FTAA, Eh?
A bigger, badder trade deal
by Robert Moberg
In These Times magazine, April, 2001
During his first months in the White House, George W. Bush
has already tilted politics against worker safety and for tax
giveaways to the rich, but on one front- trade and global economic
agreements-there has been remarkable continuity from the Clinton
era, just as Clinton extended the agenda of the first Bush regime.
However, the younger Bush inherits a public skepticism about corporate
globalization that has deepened since his father was in office.
Despite major losses on NAFTA, creation of the World Trade
Organization, and trade relations with China during the Clinton
years, the opposition movement-based on unions and environmental
groups-has grown enough in breadth and militancy to win some battles
and regularly rattle the elite corporate chiefs and global trade
and finance officials. Most notably, opponents disrupted the Seattle
WTO meeting and contributed to derailing a Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) among the rich countries. They also blocked
renewal of the president's "fast track" trade authority,
which would force Congress to vote yea or nay on trade agreements
without amendments or extensive debate.
In broad terms, the battles in the near term will follow the
same lines as over the past decade. Fast track-repackaged as "presidential
trade promotion authority"-will again be the major fight
in Congress this year, but the biggest street fight-in Quebec
City and dozens of U.S. cities in late April-will be over the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a proposed extension of
an even more pro-corporate NAFTA to the Western Hemisphere. In
each case, the crux of the conflict will be whether new global
economic agreements will provide meaningful protection for the
environment and labor rights.
Yet just as popular pressure is forcing government leaders
to take labor and environmental issues more seriously, those movements
are looking beyond securing such safeguards. Most global economic
agreements, like the nascent FTAA, are now less about trade and
tariffs or other barriers and more about investment, property
rights, privatization, deregulation and greater power for corporations
at the expense I' of governments. The critics of globalization
still have -a long way to go to secure labor rights and environmental
responsibility as part of all global economic arrangements. Yet
at the same time, they are broadening their demands to include
greater citizen control over corporations, new models of development
(including elimination of debt from most poor countries) and new
financial regulation to stabilize the global economy. split within
conservative, pro-business ranks, not unlike when some nationalist
Republicans voted with the left-leaning Democrats on trade issues
in recent years. Other business groups, like the Chamber of Commerce,
and key conservatives in Congress, like House Majority Leader
Dick Armey, oppose any reference to labor or the environment in
trade deals. The first indications from Bush's trade representative,
Robert Zoellick, suggest hostility to such provisions despite
talk of flexibility.
But the Business Roundtable's shift also poses a challenge
to the opponents of globalization. It's clear that the business
groups want any labor and environmental provisions to be as weak
as possible, providing political cover without real results. They
want to avoid binding obligations or tough enforcement (some might
accept monetary fines as penalties for labor and environmental
violations, but not the kind of trade sanctions reserved for protecting
corporate interests). Yet increasingly labor advocates and environmentalists
want stronger measures that go beyond governments pressuring each
other to enforce their own laws. They want agreements that would
enable workers and citizen groups, not just governments, to initiate
actions and that would apply sanctions and penalties against individual
corporate violators as well as governments.
How far will critics compromise with this more accommodating
wing of big business in order to strike a deal. At the end of
the NAFTA debate, the major environmental groups split, with several
of the moderate organizations endorsing NAFTA because of the side
agreements on labor and the environment that Clinton had negotiated.
Their disappointment with those side agreements helped to consolidate
later opposition to fast track.
A key test may come in a vote on the bilateral trade agreement
with Jordan negotiated at the close of the Clinton administration.
For the first time, labor and environmental protections-with provisions
for enforcement-are included in the text of a trade agreement.
Moreover, the Clinton administration invited the AFL-CIO to join
discussions of the language during the negotiations. While U.S.
Iabor participants did not get everything they wanted, they concluded
(along with their Jordanian counterparts) that the terms were
acceptable. However, Jordan is a special case: A very small country,
it trades little with the United States; its new labor laws are
quite progressive; and there's a foreign policy interest in strengthening
the Jordanian economy to foster peace in the Middle East.
Still, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch criticized the
Jordanian agreement as a model for future deals because the language
is loose (for example, calling on the parties to "strive
to ensure" that they don't relax their domestic environmental
or labor laws for economic gain) and that the obligations and
enforcement mechanisms are far weaker than for business interests
(such as intellectual property rights).
Some Democrats are pressing Bush to submit the Jordanian agreement
promptly, testing the administration's willingness to accept the
labor and environmental language, but lowa Republican Sen. Charles
Grassley has suggested lumping fast track authority together with
the Jordanian deal and a Vietnamese bilateral agreement (which
does not include labor or environmental protections) as well as
potential bilateral agreements with Singapore and Chile.
Although the Senate seems likely to remain a safe haven for
trade deals, the House is up for grabs, with crucial votes likely
to be swung by campaign contributors, friction between the two
political parties, or foreign policy interests in voting for a
package that includes trade deals with Vietnam or Jordan. Without
Clinton in the White House, Democrats may be more willing to oppose
Bush and fight for a new model of trade agreements, but anti-globalist
right-wing Republicans might also feel party pressure to back
Bush. In any case, labor, environmental and other progressive
critics of corporate globalization are already planning grassroots
pressure campaigns on legislators from both parties.
At the end of her term, Clinton trade representative Charlene
Barshefsky expressed skepticism about the need for fast track
authority. Indeed, the Clinton administration negotiated hundreds
of trade agreements without fast track, which has been used only
five times since it was first granted to President Nixon. But
fast track has both symbolic and practical value for the administration,
in suggesting to trading partners that it can deliver approval
of any terms negotiated. Bush had wanted fast track or at least
progress toward it-before the Summit of the Americas in Quebec
on April 20 as part of his campaign to accelerate negotiation
of the FTAA.
Although Quebec largely will be a formal display by hemispheric
heads of state (with the substantive ministerial negotiations
occurring earlier in April in Argentina), the Bush administration
has made the FTAA a top priority and would like to accelerate
negotiations to conclude a deal in two years rather than the scheduled
four. American corporations are anxious to consolidate their historic
dominance over the region and to use the deal to influence negotiations
at the World Trade Organization. While discussions about new agreements
on services and agriculture continue at the WTO, it is uncertain
whether there will be support for a new broad round of negotiations
when the WTO meets in tiny Qatar this fall, far removed from the
protesters of Seattle but still riven by internal disagreements
that blocked a new round in 1999.
FTAA negotiating groups from 34 countries (excluding Cuba)
have come up with an FTAA text that, in the language of negotiators,
is "heavily bracketed," meaning that most of the tough
points are unsettled. So far that text has been kept secret, although
citizen groups in the United States have sued to get it released.
But judging from position papers or other documents from the Canadian
and U.S. government, it is possible to get some sense of what
the FTAA might be like.
Although the proposed FTAA is often described as NAFTA for
the Americas, it actually "goes far beyond NAFTA in its scope
and power," according to Maude Barlow, chairwoman of The
Council of Canadians, Canada's largest public advocacy group.
"Essentially, what the FTAA negotiators have done, urged
on by the big business community in every country, is to take
the most ambitious elements of every global trade and investment
agreement-existing or proposed-and pull them all together."
The FTAA will likely include the worst-that is, the most pro-corporate
and anti-democratic-elements of both NAFTA and the WTO (as well
as the failed MAI). For example, while NAFTA focused on trade
in goods, the FTAA is likely to open up trade and investment in
all services, including health, education and other now predominantly
public services. The United States is pushing for rules that would
open up all services to international corporations unless they
were specifically excluded, rather than selectively agree on "liberalization"
of specific service sectors.
The FTAA is also likely to include the NAFTA provision- not
in the WTO-that gives corporations the right to sue governments
over violations of the agreement and to have the decisions made
by secretive international tribunals with no (or perhaps minimal)
public voice. Under NAFTA, corporations have successfully sued
governments to overturn regulations or receive compensation for
potential lost profits as a result of regulations protecting health
and the environment. For example, the Ethyl Corporation forced
Canada to reverse its ban on the sale of a dangerous gasoline
additive, and Metalclad Corporation won a judgment requiring Mexico
to pay $16.7 million on the grounds that environmental laws prohibiting
its toxic waste processing plant were the equivalent of expropriation.
Judging from available information, the FTAA would prohibit
regulation of speculative capital flows (such as Chile formerly
imposed). It would adopt standards on safety and health from the
WTO that give higher priority to trade and put stricter limits
on regulation than under NAFTA. It would impose tougher protection
of intellectual property rights, like patents (including the criminal
penalties for violations established under NAFTA but not the WTO).
It would open the door to privatization of many public services
through rules on government procurement and competition.
The United States is essentially offering the promise of freer
access to its domestic market and greater multinational investment
in Latin America in exchange for rules that strengthen the dominance
of corporations-mainly based here-over the economies and governments
of the hemisphere. The FTAA would lock in the model of development-maximizing
exports, shrinking the public sector-that has already been imposed
through the structural adjustment programs of the International
Monetary Fund with unimpressive results and great hardship for
the vast majority of Latin America. It also would put additional
downward pressure on Mexican wages as more Latin American countries
compete for the transfer of United States manufacturing or other
portable work to the broader new free trade area. This in turn
would exacerbate threats to many jobs and wages in the United
States.
There is apparently-but not surprisingly-no provision for
protection of labor rights or the environment in the FTAA. The
United States claims to have raised the issues but found no support.
But unlike NAFTA, where the main Mexican labor federation supported
the government's hostility to labor rights, there appears to be
unity among the hemispheric labor movement for labor rights in
the FTAA. There is also a growing network of environmental and
other citizen movements working together throughout the Americas.
Government negotiators are also divided. Canada's trade minister
Pierre Pettigrew has opposed the right of investors to sue governments.
Canada also has been involved in trade tiffs with both Brazil
and the United States. Brazil is reluctant to accelerate negotiations,
since it wants to consolidate its growing influence in South America,
and despite defection by Chile, the Mercosur nations of the southern
cone-including Brazil-put a higher priority on their common market
than on the FTAA. Small Caribbean countries are worried that their
special needs are being ignored.
While the Bush administration sets its sights on negotiating
the FTAA, it is ignoring the potential time bomb of the growing
U.S. trade deficit, which, based on the experience with NAFTA,
might grow even bigger with the FTAA.
Over the past three years, the trade deficit-driven mainly
by a rapidly growing imbalance in imports and exports of manufactured
goods-has soared, reaching a record 3.7 percent of GDP at the
end of last year. Developing countries with low wages and few
labor rights, especially China, are accounting for a growing share
of the deficit. The growth of the U.S. economy has masked a dramatic
trade-related phenomenon: Although manufacturing jobs usually
increase during a boom, since early 1998 the United States has
lost more than 400,000 manufacturing jobs.
This has had devastating consequences on some industries,
like steel, which suffers from "dumping" by desperate
exporters in a world with an excess of capacity to produce steel
and depressed markets outside of the United States. The shrinkage
of American manufacturing is partly a result of global trade deals
and shifts of investment by U.S. companies to other countries;
it is also partly a result of an overvalued dollar. A more general
problem is that the incomes of the world's working population,
including those in the United States, have not grown enough to
buy the goods being produced. Indeed, in much of the world, as
inequality grows, the buying power of working people is actually
declining, partly as a result of the deregulated global economy.
The result is that the U.S. and world economies are in a precarious
position.
Much of the U.S. boom, which has made possible the consumption
of the world's exports, has been financed by a stock market bubble
and a great increase in consumer debt by the majority of Americans
without stock portfolios. But with the bubble bursting and job
losses mounting, the United States cannot so easily buy everyone's
goods. The Federal Reserve needs to lower interest rates to stimulate
the economy and to reduce the value of the dollar, but a depreciating
dollar would hurt many countries, including Japan, that are already
vulnerable. It could also lead to withdrawal of investment in
the United States, the world's largest debtor nation (as a result
of our ongoing trade deficits).
Will all this lead to a global financial crisis? AFL-CIO economist
Tom Palley likens the problem to a bathtub, where the level of
debt created by trade deficits is the water in the tub. As long
as there's more space, the water-or deficits can keep gushing
in. But a crisis comes when the tub is full. The problem is nobody
knows how big the tub is. But the growth in trade deficits is
clearly unsustainable over a very long period.
So at a time when deregulation and corporate globalization
have increased the instability and inequality of the global economy,
the rich countries-led by the United States-are pushing for less
restraint on corporate power and international markets. If an
international crisis does occur, threatening the global system,
workers will still be the primary victims. If those workers were
able to organize to raise their wages and social income supports,
then the developing crisis might be averted or lessened.
The coming battles over fast track, the FTAA, WTO agreements
on services, and other global policy disputes are, at heart, questions
of redistribution of wealth and power. Echoing his domestic initiatives
on taxes, personal bankruptcy regulations and workplace safety,
Bush's agenda for the global economy is to accelerate the redistribution
well underway to those who are already rich and powerful, even
at the risk of the system as a whole.
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