The American Prosperity Myth
by Will Hutton
The Nation magazine, September
1/8, 2003
Everyone knows the story by now. America
may have its social problems, but its highly productive, job-generating,
innovative economy is the envy of the world. Europeans, on the
other hand, are in a despond of high unemployment and economic
sclerosis. Europe's addiction to welfarism-its overcooked social
contract-is killing the economic goose that lays the social egg.
Americans may pay a price in inequality for their economic vitality,
but when you take the country's extraordinary social mobility
and opportunity into account the price is worth paying. You might
want to reverse Bush's tax cuts for the very rich, but nobody
sane is going to tinker with the essence of the great American
Business Model that delivers so much wealth.
I contend-unfashionably and, I know, incredibly,
given the consensus-almost the opposite. The American economy
has great strengths, but it is not so all-conquering. And the
American Business Model, with its ruthless focus on shareholder
profits, has profound weaknesses. Indeed, American industry is
at its strongest where it has not observed antistate, pro-greed
precepts and operated in more European ways. Smart action by the
state, a viable social contract and efforts by companies to harness
human capital and serve a purpose larger than short-term profit
maximization turn out to be indispensable components of successful
American capitalism as well-though America's public conversation
hardly concedes these points. It's a gaping omission that is costing
the country dearly.
Signs of trouble are everywhere. For a
start, the United States is experiencing an alarming and unsustainable
growth of international indebtedness. By the end of this year
the country's net liability to the rest of the world will approach
$3 trillion, and it is growing exponentially. At the current rate,
liabilities will double again over the next five to seven years,
taking the United States into banana republic territory. At some
point foreigners will cease holding dollars and instead buy the
alternative world currency-the euro. The dollar will crash and
interest rates will jerk upward in response.
America has been running a trade deficit
for so long that it has ceased to be worthy of note. Yet the consistent
inability | of so many American companies in so many sectors to
compete against their foreign rivals surely exposes faults in
our approach to investment and productivity. From cars to aerospace,
industrial gases to cell phones, American companies lag behind
their European competitors in technology, production savvy and
rate of innovation. Ford and GM are a decade behind Volkswagen
in the sophistication of their production techniques. Nokia has
39 percent of the world mobile phone market, more than twice that
of Motorola, its nearest rival- despite Nokia's being based in
the highly taxed, highly unionized, generous welfare state of
Finland. Boeing's government subsidies through its military contracts,
grants and tax breaks comfortably match the diminishing support
proffered Europe's Airbus, but it is Airbus that is pioneering
the next generation of civilian aircraft and whose market share
is larger. British Rolls Royce is the trailblazer in aero-engines.
And so on. Beyond the sheltered world of America's defense industrial
complex, where fat Pentagon contracts helped create outstanding
technological leadership in weapons and the Internet, there is
scarcely a high-tech sector where US companies can claim systematic
leadership over their European competitors-a truth you would scarcely
know from a casual inspection of the American business press.
America's once proud culture of business
building has given way to a culture of financial engineering,
a doctrine of shareholder value maximization and a cult of the
takeover. The game is to keep the share price up, and every sinew-of
the organization is bent to that end; shortcuts are ever tempting,
and inevitably some companies resort to straight fraud. Nevertheless,
the conservative inclination is to overlook one or two bad apples
like Enron and WorldCom and to celebrate the rule of America's
capital markets. It is Wall Street constantly holding corporate
managements to account that drives up innovation and productivity,
or so runs the conventional argument, with companies that fail
to keep up facing a takeover.
Yet the evidence is that takeovers fail
to raise shareholder value; consultant KPMG reports in a survey
of 700 takeovers that more than four out of five either added
no value or lost it. Still, investment banks continue to seduce
overpaid CEO after CEO into believing that his deal will be the
exception. And with share options that will provide fortunes if
the deal comes off and golden parachute clauses that will secure
an equally good pay-off if it bombs, most CEOs fall prey to the
seduction. Despite a welcome wave of criticism of this febrile,
amoral atmosphere, few took note in the heady days of the dot-com
and telecom bubbles that this system was hollowing out the US
economy. It is coming back to haunt the United States now.
American productivity measured as output
for every person-hour worked is now lower than in France, the
old West Germany, Belgium and Holland. Most other parts of Europe
are catching up with the United States fast, a trend that began
in the late 1 960s and has been continuing ever since. Economist
Julian Callow of Credit Suisse First Boston calculates that after
adjusting for the very kind way American statisticians compute
productivity compared with those in Europe, Europe's growth in
productivity outstripped the United States during the 1990s.
This is the reality behind the ballooning
current account deficit numbers. The US economy may boast an innovative
IT sector and technological leadership in the military industry;
beyond that, its claims for universal competitive strength are
more and more dubious. Of course, America is home to some great
companies, but not so many to justify the fawning acceptance that
the American Business Model is better in every respect than the
European one.
Europeans do not view the company as a
casino chip to be traded away in a single-minded quest to enrich
directors and shareholders. Rather, they see companies as living
things, each one a network of human relationships organized to
serve an overriding economic and social purpose. In the European
perspective, a company has a defining organizational reason-to-be
that serves as a jumping-off point for maximizing profits, a repudiation
of the idea that anything goes in the quest for a fast buck. A
company needs to be built over time, as resources are husbanded,
personnel are groomed and trained, customers courted and innovation
nurtured; its directors need to manage a complex set of trade-offs
between the demands of shareholders and stakeholders, marketplace
trends, the need to innovate and the engagement of employees.
In this view, if only one voice counts-shareholders who want fast
returns now-the company risks ruin.
The United States is vandalizing this
conception of the company-once inherent in American capitalism-and
is pulling down the structures that support innovation and productivity.
It is Europeans who now invest more, sustaining a range of institutions
that produce a highly skilled work force and a business-building
culture. They may at first sight look like economic tortoises;
in fact, they are set to overtake the American hare. High European
unemployment, concentrated in Germany, which has made massive
mistakes in macroeconomic policy by fixing its exchange rate too
high within the euro, disguises the real performance of the European
economy: Unemployment is lower in seven European Union countries
than in the United States, and on the continent as a whole the
participation rate of 25-to-54 year-old men in the labor market
is almost the same as in the United States. As the euro becomes
embedded, Europeans will secure the advantage of a single continental
market even larger than the United States; when they get their
macroeconomic policy right, the advantages of their economic and
social model will become more evident.
This economic strength pays for a social
contract that offers most individual Europeans opportunity, mobility
and security that is beyond the compass of most ordinary Americans.
For here is another uncomfortable truth. American social mobility,
traditionally comparable to Europe's, is falling as decades of
tax cuts and spending cuts undermine the opportunities for advancement.
The chief culprit is the emergence of
a highly stratified, increasingly class-based university system,
whose very accessibility was once one of America's glories. The
academic excellence of top US universities is not in question,
but it is unclear whether they still contribute as they once did
to equal opportunity and social mobility. For American universities
have become very expensive. The competition to attract the world's
best academic talent and fund cutting-edge research has meant
an explosion of costs and a parallel explosion in tuition fees.
For the private universities-and all but one of the top twenty
are private-annual tuition, even before living expenses, tops
$17,600. The rates are similar for the top law and business schools.
Even public university tuition now averages more than $7,000 per
year.
The conservative defense is that rich
endowments allow private universities to practice "need blind"
admission and offer students whose families cannot afford the
cost a mix of grants, loans and work-study that together will
see them through college. The same principle is meant to apply
to public universities. Universities may be getting more expensive,
so the mantra goes, but there is sufficient support to help the
poorest. Equality of opportunity survives.
It is a lie. Endowment income is not matching
the rise in tuition-now set to go substantially higher in public
universities as states struggle to balance their budgets. At the
same time, the Federal Pell Grant has been pared back by successive
administrations in a conservative climate hostile to sustaining
such "social" expenditures. With fewer grants, students
have to incur huge loans to complete college, which unsurprisingly
deters those from poorer homes. In 1979 children from the richest
25 percent of American homes were only four times more likely
to go to college than those from the poorest 25 percent of homes;
by 1994 they were ten times more likely. With the recent rise
in tuition fees-up by a cool 20 percent on average since 2000-
and further erosion of private and public grants, the divide can
only have deepened.
University is becoming the preserve of
the better-off in the United States to a degree unparalleled in
the rest of the industrialized West, with attendance at the elite
colleges, law and business schools-which serve as passports to
the upper echelons of American life-increasingly restricted to
the sons and daughters of the very rich. A new aristocracy is
emerging in a country whose original ambition was to prevent such
a phenomenon from ever taking place. It was only in Old Europe
that status, opportunity and life chances were determined by accident
of birth. Twenty-five years of conservative economic and social
policies are burying that American dream.
The constricting access to university
for students of middle- and low-income homes is remarkably underreported
in the American media, as is the consequent impact on social mobility.
The blithe assumption remains that opportunity in the United States
is unparalleled. It is not. At the primary and secondary levels,
public schools, profoundly underfunded, are a second-class system
compared with private schools. Students in public schools are
less likely to complete their courses, and achieve poorer grades
when they do. But for the beleaguered community-college system,
the United States has no formal means of giving extensive vocational
and apprentice training. The combination of high dropout rates,
gaps in the system, sheer lack of capacity and indifferent standards
means that an astonishing 31 percent of American 18 year-old dropouts
receive no vocational or other formal training after leaving school.
In Germany, by contrast, that proportion is 1 percent.
Thus the children of poor and middle-income
families are doubly victims. They are less likely to go to a top-ranked
university, and they are more likely to enter the labor market
with no qualifications. It should be no surprise, therefore, to
find that 24.9 percent of American children live in poverty, while
the proportions in Germany, France and Italy are 8.6, 7.4 and
10.5 percent. And once born on the wrong side of the tracks, Americans
are more likely to stay there than their counterparts in Europe.
Those born to better-off families are more likely to stay better
off. America is developing an aristocracy of the rich and a serfdom
of the poor-the inevitable result of a twenty-year erosion of
its social contract.
Philosophically, culturally and practically,
the social contract has been attacked head-on and undermined at
every turn; its destruction has been one of the great objectives
of the renaissance of American conservatism. As a result, its
supports have been increasingly eroded. If there is to be what
political philosopher John Rawls calls an infrastructure of justice-one
insuring that everyone, despite any accident of birth, gets a
chance to develop his or her talents, participate in the life
of society, exercise liberties and enjoy basic living standards-then
a system must be in place to maintain it. And that system is of
necessity the state, with its ability to tax and spend. In this
conception, the state is not a coercive interloper but a trustee
of social fairness, providing the foundation for any society's
long-term social health and wealth.
Yet since the mid-1970s taxation has been
depicted by the right as a coercive intrusion upon individual
liberty imposed by an oppressive government. Grants to poor students,
for example, are seen as wasteful subsidies that undercut self-reliance
and the robust qualities of independence that the early settlers
possessed and upon which America was built. Yet America's social
contract, hewn out of searing experiences like the Depression
and bolstered by respect for the Constitution's claim that citizens
should have equal opportunity, requires that the state act as
its trustee-with the tax revenue to pay for it. To attack taxation
as a moral evil and economic drag, and the state as oppressive
and inefficient, is to knock away the key underpinnings of the
social contract.
There is no need to recite details of
the consequences: lower life expectancy than in Europe, vicious
inequality and desperate lack of social mobility. Yes, it is true
that the European social contract can produce perverse incentives,
so that, say, excessively generous unemployment benefits in Germany
undermine individuals' desire to look for and accept work. But
the solution is to reform the excessive generosity, as German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder is doing, rather than abandon the
social contract altogether. The impact of America's approach on
individual lives shows up in international surveys of happiness
and sense of well-being, where Americans score so badly. An obsessive
individualism in a society in which so many are harmed eats away
at the capacity to empathize, and the very stuff of human association
is undermined. A Hobbesian society, a war of all against all,
is not an environment in which human beings can flower.
It also pollutes the economy, despite
claims to the contrary. America is richer than Europe not because
it works smart but because it works long. Americans work, on average,
300 hours more a year than people in Britain, France and Germany,
a sixth more American women work than European women, more American
old people are at work and fewer young Americans get to study.
Americans have to work this hard because their productivity at
work tends to be lower than in Europe, and that is because American
companies tend to innovate and invest less; the injunction is
to sweat assets rather than be creative.
The values that underpin a social contract-fairness,
a belief in opportunity for all and respect for human potential-are
precisely those that underpin a successful company. Great visionary
companies inspire their work forces and enlist their energy, and
that cannot be done when human values are subordinated to the
enrichment of a few at the top. Equally, the institutions of a
social contract-great public schools, universities and hospitals;
codes of quality corporate governance; great transportation; affordable
housing for all-are the same institutions that support long-term
wealth generation. America, in the grip of conservative dominance,
is undermining not only the well-being of its citizens but its
capacity to create national wealth and economic growth.
To this Englishman, it is extraordinary
that the American liberal tradition has given up so much ground
to the resurgent American right. The evidence does not exist to
support the conservatives' case. Moreover, translated into international
relations, the same doctrine has had baleful results. Pre-emptive
unilateralism and the militarization of foreign policy-a transfer
of the dog-eat-dog model to international relations-is undermining
the rule of international law and leaving America to assume ever
more expensive burdens without even achieving the results it wants.
Iraq is turning into a quagmire, while terrorist networks are
still at large. At home and abroad, America's overconfident conservatives
have led the nation into a cul-de-sac. It is time to say so-and
loudly.
Will Hutton's A Declaration of Interdependence:
Why America Should Join the World (Norton) was published in May.
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