Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein
- December 20, 1983
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984
National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 82
Edited by Joyce Battle, February
25, 2003
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one
of a series of crises during an era of upheaval in the Middle
East: revolution in Iran, occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran
by militant students, invasion of the Great Mosque in Mecca by
anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan,
and internecine fighting among Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians
in Lebanon. The war followed months of rising tension between
the Iranian Islamic republic and secular nationalist Iraq. In
mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked, in the mistaken belief that
Iranian political disarray would guarantee a quick victory.
The international community responded
with U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire
and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing
in any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing
the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to Iraq, its ally under
a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries resumed in 1982). The U.S. had
already ended, when the shah fell, previously massive military
sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations
with Iran because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis; Iraq had
broken off ties with the U.S. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding
the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran
depended on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought them from
Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq started the war
with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed additional weaponry
as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian
territory, but was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq
was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S.,
having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests,
began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq
relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits,
and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its
list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been
included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian
nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda.
Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa,
was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's
Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination
of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive.
Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf
states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The
White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank
to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing
and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial
institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed
loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction
of U.S. grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with
Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier,
to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret
and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance
with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were
prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum
(NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle
East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983,
is available only in a highly redacted version [Document 21].
It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South
Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and
the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic
and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability."
It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation
with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for
action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting
policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of
the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting
Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva
protocol requires that the international community respond to
chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received
only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified
its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked
for a United Nations Security Council investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments
in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence
confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost
daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy
review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24].
The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against
Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against
"Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].
What was the Reagan administration's response?
A State Department account indicates that the administration had
decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program
to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf
war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving
desired results." But the department noted in late November
1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms,
Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built
up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation
to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW,
particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in
a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department
argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain
the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare,
and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the
issue.
Following further high-level policy review,
Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S.
policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's
priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation
to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military
capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries
of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area.
It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact
of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the
international economic system, we must assure our readiness to
deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic."
It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who
had served in various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations,
including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this time
headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D. Searle &
Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential envoy.
His December 1983 tour of regional capitals included Baghdad,
where he was to establish "direct contact between an envoy
of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while
emphasizing "his close relationship" with the president
[Document 28]. Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed
regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran
and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to
transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been
shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline
that transported Iraqi oil through its territory. Rumsfeld made
no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes
on the meeting [Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared
many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's
"willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war,
but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited
by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use
of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human
rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document
32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section
that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased"
with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his
way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document
37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March
1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical
weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that
the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq
used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's
meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since
his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because
"bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5
condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings
that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48].
Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's
hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq,
the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports
to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's
companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member
Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel
to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred
the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently
provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April
1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised
of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters
to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for
military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian
subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned
down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes
helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State
Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983
(when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks
recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State
Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's
intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered
policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear program,
and its "preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade
to include Iraqi nuclear entities" [Document 57]. Several
months later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that
even after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to
develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and
probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is
situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled
a large nuclear weapons arsenal without international censure.
Nuclear nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan
administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's
nuclear program, though its intelligence indicated that a weapons
capability was being pursued, in order to avert congressionally
mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have impeded the administration's
massive military assistance to Pakistan provided in return for
its support of the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting
a major Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide
capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq possesses
this annihilation insecticide" [Document 41]. On March 3,
the State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from
shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons
precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S. interests section
to protest to the Iraqi government, and to inform the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation
of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future," and
that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire
the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical
weapons from the United States. When we become aware of attempts
to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document
42].
The public condemnation was issued on
March 5. It said, "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons
use . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's
intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating
the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent
with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral
and religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department
briefed the press on its decision to strengthen controls on the
export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response
to intelligence and media reports that precursors supplied to
Iraq originated in Western countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s
conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any
effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships
with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open
diplomatic relations," the department's spokesperson said
"No. I'm not aware of any change in our position. We're interested
in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document
52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution
asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S.
delegate to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations
in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision"
on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate
was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint"
in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of both
France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated
in a fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented
"Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical
weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn
Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public
statements to this effect" [Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon
met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March
29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council
presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted the response
to refer to former resolutions on the war, progress toward ending
the conflict, but to not identify any specific country as responsible
for chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi
proposals if the Security Council went along. He asked for the
Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]"
but also noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to
dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council
issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical
weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State Department
memo circulating the draft text observed that, "The statement,
by the way contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document
51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued
another presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S.
objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf
region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and
the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering
capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans
"to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said
that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation
of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the
caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent
need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane
tactics which have characterized recent offensives." The
directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical
warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S.
support for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated
November 16, 1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons
after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed
their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the
U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with
Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned
to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied
that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability
is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed
thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales to
Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry"
assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent,
"remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important
factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document
60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses
Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading
a skeptical world that a preemptive and premeditated attack on
Iraq could and should be supported as a "just war."
The documents included in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik
that determined this country's policies during the years when
Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than
rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently not perceived
to serve U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan administration did
not deviate from its determination that Iraq was to serve as the
instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was
viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem
that complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi government's
repressive internal policies, though well known to the U.S. government
at the time, did not figure at all in the presidential directives
that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S.
was concerned with its ability to project military force in the
Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing
book, in its broad outlines, has been available for years. Some
of it was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few investigative
reporters uncovered much more - especially after Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed to the late representative
Henry Gonzales (1916-2000), Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively
investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the 1980s and who
would not be deterred from making information available to the
public [Note 2]. Almost all of the primary documents included
in this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive
through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995
[Note 3].
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