy is to side-step such accusations, while depicting China
as moving forward to new and threatening heights with research
and modernization, even as the US ignores Chinese calls to preserve
the ABM Treaty. China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) in 1986, conducting no explosive nuclear tests since that
time. During the Cold War, the Defense Department employed the
same ruse: even funding for Reaganís Star Wars was procured
by arguing that, otherwise, the Russians would get there first!
On August 24th, the NYT readership must
have breathed a collective sigh of relief to see an article (penned
by David E. Sanger) titled: ìBush Flatly States US Will
Pull Out of Missile Treaty.î The sigh of relief would be
generated not by the news itself, which was bad, but because of
finally hearing White House intentions flatly stated. Despite
being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
the new policy is for the US to upgrade and extend its strategic
force advantage, rather than work towards eventual disarmament,
as pledged. As a result, other nations will be compelled to acquire
or enhance stocks of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
(NBC), for protection against the planetís sole superpower.
Two days earlier, on August 22nd, the
NYT revealed that an official in the Bush administration had given
Russia an unofficial deadline of November to accede to stipulated
US changes in the ABM treaty or ìface a unilateral American
withdrawal.î The piece is euphemistically titled, ìUS
Sets Deadline for Settlement of ABM Argument.î And when
the United States disagrees with the rest of the world, it will
be a big argument. The implicit framework for addressing the issue
of missile defense is one that genuflects to power and rejects
any such principle as ìone nation, one vote.î Further,
if the US disagrees with the rest of the world, it is world opinion
that is presented as suspect. Throughout the Cold War, Americans
were constantly assured that only ìtheyî break treaties
ó or abrogate, annul, scuttle, or violate them. So today,
we amend, go beyond, exceed the constraints of, and now make arguments
for ó jettisoning a treaty which served as the linchpin
of international security for the last thirty years of the nuclear
age.
An historic moment of candor occurred
on May 1st, 2001. After months of disclaimers, George W. Bush,
in his first major speech on defense, first conceded the administrationís
intention to ìgo beyondî the ABM Treaty. This candid
adminssion, however, was marred by alarmist rhetoric updated from
the Cold War, as Bush cited numerous (and unmentioned) rogue states
which might (at some future date) seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
The President warned of an inevitable arms race, which we must
ìwinî (since negotiated multilateral reductions are
out of the question):
More nations have nuclear weapons and
still more have nuclear aspirationsÖ Most troubling of all
[my emphasis] the list of these countries includes some of the
world's least-responsible states.ÝUnlike the Cold War,
today's most urgent threat [my emphasis] stems not from thousands
of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number
of missiles in the hands of these statesÖ
North Korea, a failed communist state
that cannot even feed its own people, is a threat? And the most
urgent threat to the United States is a ballistic missile launch?
Numerous security analysts attempted (in vain) to convince the
hawks that it would be easier for a terrorist to smuggle a chemical
weapon into the United States in a suitcase. For balanced minds,
the means wrought by terrorists on September 11th provided definitive
evidence of the futility of constructing missile shields. Yet,
proponents of NMD now twist logic to the breaking point, using
the terrorist attacks as an absurd justification for implementing,
not abandoning, missile defenses. Such chicanery, of course, was
inevitable, since the latter term is a euphemism for the long-term
project of weaponizing the ìultimate high groundî
of outer space.
The day after Bushís speech, the
NYT described the radical shift from deterrence to destabilizing
ìdefensesî merely as an innocuous ìstrategy
overhaulî (David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, ìIn
Strategy Overhaul, Bush Seeks A Missile Shield,î NYT, May
2, 2001). The euphemism masks the most irresponsible strategic
gamble since Ronald Reaganís Star Wars speech of 1983.
As the Bushies expected, the more the public learned about missile
defense, the less they liked it. So the new administration resorted
to standard practice for pitching the scheme: it changed its arguments,
depending on its audience. While in Europe, the NYT reported that
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ìpresented several arguments.
He suggested that antimissile defenses could be reconciled with
some arms control treaties, avoiding the bluntness of comments
he made in Congressional hearings ó and even on the plane
flying to the conference ó that the ABM treaty was an anachronismî
(Michael R. Gordon, ìUS Tries Defusing Alliesí Opposition
to Missile Defense,î NYT, February 4, 2001). As noted, only
when concealment became impossible did the Bush administration
resort to plain talk. Until the May 1st defense speech, the policy
was to counter perceptions of unilateralism, and to hedge when
the subject of space weapons was brought up. As the NYT reported
in May, ìMr. Rumsfeld repeatedly side-stepped questions
from reporters about whether his efforts to give space operations
a higher profile in the Pentagon would inevitably lead to building
anti-satellite weapons or other types of space-based military
hardware. ëThese proposals have nothing to do with that.í
he saidî (James Dao, ìRumsfeld Plan Skirts Call for
Stationing Arms in Space,î NYT, May 9, 2001). To finesse
both public opinion and allied opposition to its designs, the
Bushies released information in stages, always careful to avoid
acknowledging the long-term strategy to weaponize space. Planning
documents are more candid, but are ignored by the mainstream,
on the principle that the Pentagon would never stoop so low as
to mislead the media or the American people.
In the preceding months, the President
and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld met with foreign leaders more to
inform them of the US commitment to NMD than to consult with them
concerning the wisdom of this fundamental shift in nuclear strategy.
Soon thereafter, worldwide complaints of US unilateralism (and
bad manners) prompted Bushís handlers to begin paying lip
service to the notion of ìconsultation with our alliesî
ó which became the Presidentís week-long mantra
in Europe in June, 2001. The shift to conciliatory rhetoric was
another manifestation of damage control, a mere bid to alter perceptions
ó before proceeding exactly as planned.
Washington is also circumspect regarding
its long-range plans to jettison other arms control agreements,
although in July, it signalled its intention to resume nuclear
testing, in clear violation of the unratified comprehensive test-ban
treaty (CTBT). Recently, arms control expert Richard Butler warned
that ìIf the United States now destroys the test ban treaty
and moves to resume nuclear testing, other nuclear-weapons states
will follow suit, and still other states will consider acquiring
nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime will perish.î
(Richard Butler, ìNuclear Testing and National Honor,î
NYT, July 13, 2001). The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forbids
the weaponization of space, must also be scrapped because it interferes
with ìnew thinkingî ó where outer space is
regarded as the next American ìfrontier.î
In elite circles, debates are confined
to pragmatic considerations (cost-benefit analyses), while a sycophantic
media frames the debate according to the principle that all decisions
made by Washington must be ìwell-intentioned.î When
stated openly, the axiom produces comical effects, such as in
this editorial: ìIf his missile defense plan makes new
missiles and generates nuclear turmoil in Asia, it will not succeed
despite the Presidentís good intentionsî (Business
Week, May 14, 2001). The standard picture of a security policy
guided by ìgood intentionsî is marred by a refusal
to acknowledge the vested interests behind military appropriations.
In keeping with this myth, some classic Orwellisms frequently
appear, such as the title of this editorial: ìBush Decides
Discarding Treaties Aids Peaceî (Walter Shapiro, Detroit
Times, May 4, 2001). (So that is what it does! Perhaps Bush who
should have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.)
The US plan to eventually scrap the Outer
Space Treaty (1967) and to ìdominateî planet Earth
is still presented by the US media as defensive, although the
new justification is the threat of terrorist warlords. At least
this threat did not have to be invented: today, we hear almost
nothing about the former menace of ìrogue statesî
like North Korea: East Asia has been replaced by the Middle East.
Prior to September 11th, the irresponsible scheme to erect missile
shields required demonizing anemic enemies and diplomatic gridlock
to keep North Korea out in the cold. Today, a real threat (domestic
terrorism) is cited to justify an antimissile scheme that would
be useless against it! In accordance with the principles of doublethink,
no two-front war is needed against rogues and Middle East extremists;
instead, the hyperbolical ìthreatî from North Korea
is now forgotten.
Until September, the newspaper of record
was largely a forum for nuclear hawks to employ sophistical arguments
urgently calling for ballistic missile defenses. NYT bias has
consistently favored far rightists who present little evidence,
rather than left-liberals who present a lot of evidence. In the
early 1980s, former Pentagon official Frank Gaffney was kicked
out of the Reagan administration because he became apoplectic
when his boss began talking to the Russians. Gaffneyís
Center For Security Policy (CSP) is less a ìthink tankî
than the leading Star Wars lobby. Gaffneyís group has received
over $2 million in donations since CSP began operation, mostly
from Lockheed Martin and Boeing. The media monitoring group FAIR
(Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) noted the tactic:
In a New York Times article, Gaffney is
quoted calling ads from the disarmament group Peace Action ëmisleading.í
But it seems far more misleading that the article failed to mention
that Gaffney's CSP receives more than 15 percent of its annual
revenue from corporate sponsors, including Boeing and Lockheed
Martin.î Michelle Ciarrocca, ìHoles in The Coverage:
Whatís Left Out of Reporting on Missile Defense,î
FAIR, Nov./Dec. 2000).
It should be added that nowhere did Gaffney
provide evidence for his dismissive reaction, nor was he asked
for any. His skeptical snort sufficed.
The ìfalse balanceî tactic
frequently recurs. Another NYT article featured the dissenting
viewpoint of Senator Carl Levin, who, in mid-2001, called for
a review of technical requirements before making a deployment
decision. To achieve a spurious ìbalance,î the NYT
again consulted Gaffney, describing him as the ìpresident
of a conservative defense analysis groupÖî They failed
to add that this analyst advocates nuclear-armed weapons in space
(that is, detonating nuclear bombs in space as part of a missile
defense strategy, among other Strangelovian fantasies). Gaffney
used his NYT forum to denounce the Senatorís prudent advice
as ìa delaying actionî (Thom Shanker, ìMissile
Defenses Need More Tests, Key Senator Says,î NYT, June 1,
2001). Characteristically, Gaffney was not asked to offer evidence
for his diametrically opposed position: that the US should proceed
to develop and deploy an unworkable system, despite the fact that
it will most likely lead to a strategic cul-de-sac.
Gaffneyís Center For Security Policy
is less interested in ìsecurityî than in implementing
Star Wars II by any conceivable rationale, and its opportunistic
arguments show how desperately logic will be contorted to pursue
ends undertaken for other reasons. His corporate-sponsored lobby
masquerades as a think tank, hosting conferences and writing speeches
for proponents of missile defense. In 1999, Gaffneyís alarmist
rhetoric was primarily aimed at Northeast Asia, not the Middle
East: ìWe must not only worry about rogue states like North
Korea that are now acquiring the means to attack their enemies
with such weapons of mass destruction. Russia and China already
have significant numbers of these long-range missilesî ó
conveniently omitting that both have been consistently clamoring
for the United States to agree to multilateral reductions of nuclear
weapons. For opponents of arms control, the standard ruse is to
accept that the race is on, and that the United States has no
other choice but to ìwin.î
Gaffney goes on to remark that ìNevada
and other parts of the western United States will shortly be in
the cross-hairs of one of the most brutal and irrational totalitarian
regimes on the planet.î (Frank Gaffney Jr., ìNevada:
Defended or in North Korean Crosshairs?î Nevada Journal,
1999). However, that was before September 11th, which provided
him with ìproofî of Americaís vulnerability
to terrorist attacks: the well-worn pretense being that opponents
of missile defenses were soft on defense. Shaping facts to suit
their commitments, CSP promptly averted its eyes to the Middle
East: ìDoes anyone think for a moment that if those waging
holy war on this country, people fully prepared to die in the
process of doing so, had access to [weapons of mass destruction]
they would refrain from using them?î The straw man argument
caricatures arms controllers with their heads in the sand: a ridiculous
claim never backed up with quotations, because none exist. What
proponents of the missile defense scheme argue against is the
futility of wasting 100 billion dollars on a fundamentally flawed
system which cannot protect the United States against the far
greater threat of domestic terrorism.
If Washington places politics above laws
of physics, it is not for the NYT to reason why. On the contrary,
the ìfalse balanceî ploy is used to discredit the
views of dissenting critics. Last year, when a group of 50 Nobel
Laureates wrote an open letter to the White House to denounce
missile defenses as ìwasteful and dangerous,î the
final ìbalanceî line of the NYT piece was a classic
in the Trust Big Brother genre: ìA spokesman for the Pentagon
said that the group, while prestigious, had no access to secret
information about the proposed systemís feasibility or
to intelligence on global missile threats.î The message
is marred by this tactic, as the last line leaves the reader with
a more ìoptimisticî assessment, courtesy of a Pentagon
spin doctor. Fortunately for Americans, the Defense Department
has information which will always be used for their benefit, but
which will be kept secret from them (also for their benefit).
(William J. Broad, ìNobel Winners Urge Halt to Missile
Plan,î NYT, July 6, 2000.)
On July 18, the NYT uncritically relayed
another attempt at misrepresentation, when Assistant Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz dismissed concerns by claiming that NMD is merely
a ìdefensiveî system which threatens no one. (James
Dao, ìDemocrats Are Warned on Missile Stance,î NYT,
July 18, 2001). Such pronouncements, of course, are intended for
the benefit of a credulous and uninformed public. Because of shared
(bipartisan) disdain for public participation and open discussion,
such rhetoric is not challenged by liberal opponents of the missile
defense scheme, who realize that it will ìplay well in
Peoria.î Abroad, the reassuring and misleading pronouncements
offered by Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz fell on deaf ears: the
attempt to acquire a shield to complement the sword was recognized
worldwide as an attempt to achieve a first-strike capability,
to break out of the condition of mutual vulnerability which characterizes
deterrence. Lacking the tender mercies of the US media (towards
the powerful) the rest of the world received information and perspectives
that made clear that the US is instigating a new arms race.
A sterling example of rhetorical innocence
was provided by Massachusetts Senator John Kerry in an article
critical of Bush policy towards North Korea. Rather than pointing
out the obvious, he argues with feigned naivete:
The Bush administration points to the
North Korean missile threat as a major reason why we need to proceed
with such a defensive system. This makes its hesitant approach
on missile talks with Pyongyang all the more puzzling. If we can
reduce or eliminate the threat posed by North Korea's missile
program, why wouldn't we push ahead? (John F. Kerry, ìEngage
North Korea,î Washington Post, March 30, 2001.)
Kerryís rhetorical pose of ìpuzzlementî
at this seeming contradiction is based on the pretense that policymakers
always present forthright explanations to the American people,
rather than inventing ballistic missile threats to bamboozle them
ó on behalf of Boeing.
Among numerous journalistic shortcomings
on this issue, the most irresponsible is the widespread assumption
that the missile defense scheme, given sufficient time and money,
can ìeventuallyî work. This untenable presupposition
was noted in the excellent article by Michelle Ciarrocca quoted
earlier, and underlies most commentary and analysis. The misleading
frame asks: do we have the political will to ìgo beyondî
treaty obligations in order to ìdefend Americaî?
If so, a viable and reliable ìshieldî can result:
or so the shoddy thinking goes. Meanwhile, rigged tests should
continue to help alter perceptions, with a compliant media reporting
a ìsuccessfulî test with great fanfare, while downplaying
subsequent revelations that it was rigged!
Yet the most likely possibility is that
no amount of money can change laws of physics, and that the ìumbrellaî
fancied by ideologues will be a mere ìscarecrow.î
This view prevails in the scientific community, but is scandalously
absent from media coverage, obscured by a commonplace journalistic
reflex, illustrated by this one sentence: ìFormidable technical
difficulties remain before Son of Star Wars can become a reality,
but the main legal obstacle to the plan is the ABM Treaty banning
national missile defense systemsî (Marcus Warren, The Daily
Telegraph, July 28, 2001). The casual reader could be forgiven
for inferring that the main obstacle is legal, and that the technical
difficulties, while formidable, can be surmounted.
While the Defense Department continues
on its natural course towards a bid for global omnipotence (ìfull
spectrum dominanceî), terrorist acts undertaken by committed
cadres of suicidal fanatics revealed the limitations of relying
primarily on high technology to achieve security. ìTechnolatryî
(blind worship of technology) is a factor which underlies American
unilateralism and its tendency to ìgo it alone.î
Such nuclear hubris led to Reaganís Star Wars speech (1983)
and continues in its current incarnation, NMD.
Earlier, I mentioned that strategic security
was actually a secondary or tertiary consideration for the MIC.
The scheme to weaponize space with lasers and ASAT (Anti-Satellite)
weapons, and to blanket the planet with sea-, land- and space-based
interceptors was not concocted to ìprotect Americansî
but to protect profits for aerospace and related industries. The
Big Four (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, TRW, and Raytheon) are still
poised for payback after multi-million dollar contributions to
both parties, along with more than $10 million political action
committee (PAC) money to the Republicans. For beneficiaries, a
new arms race sparked by a US imposition of this fundamentally
flawed and risk-fraught system is ìworth it.î To
knowingly embrace the risk of a catastrophic nuclear weapons launch
(by accident or design) in order for the United States to retain
the luxury of projecting power can hardly be called a ìdefensiveî
strategy. To create a multi-billion dollar scarecrow, and the
mere perception of nuclear invulnerability (in order to issue
ultimatums to recalcitrant middle powers) is a reckless and irresponsible
gamble which must be firmly opposed by Americans who recognize
the need to direct resources to actual security measures.
Throughout 2001, even staunch US allies
opposed this dangerous bid for nuclear supremacy, and its underlying
obsession with preparation for future wars (which hawks like Don
Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz regard as ìinevitable,î
thus ensuring their inevitability). Meanwhile, the mainstream
media reported only that the Bush administration has formulated
a new strategy overhaul, nothing more than a modest proposal to
provide for the common defense. Judging from numerous letters
to the editor of the NYT, many Americans prior to September were
nodding in assent, grateful that the leadership was doing its
job to ìprotect Americansî ó from the remote
threat of ballistic missile attack. Ironically, even as Americans
approve of what is presented as an attempt to shore up defenses,
the US has undermined its security with its willingness to scotch
the nonproliferation regime for the sake of deploying this unworkable
and destabilizing missile defense system. Embracing unacceptable
risks to achieve a nuclear force advantage, US policy has resulted
in a sharp diminution in both US and global security, which, as
noted, runs counter to commitments made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which remains the best agreement to prevent nuclear-weapons
grade material from being acquired by ìnon-state actors,î
i.e., terrorist groups.
In this new atmosphere of heightened international
insecurity, Washington has finally conceded that unilateralism
is counterproductive, but has yet to listen to the rational objections
of its allies, including Canada, which counsels abandoning this
perilous pro-nuclear policy. The detonation of even a single nuclear
warhead over a major US city would lead to the immediate loss
of hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars in property
damage, along with long-term consequences that are well known.
Avoiding this outcome must entail a progressive shift towards
a reinvigorated arms control and disarmament policy, as Russia,
China, and traditional US allies have strenuously advocated. In
order to help defend the continental United States from real,
not invented, threats, Americans can no longer afford to leave
crucial decisions concerning US security to the vested interests
of an enlarging state apparatus. As hawkish reactionaries pursue
punitive wars without and enhanced police state tactics within,
only growing protest can divert the current administration from
its irresponsible conflation of real security needs with the hubristic
pursuit of nuclear hegemony.
Richard Alan Leach is an English Instructor
and Editor at the Pohang University of Science and Technology
(POSTECH) in Pohang, a major research university in South Korea.
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