The USA PATRIOT Act:
What's So Patriotic About
Trampling on the Bill of Rights?
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, February 24,
2002
Nancy Chang, Senior Litigation Attorney Center
for Constitutional Rights
Just six weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a jittery Congress-exiled
from its anthrax-contaminated offices and confronted with warnings
that more terrorist assaults were soon to come-capitulated to
the Bush Administration's demands for a new arsenal of anti-terrorism
weapons. Over vigorous objections from civil liberties organizations
on both ends of the political spectrum, Congress overwhelmingly
approved the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, better
known by its acronym, the USA PATRIOT Act. The House vote was
356-to-66, and the Senate vote was 98-to-1. Along the way, the
Republican House leadership, in a raw display of force, jettisoned
an anti-terrorism bill that the House Judiciary Committee had
unanimously approved and that would have addressed a number of
civil liberties concerns. The hastily-drafted, complex, and far-reaching
legislation spans 342 pages. Yet it was passed with virtually
no public hearing or debate, and it was accompanied by neither
a conference nor a committee report. On October 26, the Act was
signed into law by a triumphant President George W. Bush.
I. THE USA PATRIOT ACT CONFERS VAST AND UNCHECKED POWERS TO
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Although a number of its provisions are not controversial,
the USA PATRIOT Act nevertheless stands out as radical in its
design. To an unprecedented degree, the Act sacrifices our political
freedoms in the name of national security and upsets the democratic
values that define our nation by consolidating vast new powers
in the executive branch of government. The Act enhances the executive's
ability to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence, places
an array of new tools at the disposal of the prosecution, including
new crimes, enhanced penalties, and longer statutes of limitations,
and grants the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the
authority to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism for lengthy,
and in some cases indefinite, periods of time. And at the same
time that the Act inflates the powers of the executive, it insulates
the exercise of these powers from meaningful judicial and Congressional
oversight.
Although a number of its provisions are not controversial,
the USA PATRIOT Act nevertheless stands out as radical in its
design. To an unprecedented degree, the Act sacrifices our political
freedoms in the name of national security and upsets the democratic
values that define our nation by consolidating vast new powers
in the executive branch of government. The Act enhances the executive's
ability to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence, places
an array of new tools at the disposal of the prosecution, including
new crimes, enhanced penalties, and longer statutes of limitations,
and grants the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the
authority to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism for lengthy,
and in some cases indefinite, periods of time. And at the same
time that the Act inflates the powers of the executive, it insulates
the exercise of these powers from meaningful judicial and Congressional
oversight.
It remains to be seen how the executive will wield its new
authority. However, if the two months that have elapsed since
September 11 serve as a guide, we should brace ourselves for a
flagrant disregard of the rule of law by those charged with its
enforcement. Already, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has admitted
to detaining more than 1,100 immigrants, not one of whom has been
charged with committing a terrorist act and only a handful of
whom are being held as material witnesses to the September 11
hijackings.5 Many in this group appear to have been held for extended
time periods under an extraordinary interim regulation announced
by Attorney General John Ashcroft on September 17 and published
in Federal Register on September 20.6 This regulation sets aside
the strictures of due process by permitting the INS to detain
aliens without charge for 48 hours or an uncapped "additional
reasonable period of time" in the event of an "emergency
or other extraordinary circumstance." Also, many in this
group are being held without bond under the pretext of unrelated
criminal charges or minor immigration violations, in a modern-day
form of preventive detention. Chillingly, the Attorney General's
response to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act was not a pledge
to use his new powers responsibly and guard against their abuse,
but instead was a vow to step up his detention efforts. Conflating
immigrant status with terrorist status, he declared: "Let
the terrorists among us be warned, if you overstay your visas
even by one day, we will arrest you."7
Furthermore, the Administration has made no secret of its
hope that the judiciary will accede to its broad reading of the
USA PATRIOT Act just as pliantly as Congress acceded to its broad
legislative agenda. In a letter sent to key Senators while Congress
was considering this legislation, Assistant Attorney General Daniel
J. Bryant, of DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs, openly advocated
for a suspension of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
in the government's investigation of foreign national security
threats.8 The Bryant letter brazenly declares:
As Commander-in-Chief, the President must be able to use whatever
means necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States; this
power, by implication, includes the authority to collect information
necessary to its effective exercise. . . The government's interest
has changed from merely conducting foreign intelligence surveillance
to counter intelligence operations by other nations, to one of
preventing terrorist attacks against American citizens and property
within the continental United States itself. The courts have observed
that even the use of deadly force is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if used in self-defense or to protect others. . . Here,
for Fourth Amendment purposes, the right to self-defense is not
that of an individual, but that of the nation and its citizens.
. . If the government's heightened interest in self-defense justifies
the use of deadly force, then it certainly would also justify
warrantless searches.9
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II. SUSPENSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
The Administration's blatant power grab, coupled with the
wide array of anti-terrorism tools that the USA PATRIOT Act puts
at its disposal, portends a wholesale suspension of civil liberties
that will reach far beyond those who are involved in terrorist
activities. First, the Act places our First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech and political association in jeopardy by creating
a broad new crime of "domestic terrorism," and by denying
entry to non-citizens on the basis of ideology. Second, the Act
will reduce our already lowered expectations of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment by granting the government enhanced surveillance
powers. Third, non-citizens will see a further erosion of their
due process rights as they are placed in mandatory detention and
removed from the United States under the Act. Political activists
who are critical of our government or who maintain ties with international
political movements, in addition to immigrants, are likely to
bear the brunt of these attacks on our civil liberties.
A. Silencing Political Dissent
Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act creates a federal crime
of "domestic terrorism" that broadly extends to "acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws"
if they "appear to be intendedto influence the policy of
a government by intimidation or coercion," and if they "occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."10
Because this crime is couched in such vague and expansive terms,
it may well be read by federal law enforcement agencies as licensing
the investigation and surveillance of political activists and
organizations based on their opposition to government policies.
It also may be read by prosecutors as licensing the criminalization
of legitimate political dissent. Vigorous protest activities,
by their very nature, could be construed as acts that "appear
to be intendedto influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion." Further, clashes between demonstrators and
police officers and acts of civil disobedience-even those that
do not result in injuries and are entirely non-violent-could be
construed as "dangerous to human life" and in "violation
of the criminal laws." Environmental activists, anti-globalization
activists, and anti-abortion activists who use direct action to
further their political agendas are particularly vulnerable to
prosecution as "domestic terrorists."
In addition, political activists and the organizations with
which they associate may unwittingly find themselves the subject
of unwanted government attention in the form of surveillance and
other intelligence-gathering operations. The manner in which the
government implements the Act must be carefully monitored to ascertain
whether activists and organizations are being targeted selectively
for surveillance and prosecution based on their opposition to
government policies. The First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint-based
discrimination.11
Furthermore, Section 411 of the Act poses an ideological test
for entry into the United States that takes into consideration
core political speech. Representatives of a political or social
group "whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity
the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities" can
no longer gain entry into the United States.12 Entry is also barred
to non-citizens who have used their "position of prominence
within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity,"
if the Secretary of State determines that their speech "undermines
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities."13
B. Tolling the Death-Knell on Privacy
The USA PATRIOT Act14 launches a three-pronged assault on
our privacy. First, the Act grants the executive branch unprecedented,
and largely unchecked, surveillance powers, including the enhanced
ability to track email and Internet usage, conduct sneak-and-peek
searches, obtain sensitive personal records, monitor financial
transactions, and conduct nationwide roving wiretaps. Second,
the Act permits law enforcement agencies to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of probable cause when conducting wiretaps
and searches that have, as "a significant purpose,"
the gathering of foreign intelligence. Third, the Act allows for
the sharing of information between criminal and intelligence operations
and thereby opens the door to a resurgence of domestic spying
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
1. Enhanced Surveillance Powers
By and large, Congress granted the Administration its longstanding
wish list of enhanced surveillance tools, coupled with the ability
to use these tools with only minimal judicial and Congressional
oversight. In its rush to pass an anti-terrorism bill, Congress
failed to exact in exchange a showing that these highly intrusive
new tools are actually needed to combat terrorism and that the
Administration can be trusted not to abuse them.
The recent decision in Kyllo v. United States15 serves as
a pointed reminder that once a Fourth Amendment protection has
been eroded, the resulting loss to our privacy is likely to be
permanent. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court concluded that the use
of an advanced thermal detection device that allowed the police
to detect heat emanating from marijuana plants growing inside
the defendant's home constituted a "search" for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and was presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant. The Court placed great weight on the fact that
the device was new, "not in general public use," and
had been used to "explore details of a private home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion."16
Implicit in the Court's holding is the principle that once a technology
is in general public use and its capabilities are known, a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment may no longer
attach.
Several of the Act's enhanced surveillance tools, and the
civil liberties concerns they raise, are examined below.
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a. Sneak and Peek Searches
Section 213 of the Act authorizes federal agents to conduct
"sneak and peek searches," or covert searches of a person's
home or office that are conducted without notifying the person
of the execution of the search warrant until after the search
has been completed. Section 213 authorizes delayed notice of the
execution of a search warrant upon a showing of "reasonable
cause to believe that providing immediate notification may have
an adverse result."17 Section 213 also authorizes the delay
of notice of the execution of a warrant to conduct a seizure of
items where the court finds a "reasonable necessity"
for the seizure.
Section 213 contravenes the "common law 'knock and announce'
principle," which forms an essential part of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness inquiry.18 When notice of a search is delayed,
one is foreclosed from pointing out deficiencies in the warrant
to the officer executing it, and from monitoring whether the search
is being conducted in accordance with the warrant. In addition,
Section 213, by authorizing delayed notice of the execution of
a warrant to conduct a seizure of items, contravenes Rule 41(d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that,
"The officer taking property under the warrant shall give
to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was
taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken
or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the
property was taken."
Under Section 213, notice may be delayed for a "reasonable
period." Already, DOJ has staked out its position that a
"reasonable period" can be considerably longer than
the seven days authorized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Villegas,19 and by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Freitas.20 DOJ states in its Field
Guidance on New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism
Legislation21 that "[a]nalogy to other statutes suggest [sic]
that the period of delay could be substantial if circumstances
warrant," and cites in support of this proposition a case
that found a 90-day delay in providing notice of a wiretap warrant
to constitute "a reasonable time." Notably, Section
213 is not limited to terrorism investigations, but extends to
all criminal investigations, and is not scheduled to expire.
b. Access to Records in International Investigations
Section 21522 is one of several provisions in the USA PATRIOT
Act that relaxes the requirements, and extends the reach, of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).23 Under
Section 215, the Director of the FBI or a designee as low in rank
as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge may apply for a court
order requiring the production of "any tangible things (including
books, records, papers, documents, and other items)" upon
his written statement that these items are being sought for an
investigation "to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities."24 A judge presented
with an application under Section 215 is required to enter an
order if he "finds that the application meets the requirements
of this section."25
Notably absent from Section 215 is the restriction in the
FISA provision it amends that had required the government to specify
in its application for a court order that "there are specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person
to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power."26 Now, under Section 215, the FBI may obtain
sensitive personal records by simply certifying that they are
sought for an investigation "to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." The FBI
need not suspect the person whose records are being sought of
any wrongdoing. Furthermore, the class of persons whose records
are obtainable under Section 215 is no longer limited to foreign
powers and their agents, but may include United States citizens
and lawful permanent residents, or "United States persons"
in the parlance of the FISA.27 While Section 215 bars investigations
of United States persons "solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution," it
does nothing to bar investigations based on other activities that
tie them, no matter how loosely, to an international terrorism
investigation.28
The FISA provision that was amended by Section 215 had been
limited in scope to "records" in the possession of "a
common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage
facility, or vehicle rental facility."29 Section 215 extends
beyond "records" to "tangible things" and
is no longer limited in terms of the entities from whom the production
of tangible things can be required.30 A Congressional oversight
provision will require the Attorney General to submit semi-annual
reports on its activities under Section 215.31 Section 215 is
scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005.
c. Tracking Internet Usage
Under Section 216 of the Act, courts are required to order
the installation of a pen register and a trap and trace device31
to track both telephone and Internet "dialing, routing, addressing
and signaling information"32 anywhere within the United States
when a government attorney has certified that the information
to be obtained is "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."33
Section 216 states that orders issued under its authority cannot
be permit the tracking of the "contents of any wire or electronic
communications." However, in the case of email messages and
Internet usage, the Act does not address the complex question
of where the line should be drawn between "dialing, routing,
addressing and signaling information" and "content."
Unlike telephone communications, where the provision of dialing
information does not run the risk of revealing content,35 email
messages move together in packets that include both address and
content information. Also, the question of whether a list of web
sites and web pages that have been visited constitutes "dialing,
routing, addressing and signaling information" or "content"
has yet to be resolved.
By providing no guidance on this question, Section 216 gives
the government wide latitude to decide what constitutes "content."
Of special concern is the fact that Section 216 authorizes the
government to install its new Carnivore or DCS1000 system, a formidable
tracking device that is capable of intercepting all forms of Internet
activity, including email messages, web page activity, and Internet
telephone communications.36 Once installed on an Internet Service
Provider (ISP), Carnivore devours all of the communications flowing
through the ISP's network-not just those of the target of surveillance
but those of all users-and not just tracking information but content
as well. The FBI claims that through the use of filters, Carnivore
"limits the messages viewable by human eyes to those which
are strictly included within the court order."37 However,
neither the accuracy of Carnivore's filtering system, nor the
infallibility of its human programers, has been demonstrated.
While Section 216 requires the government to maintain a record
when it utilizes Carnivore, this record need not be provided to
the court until 30 days after the termination of the order, including
any extensions of time.38 Section 216 is not scheduled to expire.
2. Allowing Law Enforcement Agencies to Evade the Fourth Amendment's
Probable Cause Requirement
Perhaps the most radical provision of the USA PATRIOT Act
is Section 218, which amends FISA's wiretap and physical search
provisions. Under FISA, court orders permitting the executive
to conduct surreptitious foreign intelligence wiretaps and physical
searches may be obtained without the showing of probable cause
required for wiretaps and physical searches in criminal investigations.
Until the enactment of the Act, orders issued under FISA's lax
standards were restricted to situations where the gathering of
foreign intelligence information was "the purpose" of
the surveillance.39
Under Section 218, however, orders may be issued under FISA's
lax standards where the primary purpose of the surveillance is
criminal investigation, and the gathering of foreign intelligence
information constitutes only "a significant purpose"of
the surveillance.40 As a result, Section 218 allows law enforcement
agencies conducting a criminal investigation to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment whenever they are able to claim that the gathering
of foreign intelligence constitutes "a significant purpose."
In doing so, Section 218 gives the FBI a green light to resume
domestic spying on government "enemies"-a program that
reached an ugly apex under J. Edgar Hoover's directorship.
In the seminal case of United States v. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith),41 the Supreme
Court rejected President Richard Nixon's ambitious bid for the
unchecked executive power to conduct warrantless wiretaps when
investigating national security threats posed by domestic groups
with no foreign ties. The Court recognized that national security
cases reflect "a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crime."42 With
respect to the First Amendment, the Court wisely observed that
"[o]fficial surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal
investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement
of constitutionally protected privacy of speech" because
of "the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept
and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political
dissent."43
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With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court acknowledged
the constitutional basis for the President's domestic security
role, but refused to exempt the President from the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.44 The Court explained that the oversight
function assumed by the judiciary in its review of applications
for warrants "accords with our basic constitutional doctrine
that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation
of powers and division of functions among the different branches
and levels of Government."45
Notably, the Keith Court declined to examine "the scope
of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities
of foreign powers, within or without this country."46 To
fill the vacuum left in the wake of the Keith decision, in 1978
Congress enacted FISA, which is premised on the assumption that
Fourth Amendment safeguards are not as critical in foreign intelligence
investigations as they are in criminal investigations. The Supreme
Court has yet to rule on FISA's constitutionality. However, both
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have cautioned that applying FISA's
lax standards to criminal investigations raises serious Fourth
Amendment concerns. In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, the
Fourth Circuit held that "the executive should be excused
from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted
'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons," because "once
surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the courts
are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause determination,
and because, importantly, individual privacy interests come to
the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede when the
government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal
prosecution."47 In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit held
in United States v. Johnson that "the investigation of criminal
activity cannot be the primary purpose of [FISA] surveillance"
and that "[FISA] is not to be used as an end-run around the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches."48
The constitutionality of Section 218 is in considerable doubt.
The extremist position staked out by DOJ in the Bryant Letter,
which argues that "[i]f the government's heightened interest
in self-defense justifies the use of deadly force, then it certainly
would also justify warrantless searches," would undermine
the separation of powers doctrine.49 Until the Supreme Court weighs
in on this matter, the government will find itself in a quandary
each time it seeks to prosecute a criminal defendant based on
evidence that, although properly obtained under the lesser showing
required by Section 218, does not meet the probable cause showing
required by the Fourth Amendment. Should the government decide
to base prosecutions on such evidence, it will run the risk that
the evidence will be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule.50 Section 218 is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005.
3. Sharing of Sensitive Criminal and Foreign Intelligence
Information
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the disclosure,
without judicial supervision, of certain criminal and foreign
intelligence information to officials of the FBI, CIA, and INS,
as well as other federal agencies, where receipt of the information
will "assist the official in the performance of his official
duties."51 Section 203(a) permits the disclosure of matters
occurring before a grand jury-a category that is as boundless
in scope as the powers of a grand jury to subpoena records and
witnesses.52 Section 203(b) permits the disclosure of recordings
of intercepted telephone and Internet conversations.53 And Section
203(d) permits the disclosure of foreign intelligence obtained
as part of a criminal investigation.54
While some additional sharing of information between agencies
is undoubtedly appropriate given the nature of the terrorist threats
we face, the Act fails to protect us from the dangers posed to
our political freedoms and our privacy when sensitive personal
information is widely shared without court supervision. A cautionary
tale can be found in the 1976 report of the Senate's Church Committee,
which revealed that the FBI and CIA had spied on thousands of
law-abiding citizens, from civil rights workers to anti-Vietnam
War protestors, who had been targeted solely because they were
believed to harbor politically dissident views.55 Section 203(a)
is not scheduled to expire. Subsections (b) and (d) of Section
203, however, are scheduled to expire.
C. Stripping Immigrants of Constitutional Protections
The USA PATRIOT Act deprives immigrants of their due process
and First Amendment rights through two mechanisms that operate
in tandem. First, Section 411 vastly expands the class of immigrants
who are subject to removal on terrorism grounds through its broad
definitions of the terms "terrorist activity," "engage
in terrorist activity," and "terrorist organization."
Second, Section 412 vastly expands the authority of the Attorney
General to place immigrants he suspects are engaged in terrorist
activities in detention while their removal proceedings are pending.
1. Expanding The Class of Immigrants Subject to Removal
Section 411 vastly expands the class of immigrants that can
be removed on terrorism grounds.56 The term "terrorist activity"
is commonly understood to be limited to pre-meditated and politically-motivated
violence targeted against a civilian population.57 Section 411,
however, stretches the term beyond recognition to encompass any
crime that involves the use of a "weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere personal monetary gain)."58 Under this
broad definition, an immigrant who grabs a knife or makeshift
weapon in the midst of a heat-of-the-moment altercation or in
committing a crime of passion may be subject to removal as a "terrorist."
The term "engage in terrorist activity" has also
been expanded to include soliciting funds for, soliciting membership
for, and providing material support to, a "terrorist organization,"
even when that organization has legitimate political and humanitarian
ends and the non-citizen seeks only to support these lawful ends.59
In such situations, Section 411 would permit guilt to be imposed
solely on the basis of political associations protected by the
First Amendment.60
To complicate matters further, the term "terrorist organization"
is no longer limited to organizations that have been officially
designated as terrorist and that therefore have had their designations
published in the Federal Register for all to see.61 Instead, Section
411 now includes as "terrorist organizations" groups
that have never been designated as terrorist if they fall under
the loose criterion of "two or more individuals, whether
organized or not," which engage in specified terrorist activities.62
In situations where a non-citizen has solicited funds for, solicited
membership for, or provided material support to, an undesignated
"terrorist organization," Section 411 saddles him with
the difficult, if not impossible, burden of "demonstrat[ing]
that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that
the act would further the organization's terrorist activity."63
Furthermore, while Section 411 prohibits the removal of a non-citizen
on the grounds that he solicited funds for, solicited membership
for, or provided material support to, a designated "terrorist
organization" at a time when the organization was not designated
as a "terrorist organization," Section 411 does not
prohibit the removal of a non-citizen on the grounds that he solicited
funds for, solicited membership for, or provided material support
to, an undesignated "terrorist organization" prior to
the enactment of the Act.64
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2. Detention at the Attorney General's Decree
At the same time that Section 411 vastly expands the class
of immigrants who are removable on terrorist grounds, Section
412 vastly inflates the Attorney General's power to detain immigrants
who are suspected of falling into that class.65 Upon no more than
the Attorney General's unreviewed certification that he has "reasonable
grounds to believe" that a non-citizen is engaged in terrorist
activities or other activities that threaten the national security,
a non-citizen can be detained for as long as seven days without
being charged with either a criminal or immigration violation.66
This low level of suspicion falls far short of a finding of probable
cause, and appears even to fall short of the "reasonable
and articulable suspicion" that supports a brief investigatory
stop under the Fourth Amendment.67
If the non-citizen is charged with an immigration violation,
he is subject to mandatory detention and is ineligible for release
until he is removed, or until the Attorney General determines
that he should no longer be certified as a terrorist.68 While
the immigration proceedings are pending, the Attorney General
is required to review his certification once every six months.69
However, Section 412 does not direct the Attorney General either
to inform the non-citizen of the evidence on which the certification
is based, or to provide the non-citizen with an opportunity to
contest that evidence at an Immigration Judge hearing or other
administrative review procedure. Instead, Section 412 limits the
non-citizen's ability to seek review of the certification to a
habeas corpus proceeding filed in federal district court, appeals
from which must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.70 Since habeas proceedings are civil rather than
criminal in nature, the government has no obligation under the
Sixth Amendment to provide non-citizens with free counsel in such
proceedings.71
Even where a non-citizen who is found removable is deemed
eligible for asylum or other relief from removal, Section 412
does not permit his release.72 Further, in the event that the
non-citizen is found removable, but removal is "unlikely
in the reasonably foreseeable future"-most likely because
no other country will accept him-he may be detained for additional
periods of six months "if the release of the alien will threaten
the national security of the United States or the safety of the
community or any person."73 Only habeas review of such a
determination is available under Section 412.74
The Due Process Clause "applies to all 'persons' within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."75 Yet, Section
412 exposes immigrants to extended, and, in some cases, indefinite,
detention on the sole authority of the Attorney General's untested
certification that he has "reasonable grounds to believe"
that a non-citizen is engaged in terrorist activities. It remains
to be seen what evidentiary safeguards, if any, the Attorney General
will build into his regulations implementing Section 412. It also
remains to be seen how rigorous federal court habeas reviews of
such certifications will be and to what extent the courts will
demand that the Attorney General base his certification on objective
evidence. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the Act will deprive non-citizens of their liberty without due
process of law.76
3. The Political Implications of the USA PATRIOT Act for Immigrants
In short, immigrants who engage in political activities in
connection with any organization that has ever violated the law
risk being certified as terrorists, placed in mandatory detention,
and removed, whether on a technical immigration violation or on
terrorism grounds. Immigrants cannot protect themselves from such
risks by simply avoiding association with organizations that have
been designated as "terrorist organizations" because
the Act broadens that term to include undesignated groups. Nor
can immigrants protect themselves from such risks by limiting
themselves to activities that are protected by the First Amendment,
such as soliciting membership for, soliciting funds for, and providing
material support to, a "terrorist organization" towards
the goal of furthering the organization's lawful ends, because
the Act broadens the term "engage in terrorist activity"
to include these activities. Ironically, in the post-USA PATRIOT
Act world, immigrants who are intent on avoiding such risks should
refrain from any associations with organizations that could potentially
be deemed terrorist, even if their association is strictly confined
to activities that further the humanitarian and peace-oriented
goals of the organization, such as training members of such a
organization on how to present international human rights claims
to the United Nations, representing such an organization in peace
negotiations, and donating humanitarian aid to such an organization.
III. WILL THE JUDICIARY REIN IN THE EXECUTIVE AND UPHOLD THE
BILL OF RIGHTS?
Our commitment to the Bill of Rights and to the democratic
values that define this nation has been put to the test by the
events of September 11. Already, Congress and the Administration
have demonstrated their eagerness to sacrifice civil liberties
in hopes of gaining an added measure of security. The task of
upholding the Bill of Rights-or acquiescing in its surrender-will
soon fall to the judiciary, as lawsuits testing the constitutionality
of the USA PATRIOT Act wind their way through the courts.
In what we have come to regard as some of the most shameful
episodes in our history, the judiciary has consistently bowed
to the wishes of the political branches of government in times
of crisis by finding the state interest in national security to
be paramount to all competing interests. During World War I, the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of socialist Eugene Debs for
expressing his opposition to World War I, refusing to recognize
his non-violent, anti-war advocacy as speech protected by the
First Amendment.77 More recently, following the bombing of Pearl
Harbor during World War II, the Supreme Court upheld an Executive
Order mandating the internment of more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans
and Japanese immigrants based solely on their ancestry, refusing
to recognize their preventive detention as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.78
The extent to which the judiciary will defer to the Administration's
views on the troubling First and Fourth Amendment issues presented
by the USA PATRIOT Act, will tolerate ethnic and ideological profiling
by the Administration as it implements the Act, and will allow
the due process rights of immigrants in detention to be eroded
remains to be seen. Certainly, the more anxious the times become,
the more likely the judiciary will be to side with the Administration-at
least where judges are convinced that the measures are vital to
the national security, are not motivated by discriminatory intent,
and tread as lightly as possible upon civil liberties. The recent
words of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who so often
figures as the swing vote on pivotal decisions, do not hold out
hope for a vigorous defense of our political freedoms by the judiciary.
Following a visit to Ground Zero, where the World Trade Centers
once stood, the Justice bleakly predicted, "We're likely
to experience more restrictions on personal freedom than has ever
been the case in this country."79
**********
Endnotes
1.This article is an excerpt from the forthcoming book, Silencing
Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Antiterrorism Measures
Threaten Our Civil Liberties, by Nancy Chang, which will be available
from Seven Stories Press in March 2002. This article is available
as a free eBook on the Seven Stories Press website, http://www.sevenstories.com.
2.Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56.
3.Adam Clymer, "Antiterrorism Bill Passes; U.S. Gets
Expanded Powers," The New York Times, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1;
Robin Toner and Neil A. Lewis, "House Passes Terrorism Bill
Much Like Senate's, but With 5-Year Limit," The New York
Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6; Jonathan Krim, "Anti-Terror
Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups Unite To Seek Safeguards,"
The Washington Post, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17; Mary Leonard, "Civil
Liberties," The Boston Globe, Sept. 21, 2001, at A13.
4.Adam Clymer, "Bush Quickly Signs Measure Aiding Antiterrorism
Effort," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5.
5.Amy Goldstein, et al., "A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption,"
Washington Post, Nov. 4, 2001, at A1.
6.See 66 Federal Register 48334-35 (Sept. 20, 2001). Congress
denied the Attorney General's request for the codification of
this interim regulation in the USA PATRIOT Act and limited to
seven days the time aliens suspected of terrorist activity can
be detained without charge. Although the interim regulation would
appear to be in tension with the Act, it has not yet been rescinded.
This interim regulation appears to have been drafted with
the holding of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991), in mind. In County of Riverside, the Supreme Court considered
the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals who had been arrested
without a warrant and placed in detention. The Court ruled that
after such an arrestee has been held in detention for 48 hours,
the burden shifts to the government to show a bona fide emergency
or an extraordinary circumstance for failing to provide the arrestee
with a judicial probable cause determination. In marked contrast
to the arrestees in County of Riverside, all of whom were arrested
based on a probable cause finding by the arresting officer, the
interim regulation has been drafted to support the detention of
any non-citizen in this country, even when a basis for suspecting
him of a criminal or immigration violation is entirely lacking.
7.Dan Eggen, "Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged,"
Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1.
8.This undated letter was sent to Senators Bob Graham, Orrin
Hatch, Patrick Leahy, and Richard Shelby. A copy of this letter
is on file with the author.
9.Bryant Letter at p. 9 (emphasis added).
10.USA PATRIOT Act § 802, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
11.See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
12.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb).
13.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI).
14.Out of concern for the dangers that the USA PATRIOT Act's
enhanced surveillance procedures pose to our privacy, and over
the strong objections of the Administration, Congress has scheduled
some-though not all-of these procedures to sunset, or expire,
on December 31, 2005. See USA PATRIOT Act § 224(a). However,
Congress has exempted from the operation of any sunset clause:
(1) foreign intelligence investigations that began before the
sunset date, and (2) offenses that began or occurred before the
sunset date. See USA PATRIOT Act § 224(b).
15.121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001).
16.Id.
17.USA PATRIOT Act § 213, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
The definition of the term "adverse result" in Section
213 is borrowed from a statute establishing the standards under
which the government may provide delayed notice when it searches
stored email and other wire and electronic communictions-searches
that are not nearly as intrusive as physical searches of one's
home or office. The term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2)
as: "(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;
(B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering with
evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise
seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial."
18.Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
19.899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
20.800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
21.See http://www.cdt.org/security/011030doj.
22.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1862 and 1863.
23.50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
24.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. 1862(a)(1).
25.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1).
26.See 18 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B), prior to its amendment
by USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
27.FISA defines the term "United States persons"
to include United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).
28.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(1).
29.See U.S.C. § 1862(a), prior to its amendment by USA
PATRIOT Act § 215.
30.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. § 1862.
31.USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. § 1863.
32.Pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). Trap and trace devices record telephone
numbers from which incoming calls originate. See 18 U.S.C. §
3127(4).
33.USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3127(4) (emphasis added).
34.USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(a).
35.In the case of orders for pen registers and trap and trace
devices, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 demands
only "a certification by the applicant that the information
likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."
18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(b)(2). See also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979). However, providing telephone dialing information
does not reveal the contents of telephone communications.
36.USA PATRIOT Act §216 (b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(a)(3)(A).
37.Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by
the FBI, Statement of Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director,
Laboratory Division, July 24, 2000.
38.USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(b)(3).
39.50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)
(emphasis added).
40.USA PATRIOT Act § 218, amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B) (emphasis added).
41.407 U.S. 297 (1972).
42.407 U.S. at 313.
43.407 U.S. at 320.
44.Id.
45.407 U.S. at 317.
46.407 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
47.United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th
Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
48.United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1992).
49.See supra Note 8 and the accompanying text.
50.The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule that
bars prosecutors from using incriminating evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to prove guilt. See, e.g., Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
51.USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a), (b), and (d). The information
that may be shared must involve either "foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence," as that term is defined in the National
Security Act of 1947, at 50 U.S.C. § 401a, or "foreign
intelligence information," as that term is defined in Section
203(a)(1), (b)(2)(C), and (d)(2).
52.USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a), amending Rule 6(e)(3)(C)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
53.USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b), amending 18 U.S.C. §
2517(6).
54.USA PATRIOT Act §§ 203(d) and 905(a).
55.Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities and
the Rights of Americans, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976).
56.Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), non-citizens
who have or are engaged in "terrorist activities" or
activities that threaten the national security are subject to
removal from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)
and (B).
57.Since 1983, the United States government has defined the
term "terrorism," "for statistical and analytical
purposes," as the "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience." See Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, United
States Department of State, Introduction (April 2001).
58.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b).
59.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(bb)
and (cc), (V)(bb) and (cc), and (VI)(cc) and (dd).
60.The Supreme Court has described guilt by association as
"alien to the traditions of a free society and the First
Amendment itself." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 932 (1982). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
61.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) amended 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)
to include as a "terrorist organization" any foreign
organization so designated by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189, a provision that was introduced in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. As of October 5, 2001,
26 organizations had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations
under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. See 66 Federal Register 51088-90 (Oct.
5, 2001). In order to qualify as a designated "foreign terrorist
organization" under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I),
the Secretary of State must find that "(A) the organization
is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist
activity; and (C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens
the security of United States nationals or the national security
of the United States." See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C).
In addition, USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) amended 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) to include as a "terrorist organization"
any domestic or foreign organization so designated by the Secretary
of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney
General under Section 411. On December 5, 2001, the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, designated
39 groups as Terrorist Exclusion List organizations under this
provision. See 66 Federal Register 63619-63620 (Dec. 7, 2001).
In order to qualify as a designated "terrorist organization"
under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), a "finding"
must be made that the organization engages in one or more of the
"terrorist activities" described in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). These activities consist of: (1) "commit[ting]
or incit[ing] to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention
to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;"
(2) "prepar[ing] or plan[ning] a terrorist activity;"
and (3) "gather[ing] information on potential targets for
terrorist activity." See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).
62.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
In order to qualify as an undesignated "terrorist organization"
under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), "a group of
two or more individuals, whether organized or not," must
engage in one or more of the "terrorist activities"
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). See supra
Note 59.
63.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc), (V)(cc), and (VI)(dd).
64.USA PATRIOT Act § 411(c)(3)(A) and (B).
65.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a).
66.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(3)
and (5).
67.See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
68.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(2).
69.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(7).
70.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(b)(1)
and (2)(A)(iii) and (iv).
71.See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
72.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(2).
73.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(6).
74.USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(b)(1).
75.See Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001).
76.While the USA PATRIOT Act does not explicitly authorize
the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings, its provisions
are certain to encourage its use. Since 1996, the INA has explicitly
provided for the use of such evidence in removal proceedings before
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1531 et
seq. In addition, the INS has long taken the position that it
is authorized to use secret evidence in bond proceedings. See,
e.g., Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F.Supp.2d 1329 (S.D.Fl. 2000); Kiareldeen
v. Reno, 71 F.Supp.2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999).
77.See Debs. v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
78.See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
79.Linda Greenhouse, "In New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees
Limits on Freedom," The New York Times, Sept. 29, 2001, at
B5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
*****
Nancy Chang, Senior Litigation Attorney
Center for Constitutional Rights
666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, NY 10012 November 2001
Civil
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