A World of Debt
Why "Debt Relief" Has Failed to Liberate
Poor Countries
by Rick Rowden
The American Prospect magazine, Summer 2001
One of Bill Clinton's final acts as president was to secure
Congress's approval for a $43s-million component within the foreign-aid
bill last October. This provision fulfills the pledge the United
States originally made in 1996 at the Group of Seven (G-7) summit,
where the world's seven richest governments agreed to finance
a debt-relief plan for 41 of the poorest third-world nations.
The plan-formally called the Debt-Relief Initiative for Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries and commonly referred to as the HIPC initiative-was
announced by the G-7 countries with much self-congratulatory fanfare.
Yet, fraught with serious shortcomings and all-too-familiar strings
attached, it is under fire by some of the biggest advocates of
third-world debt relief.
In the 1960s and 1970s, third-world debt was largely incurred
by corrupt, unaccountable regimes. Many loans were officially
targeted toward large, wasteful infrastructure projects, but often
the money went into the pockets of the top 100 or 200 people surrounding
the regime leaders and ended up in private Swiss bank accounts
back in the first world. Much of the third world's present $2.6
trillion in debt is from accrued interest on the original loans
or on refinanced versions of them.
Third-world debt is administered by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which are largely controlled by
the G-7 governments. Originally Keynesian in their policies, these
two institutions were created to finance the reconstruction of
Western Europe after World War II and to rebuild and stabilize
the international payments system. It was Ronald Reagan's administration,
seconded by Britain's Margaret Thatcher, that infused them with
a neoliberal economics ideology and sent them in to micro-manage
more than go third world economies. They sought to reduce the
role of the state and increase the role of the private international
investment sector in these countries' economic development.
Since the early 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank have based
loan awards on nations' compliance with "structural-adjustment
programs"-economic-reform policies with a free market bias.
This stamp of approval acts as a green light for the release
of additional bilateral and multilateral loans. Because nearly
all private foreign investment goes to about a dozen "emerging
market" economies-eastern China alone receives the bulk of
it-most poor nations depend entirely on bilateral or multilateral
loans and foreign aid just to service the interest payments on
decades of previous debt. Poor countries must prove that they
are implementing the economic reforms at a satisfactory pace in
order to have each "tranche," or portion of the loan,
released.
HYPOCRITICAL HELPERS
By the early l990s, while the IMF and the World Bank claimed
to be helping the third world develop and get out of debt, most
of their clients not only remained underdeveloped and poor but
had fallen deeper into debt. And by the mid-l990s, the global
gap between the rich and poor countries had roughly doubled since
the 19605. Today the top 20 percent of the world's population
controls more than 80 percent of the world's wealth and the bottom
20 percent controls about 1 percent. Debt payments from the poor
countries to the rich ones usually amount to far more than new
aid or foreign investment flowing from the rich countries to the
poor. To make matters worse, although the structural-adjustment
programs are supposed to reduce poverty through "market-led
economic growth," they have yet to help even one third-world
economy achieve both a high rate of growth and a substantive decline
in poverty. A study conducted by the Center for Economic and Policy
Research suggests that the structural-adjustment programs have
actually impaired economic growth rates.
Strikingly, the conditions attached to IMF and World Bank
loans are nothing like the policies of industrialized economies
over the past 150 years. Europe, the United States, Japan, and
the Four Tigers of Asia (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan) all have relied on an extensive partnership between industry
and the state. Their industrialization process involved several
decades or more of government providing protective trade barriers,
large subsidies to domestic industry, support for public utilities
and state-owned industries, tax breaks and other incentives for
research and development to diversify the economy, and controls
on currency and capital.
In contrast, structural-adjustment programs call for third
world economies to reduce the states' role in their economic development
process. These conditions-which are pushed most heavily by the
U.S. Treasury Department and are thus dubbed the Washington Consensus-force
third-world governments to lower or eliminate trade barriers and
tariffs, lower or eliminate subsidies to their businesses, privatize
public utilities and state-owned businesses, limit production
to only one or two major exports, and eliminate their controls
on currency and capital. A11 of this constricts the ability of
the state to assist domestic industry or provide needed public
services. Since no country in history has ever industrialized
under such a process, structural-adjustment programs are essentially
a massive, radical experiment foisted on the poorest two-thirds
of the world's population.
Structural-adjustment programs drew lots of criticism throughout
the l990s. Such objections culminated in the boisterous protests
last year outside the IMF and World Bank joint conferences in
Prague and in Washington, D.C. Critics note that the trade barrier
reductions and subsidy cuts have wiped out domestic businesses,
which could not compete with foreign multinational competitors;
and that when a country's public utilities and state-owned companies
are privatized, only foreign investors or the few domestic elites
can afford to purchase them. Being forced to stick to one or two
main exports has repeatedly made entire economies vulnerable to
sudden price drops in international commodity markets. And currency-and-capital-control
deregulation is now widely understood to have exacerbated the
recent currency crisis in Asia.
In its 2001 annual edition of Global Economic Perspectives
and the Developing Countries, the World Bank itself has pointed
to one of the largest hypocrisies of all in global trading: The
rich countries maintain high levels of trade barriers and subsidies
for their own protection but force third-world governments to
remove barriers and subsidies that support their industries. These
prevent third-world goods from being sold in their markets. The
effects of such hypocrisy have been disastrous.
THE POLITICS OF DEBT RELIEF
Criticism of the IMF and the World Bank gained political momentum
in the late l990s with the emergence of international activist
groups such as the Jubilee USA Network of religious organizations
and development organizations-Oxfam International, Bread for the
World, and so Years Is Enough Network-whose grass-roots campaigns
have successfully put debt relief on the public agenda. Many groups
have called for total debt cancellation, and their demand has
been echoed by the pope, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Meltzer
Commission, and others. Bono of the rock group U2 also has taken
on the cause; he lined up with key members of Congress to highlight
the importance of debt relief and to urge full funding for the
U.S. contribution to the HIPC initiative.
The HIPC framework, which promises cancellation of limited
portions of countries' debts over a two- to four-year period,
is supposed to invite nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
civic groups to consult with their governments, the IMF, and the
World Bank in an open, inclusive group effort to draft a road
map of economic reforms called "poverty reduction strategy
papers." These papers are meant to direct new budgets to
emphasize poverty reduction strategies while also implementing
the old loan terms.
The HIPC initiative's stated goals include "community
participation," "country ownership" of the loan,
plans to "decentralize" budgetary administration, and
greater "transparency." These provisions are designed
to placate critics of the traditional top-down approach. The lexicon
of new terms, a veritable hodgepodge of themes and concepts long
supported by the World Bank's progressive critics, has been co-opted
for a public relations bonanza. All of this is akin to MasterCard
telling its customers they have ownership over their debt payment
plan. Its only substance is rhetorical.
There are no clear guidelines about who is a legitimate NGO
or who should be allowed to participate. In countries such as
Ghana and Tanzania, governments handpicked which groups were allowed
to represent civil society in the poverty reduction-strategy process;
and even those who participated were working with incomplete information.
In Cambodia the available documents were not even translated from
English. NGOs have criticized the process as "a joke"
in which "a preoccupation with structural adjustment targets
suffocates the strategy" of poverty reduction. Participants
have complained that there are two discrete tracks-one for poverty
reduction and the other for structural adjustment.
Many quarters, ranging from international citizens' groups
to the UN Human Rights Commission, have questioned the sincerity
of the World Bank and IMF's promise to consider local participation
when drafting the country strategy papers required for HIPC debt
relief. When pushed, the IMF admits that the Joint Staff Assessment
committees will also evaluate the "soundness" of the
economic policies in each strategy paper before offering their
final judgments to the governing boards of the IMF and the World
Bank.
Furthermore, while everyone watches the poverty reduction
process unfold, the IMF and the World Bank silently continue to
wring hundreds of other concessions and commitments from governments,
through several secret loan agreements that impose traditional
structural-adjustment conditions. Documents such as the "President's
Report" or the "Letters of Development Policy"
are never disclosed. And even when sectoral-adjustment loans or
country assistance strategies are disclosed, important information
can be omitted by governments, and the documents are made public
only after IMF and World Bank executive board approval.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the HIPC initiative is that
the amount of debt relief it provides is insufficient to free
the indebted countries from unsustainable debt burdens in the
future. By December 2000, the IMF and the World Bank had finalized
debt-relief plans for 22 of the 41 HIPCs and officially lifted
some $34 billion in debt service obligations. Yet the payment
reductions are spread over the next 20 to 25 years, so these countries
are still left with vast amounts of debt to be serviced.
The HIPC initiative's ultimate goal is to reduce each country's
debt service by an average of 37 percent. It aims to reach a certain
ratio of debt-to-exports earnings, a point at which the rest of
the debt burden is considered to be sustainable. The 22 countries
furthest through the process have had their payments reduced on
average by 31.2 percent. But groups such as Drop the Debt in the
UK and the Jubilee USA Network argue that this is inadequate because
a majority of countries that have already gotten reduced payments
will continue to pay more toward their debt than they spend on
health care or education.
For example, Cameroon's annual debt payments will be reduced
by 40 percent over the next five years. But Cameroon will still
pay, on average, $280 million per year during this period. The
projected payments far exceed the amount the country spends annually
on education ($239 million) and health care ($87 million). The
total relief is about $2 billion, but as with most HIPCs, it will
be spread thinly over the next 20 to 25 years. The amount looks
especially inadequate in light of the extremely high level of
poverty in Cameroon, where one-third of the children are malnourished
and 60 percent of the population lack access to clean water.
The IMF and the World Bank never said the HIPC program would
completely eliminate the countries' debt; they claimed only that
it would reduce the debt to a sustainable level, as determined
by a debt-to-exports ratio of 150 percent. Yet this claim- based
on projections that the HIPCs would have an annual economic growth
rate of g.1 percent for 20 years-was found to be overly optimistic
in studies by both Oxfam International and the U.S. General Accounting
Office. Additionally, the HIPC program neglects to account fully
for countries that fall back into unsustainability as they borrow
more money.
In a report prepared this April, the World Bank conceded that
the debt-to-exports ratio of 150 percent may not be enough to
prevent countries from reverting to unsustainability: There may
be unanticipated increases in the costs of oil imports for the
HIPCs, as well as declines in the prices of many HIPC exports
in international commodity markets. More telling, at a seminar
in London this February, the World Bank admitted that the HIPCs
will gain only 40 cents for every dollar of official debt relief.
Ishac Diwan of the World Bank explained that "the HIPC initiative
is more helpful to multilateral organizations than it is to poor
countries." The "relief' being offered does not come
from writing off the debts in question but rather from the establishment
of a trust fund composed of contributions from wealthy first-world
governments to make dollar-for-dollar payments to the World Bank
and the IMF-a setup that has amounted to a taxpayer-funded bailout
for the decades of reckless lending by the institutions. In many
cases, the debt being forgiven was not actively being paid back
anyway, so its disappearance from the official books did not translate
into any new tangible savings for the indebted countries.
A FEW MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS
At first activists debated whether or not debt relief that
comes with structural-adjustment programs is better than nothing.
Some groups refused to support the HIPC initiative because its
relief is too limited and structural-adjustment conditions remain
attached. But other groups lobbied Congress to continue funding
the HIPC program because they believed that it was the best deal
they would get and that calling for full debt cancellation was
politically unrealistic. Moreover, they acknowledged that even
the limited relief offered has allowed some countries to put more
resources toward health and education than they otherwise would
have. And as flawed as the poverty-reduction strategy process
is, the call for local NGOs to participate in a civic process
with their governments has opened up positive channels of communication
in some countries.
While the disagreement about whether or not to support the
limited HIPC initiative divided many citizens' groups in the past,
today the emerging consensus among a growing number of debt cancellation
activists and NGOs is that the initiative is largely smoke and
mirrors, because the debt relief does not entail total cancellation
and because the structural-adjustment programs are still being
pushed. Critics say that structural adjustment programs prevent
poor countries from industrializing the way the Four Tigers and
the first world did, and that the debt burden itself is illegitimate.
Notwithstanding claims by the World Bank and the IMF that
they cannot afford to provide greater levels of relief, Adam Lerrick-former
head of product development at Credit Suisse First Boston and
an adviser to the congressionally appointed Meltzer Commission-concluded
in the September 2000 issue of Euromoney that the capital reserves
in the big multilateral banks are more than large enough to wipe
out the $4s-billion share of multilateral debt owed by the HIPCs.
More recently, the United Kingdom's Drop the Debt campaign teamed
up with Oxfam International to release the findings of an independent
audit of internal reserve accounts and other sources of revenue
held by the IMF and the World Bank. Completed by the London accounting
firm Chantrey Vellacott DFK, the audit indicated that the World
Bank, the IMF, and regional development banks do, in fact, have
the funds available to cancel HIPC debt. These reports have emboldened
a large international coalition of citizen activists to go far
beyond the limited HIPC initiative and call on the IMF and the
World Bank to use their own internal funds, not first-world taxpayers'
money, to eradicate the debts.
However, many worry that some countries would not spend the
saved money on development programs for their people. One possible
solution to this problem is to emulate Uganda's Poverty Action
Fund-which puts debt-relief proceeds into schools, roads, and
the like and is run entirely by local NGOs. But it should be noted
that even if 100 percent of HIPC debt were canceled, many oppressive
regimes would not automatically raise health or education budgets
for their impoverished masses. Indeed, third-world elites benefit
from the existing situation and are among the first to purchase
the state-owned enterprises that are privatized under structural
adjustment.
And regardless, total debt cancellation would still leave
most countries in need of future financial assistance. This is
why more activists are starting to think that the World Bank and
the IMF should get out of the lending business and switch to providing
development grants. In an era of staggering poverty and a worsening
AIDS crisis, it no longer makes sense to give loans. One thing
that activists and World Bank officials appear to agree on is
that as first-world governments get richer, they could be giving
much more to developing nations. While many countries officially
have agreed to provide o.7 percent of their annual GDPs in foreign
aid to poor countries, few first-world governments do so. Also,
more than 75 poor countries are not included among the 41 formally
recognized HIPCs. They, too, must borrow, simply to service their
debt payments. Since 1996 the debt burden of all developing countries
has climbed from $2.2 trillion to $2.6 trillion.
Once again, it's apparent that the real issues posed by third
world debt are political, not financial. Karin Lissakers, who
resigned in April as the U.S. executive director of the IMF, has
admitted that if conventional financial standards were applied
to third-world debt, "a substantial portion" of it would
be wiped away overnight. After all, credit card companies will
cancel charges on a stolen card-also known as "odious debt"-
because of the widespread belief that cardholders shouldn't be
held liable for such charges. Even the IMF and the World Bank
have insisted that Russia and the Eastern European countries write
off the debts owed to them by Nicaragua and other third world
countries in order to have their books "better reflect reality,"
since these debts are not payable. Yet the IMF and the World Bank
do not take it upon themselves to "better reflect reality":
They refuse to employ the odious-debt approach. As a consequence,
the largely youthful third-world masses continue to have their
health and education budgets slashed to pay for the debts of corrupt
regimes from long ago.
Because the IMF and the World Bank continue to impose structural-adjustment
programs and show no willingness to forgive third-world debt in
its entirety, the vaunted HIPC initiative is bound for spectacular
failure. When the G-7 governments, along with Russia, meet for
a summit conference in Italy this July, they will have another
opportunity to improve the initiative. Tens of thousands of protesters
will be outside the G-7 summit, as well as outside the IMF and
World Bank annual meetings in Washington, D.C., this September,
to call for total debt cancellation and an end to the controversial
structural-adjustment programs. Unless the core issues surrounding
relations between first-world and third-world nations are fully
acknowledged and dealt with by the richest countries, the HIPC
program will end up as just another historical footnote and the
crises of deepening debt and global poverty will continue to be
unresolved.
Rick Rowden conducts research on IMF and World Bank policies
for the RESULTS Educational Fund in Washington, D. C. He has taught
international political economy at Golden Gate University in San
Francisco.
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