Building an Elite Consensus
excerpted from the book
When Corporations Rule the World
by David C. Korten
published by Kumarian Press, 1995
*****
Visions of American Hegemony
The roots of the current drive toward economic globalization
go back to the trauma of the depression that preceded World War
II. America's policy elites were deeply concerned about ensuring
that nothing similar would ever recur. There were two prevailing
ideas as to how this might be accomplished. One would have required
major reforms of the U.S. economy, including strong governmental
intervention in the market. The other depended on ensuring the
domestic American economy sufficient access to foreign markets
and raw materials to sustain the continuous expansion required
to maintain full employment without market reforms. The latter
was by far the more popular alternative among those in power,
including a small elite group of foreign policy planners associated
with the Council on Foreign Relations.
A meeting ground for powerful members of the U.S. corporate
and foreign policy establishments, the Council on Foreign Relations
styles itself as a forum for the airing of opposing views-an incubator
of leaders and ideas. Its activities are organized around dinner
meetings and study programs for its members-often involving influential
world figures or foreign policy thinkers-in settings that are
conducive to candid off-the-record discussion. It similarly styles
its influential Foreign Affairs journal as a forum for the open
debate of significant foreign policy issues.
The portion of the Council's history that is of particular
interest to our present inquiry began on September 12, 1939, less
than two weeks after the outbreak of World War II. On that day,
Walter Mallory, executive director of the Council, and Hamilton
Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, met in Washington with
George Messersmith, assistant secretary of state and a member
of the Council. They outlined a long-range planning project to
be carried out by the Council in close collaboration with the
State Department on long-term problems of the war and plans for
the peace. Several war and peace studies groups composed of foreign
policy experts would produce confidential expert recommendations
for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, during his tenure as
governor of New York, had lived in a town house next door to the
Council's headquarters. Relations between Roosevelt and the Council
continued to be close. At that point in history, the State Department
lacked the funds and personnel to undertake such studies, so its
leadership accepted the Council's proposal. By the end of the
war, the partnership had produced 682 confidential memoranda for
the government, with funding provided in part from the Rockefeller
Foundation.
The planners anticipated that the defeat of Germany and Japan
and the wartime devastation of Europe would leave the United States
in an undisputed position to dominate the postwar economy. They
believed the more open that economy was to trade and foreign investment,
the more readily the United States would be able to dominate it.
Working from that logic, the plans produced by the State Department-Council
planning groups placed a substantial emphasis on creating an institutional
framework that would create an open global economy.
In April 1941, a confidential memo from the Economic and Financial
Group of the Council provided the government with the following
suggestion on how to frame the public presentation of U.S. objectives
for propaganda purposes during the war:
If war aims are stated which seem to be concerned solely with
Anglo-American imperialism, they will offer little to people in
the rest of the world, and will be vulnerable to Nazi counter
promises. Such aims would also strengthen the most reactionary
elements in the United States and the British Empire. The interests
of other peoples should be stressed, not only those of Europe,
but also of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This would have a
better propaganda effect.
Memorandum E-B34, issued by the Council to the president and
the State Department on July 24, 1941, outlined the concept of
a "Grand Area." This was the area of the world that
the United States would need to dominate economically and militarily
to ensure materials for its industries with the "fewest possible
stresses." The minimum necessary Grand Area would consist
of most of the non-German world. Its preferred scope would consist
of the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, the remainder of
the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China,
and Japan. The concept outlined in the memo involved working for
economic integration within the largest available core area and
then expanding outward to weave other areas into the core, as
circumstances allowed.
This same memorandum called for the creation of worldwide
financial institutions for stabilizing currencies and facilitating
programs of capital investment in the development of backward
and merge the economic interests of three regional partners: North
America (the United States and Canada), Western Europe, and Japan.
This idea became a frequent topic of discussion at Bilderberg
meetings. It was decided to create a new forum that included the
Japanese and had a more formal structure than Bilderberg.
In 1973, the Trilateral Commission was formed by David Rockefeller,
chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who
served as the Commission's director and coordinator until 1977,
when he became national security advisor to U.S. President Jimmy
Carter. The Trilateral Commission describes itself as follows:
The Commission's members are about 325 distinguished citizens,
with a variety of leadership responsibilities from these three
regions. When the first biennium of the Trilateral Commission
was launched in 1973, the most immediate purpose was to draw together-at
a time of considerable friction among governments- the highest
level unofficial group possible to look together at the common
problems facing our three areas. At a deeper level, there was
a sense that the United States was no longer in such a singular
leadership position as it had been in earlier post-World War II
years, and that a more shared form of leadership-including Europe
end Japan in particular-would be needed for the international
system to navigate successfully the major challenges of the coming
years. These purposes continue to inform the Commission's work.
In contrast to Bilderberg, which is known for its secrecy,
the Trilateral Commission is a more transparent organization that
readily distributes its membership and publication lists to anyone
who calls its publicly listed phone number, and its publications
are available for sale to the public. Whereas Bilderberg includes
many heads of state, other top government officials, and royalty,
members of the Trilateral Commission who assume highly administrative
positions in government resign from the Commission for the period
of their tenure.
The collective power of the Commission's members is impressive.
They include the heads of four of the world's five largest non-banking
transnational corporations (ITOCHU, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and
Mitsui & Co.); top officials of five of the world's six largest
international banks (Sumitomo Bank, Fuji Bank, Sakura Bank, Sanwa
Bank, and Mitsubishi Bank); and heads of major media organizations
(Japan Times, Ltd.; Le Poit; Times Mirror Co.; the Washington
Post Co.; Cable News Network [CNN]; and Time Warner).
U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter, George Bush, and Bill Clinton
were all members of the Trilateral Commission, as was Thomas Foley,
former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. Many key
members of the Carter administration were both Bilderbergers and
Trilateral Commission members, including Vice President Mondale,
Secretary of State Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski,
and Treasury Secretary Blumenthal. Former members of the Trilateral
Commission who went on to hold key positions under the Clinton
administration include Warren Christopher, secretary of state;
Bruce Babbitt, secretary of the interior; Henry Cisneros, secretary
of housing and urban development; Alan Greenspan, chairman of
the U.S. Federal Reserve System; Joseph Nye Jr., chairman of the
National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency; Donna
E. Shalala, secretary of health and human services; Clifton Wharton,
Jr., deputy secretary of state; and Peter Tarnoff, undersecretary
of state for political affairs.
Although the Commission publishes its own position papers,
its views are conveyed through many outlets not necessarily associated
with it. The trilateralist vision of Sony chairman Akio Morita
that was published in Atlantic Monthly and discussed in the previous
chapter is an example. At the time, Morita was the Japanese chairman
of the Trilateral Commission.
It is important to note that the Council on Foreign Relations,
the Bilderberg, and the Trilateral Commission bring together heads
of competing corporations and leaders of competing national political
parties for closed-door discussions and consensus-building processes
that the public never sees. Although the participants may believe
that they represent a broad spectrum of intersectoral and even
international perspectives, in truth, it is a closed and exclusive
process limited to elite Stratos dwellers. Participants are predominantly
male, wealthy, from Northern industrial countries, and, except
for the Japanese on the Trilateral Commission, Caucasian. Other
voices are excluded.
The resulting narrowness of perspective is evident in the
publications of the Trilateral Commission. They are written by
seasoned and thoughtful professionals, and a diversity of views
is presented. Yet they all accept without question the ideological
premises of corporate libertarianism. The benefits of economic
integration and a harmonization of the tax, regulatory, and other
policies of the trilateral countries-and ultimately of all countries-are
assumed as an article of faith. The debate centers on how, not
whether.
No note is taken of the fact that harmonizing standards-which
necessarily means setting standards-can be accomplished only through
international negotiations, which by their nature must be carried
out in secret by the administrative branches of governments. Thus,
in the absence of an elected international parliament, a call
to harmonize standards is a call to take decisions regarding the
standards by which businesses will operate out of the hands of
democratically elected national legislative bodies and pass them
to the unelected bureaucrats who represent governments in international
negotiations. Such a situation lends itself especially well to
cozy insider deal making-especially when these bureaucrats come
from the same elite circles as members of the Trilateral Commission.
For example, Carla Hills, who as U.S. trade representative under
President George Bush played a key role in negotiating the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that established the new
World Trade Organization, was a member of the Trilateral Commission.
The fact that George Bush and Bill Clinton were both members
of the Trilateral Commission makes it easy to understand why there
was such a seamless transition from the Republican Bush administration
to the Democratic Clinton administration with regard to the U.S.
commitment to pass the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and GATT. Clinton's leadership in advancing what many progressives
thought to be a Bush agenda on these agreements won him high marks
from his colleagues on the Trilateral Commission but seriously
alienated major elements of his core constituency, who had looked
to him to provide a less corporatist view of the trade agenda.
On this most fundamental of issues, the electoral system gave
the voters only the illusion of choice.
The policy actions being advanced by the elite consensus constitute
an increasingly effective attack on the institutions of democracy-the
very purpose of which is to prevent a small inside elite from
capturing control of the instruments of governance. Their dominance
of the policy debate largely precludes raising alternatives to
prevailing assumptions.
Economic globalization is neither in the human interest nor
inevitable. It is axiomatic that political power aligns with economic
power. The larger the economic unit, the larger its dominant players,
and the more political power becomes concentrated in the largest
corporations. The greater the political power of corporations
and those aligned with them, the less the political power of the
people, and the less meaningful democracy becomes. There is an
alternative: to localize economies, disperse economic power, and
bring democracy closer to the people. However, networks and alliances
made up exclusively of Stratos dwellers are unlikely to articulate
and pursue such an alternative. To the contrary, as we shall see
in the next chapter, the Stratos dwellers are mobilizing the full
resources of the world's largest corporations behind an effort
to consolidate global corporate rule.
When
Corporations Rule the World