Oil, Geopolitics, and the Coming
War with Iran
by Michael T. Klare
TomDispatch.com, April 11, 2005
commondreams.org
As the United States gears up for an attack
on Iran, one thing is certain: the Bush administration will never
mention oil as a reason for going to war. As in the case of Iraq,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will be cited as the principal
justification for an American assault. "We will not tolerate
the construction of a nuclear weapon [by Iran]," is the way
President Bush put it in a much-quoted 2003 statement. But just
as the failure to discover illicit weapons in Iraq undermined
the administration's use of WMD as the paramount reason for its
invasion, so its claim that an attack on Iran would be justified
because of its alleged nuclear potential should invite widespread
skepticism. More important, any serious assessment of Iran's strategic
importance to the United States should focus on its role in the
global energy equation.
Before proceeding further, let me state
for the record that I do not claim oil is the sole driving force
behind the Bush administration's apparent determination to destroy
Iranian military capabilities. No doubt there are many national
security professionals in Washington who are truly worried about
Iran's nuclear program, just as there were many professionals
who were genuinely worried about Iraqi weapons capabilities. I
respect this. But no war is ever prompted by one factor alone,
and it is evident from the public record that many considerations,
including oil, played a role in the administration's decision
to invade Iraq. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that many
factors -- again including oil -- are playing a role in the decision-making
now underway over a possible assault on Iran.
Just exactly how much weight the oil
factor carries in the administration's decision-making is not
something that we can determine with absolute assurance at this
time, but given the importance energy has played in the careers
and thinking of various high officials of this administration,
and given Iran's immense resources, it would be ludicrous not
to take the oil factor into account -- and yet you can rest assured
that, as relations with Iran worsen, American media reports and
analysis of the situation will generally steer a course well clear
of the subject (as they did in the lead-up to the invasion of
Iraq).
One further caveat: When talking about
oil's importance in American strategic thinking about Iran, it
is important to go beyond the obvious question of Iran's potential
role in satisfying our country's future energy requirements. Because
Iran occupies a strategic location on the north side of the Persian
Gulf, it is in a position to threaten oil fields in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, which together possess
more than half of the world's known oil reserves. Iran also sits
athwart the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which,
daily, 40% of the world's oil exports pass. In addition, Iran
is becoming a major supplier of oil and natural gas to China,
India, and Japan, thereby giving Tehran additional clout in world
affairs. It is these geopolitical dimensions of energy, as much
as Iran's potential to export significant quantities of oil to
the United States, that undoubtedly govern the administration's
strategic calculations.
Having said this, let me proceed to an
assessment of Iran's future energy potential. According to the
most recent tally by Oil and Gas Journal, Iran houses the second-largest
pool of untapped petroleum in the world, an estimated 125.8 billion
barrels. Only Saudi Arabia, with an estimated 260 billion barrels,
possesses more; Iraq, the third in line, has an estimated 115
billion barrels. With this much oil -- about one-tenth of the
world's estimated total supply -- Iran is certain to play a key
role in the global energy equation, no matter what else occurs.
It is not, however, just sheer quantity
that matters in Iran's case; no less important is its future productive
capacity. Although Saudi Arabia possesses larger reserves, it
is now producing oil at close to its maximum sustainable rate
(about 10 million barrels per day). It will probably be unable
to raise its output significantly over the next 20 years while
global demand, pushed by significantly higher consumption in the
United States, China, and India, is expected to rise by 50%. Iran,
on the other hand, has considerable growth potential: it is now
producing about 4 million barrels per day, but is thought to be
capable of boosting its output by another 3 million barrels or
so. Few, if any, other countries possess this potential, so Iran's
importance as a producer, already significant, is bound to grow
in the years ahead.
And it is not just oil that Iran possesses
in great abundance, but also natural gas. According to Oil and
Gas Journal, Iran has an estimated 940 trillion cubic feet of
gas, or approximately 16% of total world reserves. (Only Russia,
with 1,680 trillion cubic feet, has a larger supply.) As it takes
approximately 6,000 cubic feet of gas to equal the energy content
of 1 barrel of oil, Iran's gas reserves represent the equivalent
of about 155 billion barrels of oil. This, in turn, means that
its combined hydrocarbon reserves are the equivalent of some 280
billion barrels of oil, just slightly behind Saudi Arabia's combined
supply. At present, Iran is producing only a small share of its
gas reserves, about 2.7 trillion cubic feet per year. This means
that Iran is one of the few countries capable of supplying much
larger amounts of natural gas in the future.
What all this means is that Iran will
play a critical role in the world's future energy equation. This
is especially true because the global demand for natural gas is
growing faster than that for any other source of energy, including
oil. While the world currently consumes more oil than gas, the
supply of petroleum is expected to contract in the not-too-distant
future as global production approaches its peak sustainable level
-- perhaps as soon as 2010 -- and then begins a gradual but irreversible
decline. The production of natural gas, on the other hand, is
not likely to peak until several decades from now, and so is expected
to take up much of the slack when oil supplies become less abundant.
Natural gas is also considered a more attractive fuel than oil
in many applications, especially because when consumed it releases
less carbon dioxide (a major contributor to the greenhouse effect).
No doubt the major U.S. energy companies
would love to be working with Iran today in developing these vast
oil and gas supplies. At present, however, they are prohibited
from doing so by Executive Order (EO) 12959, signed by President
Clinton in 1995 and renewed by President Bush in March 2004. The
United States has also threatened to punish foreign firms that
do business in Iran (under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996),
but this has not deterred many large companies from seeking access
to Iran's reserves. China, which will need vast amounts of additional
oil and gas to fuel its red-hot economy, is paying particular
attention to Iran. According to the Department of Energy (DoE),
Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003, and is expected
to provide an even larger share in the future. China is also expected
to rely on Iran for a large share of its liquid natural gas (LNG)
imports. In October 2004, Iran signed a $100 billion, 25-year
contract with Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint
development of one of its major gas fields and the subsequent
delivery of LNG to China. If this deal is fully consummated, it
will constitute one of China's biggest overseas investments and
represent a major strategic linkage between the two countries.
India is also keen to obtain oil and
gas from Iran. In January, the Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL)
signed a 30-year deal with the National Iranian Gas Export Corp.
for the transfer of as much as 7.5 million tons of LNG to India
per year. The deal, worth an estimated $50 billion, will also
entail Indian involvement in the development of Iranian gas fields.
Even more noteworthy, Indian and Pakistani officials are discussing
the construction of a $3 billion natural gas pipeline from Iran
to India via Pakistan ¬ an extraordinary step for two long-term
adversaries. If completed, the pipeline would provide both countries
with a substantial supply of gas and allow Pakistan to reap $200-$500
million per year in transit fees. "The gas pipeline is a
win-win proposition for Iran, India, and Pakistan," Pakistani
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz declared in January.
Despite the pipeline's obvious attractiveness
as an incentive for reconciliation between India and Pakistan
-- nuclear powers that have fought three wars over Kashmir since
1947 and remain deadlocked over the future status of that troubled
territory -- the project was condemned by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice during a recent trip to India. "We have communicated
to the Indian government our concerns about the gas pipeline cooperation
between Iran and India," she said on March 16 after meeting
with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh in New Delhi. The administration
has, in fact, proved unwilling to back any project that offers
an economic benefit to Iran. This has not, however, deterred India
from proceeding with the pipeline.
Japan has also broken ranks with Washington
on the issue of energy ties with Iran. In early 2003, a consortium
of three Japanese companies acquired a 20% stake in the development
of the Soroush-Nowruz offshore field in the Persian Gulf, a reservoir
thought to hold 1 billion barrels of oil. One year later, the
Iranian Offshore Oil Company awarded a $1.26 billion contract
to Japan's JGC Corporation for the recovery of natural gas and
natural gas liquids from Soroush-Nowruz and other offshore fields.
When considering Iran's role in the global
energy equation, therefore, Bush administration officials have
two key strategic aims: a desire to open up Iranian oil and gas
fields to exploitation by American firms, and concern over Iran's
growing ties to America's competitors in the global energy market.
Under U.S. law, the first of these aims can only be achieved after
the President lifts EO 12959, and this is not likely to occur
as long as Iran is controlled by anti-American mullahs and refuses
to abandon its uranium enrichment activities with potential bomb-making
applications. Likewise, the ban on U.S. involvement in Iranian
energy production and export gives Tehran no choice but to pursue
ties with other consuming nations. From the Bush administration's
point of view, there is only one obvious and immediate way to
alter this unappetizing landscape -- by inducing "regime
change" in Iran and replacing the existing leadership with
one far friendlier to U.S. strategic interests.
That the Bush administration seeks to
foster regime change in Iran is not in any doubt. The very fact
that Iran was included with Saddam's Iraq and Kim Jong Il's North
Korea in the "Axis of Evil" in the President's 2002
State of the Union Address was an unmistakable indicator of this.
Bush let his feelings be known again in June 2003, at a time when
there were anti-government protests by students in Tehran. "This
is the beginning of people expressing themselves toward a free
Iran, which I think is positive," he declared. In a more
significant indication of White House attitudes on the subject,
the Department of Defense has failed to fully disarm the People's
Mujaheddin of Iran (or Mujaheddin-e Khalq, MEK), an anti-government
militia now based in Iraq that has conducted terrorist actions
in Iran and is listed on the State Department's roster of terrorist
organizations. In 2003, the Washington Post reported that some
senior administration figures would like to use the MEK as a proxy
force in Iran, in the same manner that the Northern Alliance was
employed against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Iranian leadership is well aware
that it faces a serious threat from the Bush administration and
is no doubt taking whatever steps it can to prevent such an attack.
Here, too, oil is a major factor in both Tehran's and Washington's
calculations. To deter a possible American assault, Iran has threatened
to close the Strait of Hormuz and otherwise obstruct oil shipping
in the Persian Gulf area. "An attack on Iran will be tantamount
to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and, in a word, the entire
Middle East oil," Iranian Expediency Council secretary Mohsen
Rezai said on March 1st.
Such threats are taken very seriously
by the U.S. Department of Defense. "We judge Iran can briefly
close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using
predominantly naval, air, and some ground forces," Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February
16th.
Planning for such attacks is, beyond
doubt, a major priority for top Pentagon officials. In January,
veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh reported in the New
Yorker magazine that the Department of Defense was conducting
covert reconnaissance raids into Iran, supposedly to identify
hidden Iranian nuclear and missile facilities that could be struck
in future air and missile attacks. "I was repeatedly told
that the next strategic target was Iran," Hersh said of his
interviews with senior military personnel. Shortly thereafter,
the Washington Post revealed that the Pentagon was flying surveillance
drones over Iran to verify the location of weapons sites and to
test Iranian air defenses. As noted by the Post, "Aerial
espionage [of this sort] is standard in military preparations
for an eventual air attack." There have also been reports
of talks between U.S. and Israeli officials about a possible Israeli
strike on Iranian weapons facilities, presumably with behind-the-scenes
assistance from the United States.
In reality, much of Washington's concern
about Iran's pursuit of WMD and ballistic missiles is sparked
by fears for the safety of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, other Persian
Gulf oil producers, and Israel rather than by fears of a direct
Iranian assault on the United States. "Tehran has the only
military in the region that can threaten its neighbors and Gulf
security," Jacoby declared in his February testimony. "Its
expanding ballistic missile inventory presents a potential threat
to states in the region." It is this regional threat that
American leaders are most determined to eliminate.
In this sense, more than any other, the
current planning for an attack on Iran is fundamentally driven
by concern over the safety of U.S. energy supplies, as was the
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the most telling expression of
White House motives for going to war against Iraq, Vice President
Dick Cheney (in an August 2002 address to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars) described the threat from Iraq as follows: "Should
all [of Hussein's WMD] ambitions be realized, the implications
would be enormous for the Middle East and the United States....
Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a seat atop
10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then
be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take
control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, [and]
directly threaten America's friends throughout the region."
This was, of course, unthinkable to Bush's inner circle. And all
one need do is substitute the words "Iranian mullahs"
for Saddam Hussein, and you have a perfect expression of the Bush
administration case for making war on Iran.
So, even while publicly focusing on Iran's
weapons of mass destruction, key administration figures are certainly
thinking in geopolitical terms about Iran's role in the global
energy equation and its capacity to obstruct the global flow of
petroleum. As was the case with Iraq, the White House is determined
to eliminate this threat once and for all. And so, while oil may
not be the administration's sole reason for going to war with
Iran, it is an essential factor in the overall strategic calculation
that makes war likely.
Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace
and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author
of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing
Dependency on Imported Oil (Metropolitan Books).
Central Asia watch
Index of Website
Home
Page