The People's War:
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal
from Himal Magazine, Nepal
news archives, and Dr.Chitra K. Tiwari.
There is trouble in paradise. In the very
birthplace of Buddha, peace has proven to be elusive. At first
glance, Nepal appears to be idyllic, but there is strife brewing
beneath the surface, and it is wearing a red star. The media coverage
of late has served to frighten and scare off desperately needed
tourism and strike paranoia into the national psyche. But it has
not focused on the real issues at hand the situation on the ground.
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)
Maoist fired the first shots of the People's War on February 12,
1996 seeking to destroy constitutional monarchy and establish
a people's republic. To date, over 1800 people have died with
unofficial reports soaring as high as 4,000 mostly Maoists, police
and innocent villagers caught in the crossfire. In the protracted
fighting, both sides have been accused of gross human rights and
extra-judicial killings. The continued success of this guerilla
insurgency has lead to the present situation of 68 of Nepal's
75 districts affected to some degree, of them 32, by the government's
own admission, considered to be hardest hit, and 5 districts where
they have organized a parallel government: Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot,
Salyan and Kalikot. In this region of five contiguous western
districts, there is no indication or presence of any government
aside from the Maoists. Access to these areas is strictly controlled
by the insurgents and prior permission is needed to enter. They
are also active in two areas close to Kathmandu, Sindhuli and
Gorkha district, the latter being a symbolic victory for the Maoists
as it is the birthplace and home of Nepal's first King Prithivi
Narayan Shah.
Today, while much of Nepal continues to
function, the insurgency has bled into the national consciousness
and is at the forefront of everyone's discussions. Their avowed
strategy is straight from Mao Tse Tung's writings a peasant
takeover in the countryside to surround and threaten elites in
urban areas, selective use of violence and re-education of civilians
and their movement is modeled on Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path.)
As of September 2001, things are hopeful
for peace talks between the government and the Maoists have finally
been intiated, but many question how willing and sincere the parties
are and whether it is even possible to bridge the gap between
them on fundamental issues.
Origins:
The communist movement in Nepal that first
appeared in 1949 after the formation of Communist Party of Nepal
under the leadership of late Pushpa Lal Shrestha emerged in intellectual
opposition to the Nepali Congress, though at times, they united
against their common foes, first the Ranas, and subsequently,
the monarchy. In 1960, Nepal's brief exercise in democracy was
dissolved when King Mahendra seized sate power and banned all
political parties. During this era of prohibition, the communist
and congress parties continued functioning. Apparently unsure
who exactly was their enemy and underpinned by the loosest of
ideology, the communists began disagreeing amongst themselves
and various units began acting independantly. Personality differences
fractured them further, and as a result, Nepal saw at one moment
as many as 19 communist parties.
In 1974, two radicals, Mohan Bikram Singh
and Nirmal Lama succeeded in holding the historic Fourth Convention
and their official declaration departed significantly from Shrestha's
belief that the Communists needed to join hands with Congress
to fight against absolute monarchism. They instead began a people's
movement which could be easily converted into an armed revolt
at the appropriate time. The Maoists top leaders were born of
this movement.
Meanwhile, an armed communist revolution
popped up quite unexpectedly in Jhapa in the south-eastern most
corner of Nepal and across the border from the Naxalbari region
in India. This romantic adventure was inspired by the Naxalite
movement well underway in West Bengal, and led by young activists
bent on eliminating 'class enemies' in Jhapa. It was easily suppressed
by the King, due mainly to the inexperience of the leaders, the
suppression of Naxalites in India, and the lack of militancy in
other districts of Nepal. The leaders of Jhapa movement
even took to the constitutional path and participated in later
Panchayat (the King's pseudo-democractic governmental structure)
elections as "pro-people Panchas." The Jhapa movement
was just one example of the extreme left continuously present
in Nepal.
In 1983, Mohan Bikram separated and form
the CPN Masal, and only two years later, a faction within
Masal broke away and formed the CPN Mashal. At the its head
was Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Prachanda, the military
head of today's Maoists. This cacaphony of communist movements
remained until 1990 and the Jana Andolan. The People's Movement
was organized by a united Congress Party and a grouping of seven
left parties, the United Left Front against King Birendra's Panchayat
system and after only two months and a small loss of life, multi-party
democracy was returned to Nepal. Both Masal and Mashal did not
join the movement until street protests had gained momentum but
were quick to capitalize on its success, forming the United People's
Front (UPF) to act as force in the coming elections. A constitution
was promulgated in November of 1990 and in the following elections,
Congress took 110 seats, CPN- United Marxist Leninist (today's
powerful opposition party) 69 seats, and UPF, 9 seats.
The factions still could not co-exist
and by mid-1994, in further splintering, one group headed by Nirmal
Lama was given official recognition in parliament while the other
led by Baburam Bhattarai (the Maoists current mouthpiece and architect
of political propaganda) was spurned. In March of 1995, Baburam's
group held its 'Third Plenum' at which they renamed their group
the CPN Maoist and foreswore elections to take up arms.
The Shots Heard Around Nepal
On February 4, 1996, Baburam Bhattarai
presented the Nepali-Congress led coalition government of Sher
Bahadur Dueba (today's current Prime Minister yet again and ironically
the best chance for peace) with a list of 40 demands cover the
gamut of nationalism, democracy and livelihood. The demands included
abrogation of existing Indian treaties, stripping the monarchy
of all power and privileges, drafting a new constitution by means
of a constituent assembly, nationalizing the property of capitalists,
declaring Nepal a secular nation, an end to all foreign aid and
a number of social reforms and development demands. He stated
that is the government did not take immediate steps towards fulfilling
these demands byt Feb 17, they would "forced to embark on
an armed struggle against the existing state." Four days
earlier than the stated deadline, the Maoists struck simaltaneously
in six districts.
The acrimony between the dominant Nepali
Congress and the entire spectrum of the left provided much of
the fertile ground for such an armed revolution. In 1991, shortly
after taking over the government, left activists began to face
harassment by local administrators at the behest of Congress party
workers, and it was even worse in the rural areas where the Maoists
are most active today. In Rukum and Rolpa, two historically communist
areas, the congress-communist fight turned ugly and leftists began
taking action against 'class enemies.' For their part, Congress,
as the head of government, didn't hesitate to use the state machinery
against their opponents. With abuses piling up on both sides,
the CPN-UML entered the fray, determined not to lose left-leaning
voters to the UPF (pre-Maoist) and it was round robin of political
revenge, state terror and retaliation.
In the early beginnings of the insurgency,
successive governments viewed the Maoists as a law and order problem
and unleashed the police against them. In late 1995, the central
government under Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadka, elected from
Dang district near the heart of the insurgency, responded with
a police operation codenamed Romeo. Many believe that Khadka considered
the rise of the extreme left in his home as an affront and thus
the particular ruthlessness of Romeo. The only success was the
thorough alienation of the local peasantry, as supression in those
areas rose to the level of state terror.
In addition to these actions, there also
arose the Janjati movements to avenge the historic mistreatment
of Nepal's minorities, as much as 35% of the population. In a
newly democratic era, their voices rose to the surface and many
believe that this was the opportunity to win the hearts and minds
of much of the rural villages by addressing their historic neglect
and discrimination, but, the government's response was superficial.
The Maoists were quick to identify this opportunity and gave their
class struggle an ethnic flavor. Ironically, the Maoist leadership
is dominantly Bahun, the highest caste, and the very group historically
criticized for such discrimination, but the tactics workedand
in Rolpa and Rukum, Magars embraced the Maoists enthusiastically.
Later, ethnic activists and leaders were to part ways with the
Maoists as power would remain with the Bahuns no matter who won.
A New Era of Governance
Much of the support for the Maoist movement
lies in the general sense of discontent in the aftermath of the
1990 democratic movement. This is what successive generations
of Nepalis had fought, died or went into exile for. It was not
the instant magic cure-all many naively expected. As the democratic
exercise proceeded, the social and economic situation did not
improve and government was reduced to squabbling factions vying
for power, and a new wealthy and corrupt elite emerged. Rich and
poor grew further apart and in many rural areas, just beginning
to flirt with literacy and political awareness, youths became
increasingly restless as democracy failed to deliver. In the new
modern age, Nepal became acutely aware of it's own short-comings
both through contact with the increasing tourist trade and global
media which presents a very different picture of what life could
be for these disallusioned rural youth. When democracy was ushered
in, a heightened political consciousness followed. Classic Maoist
propaganda and ideological language was extremely appealing to
politicized youth steeped in poverty.
If it seemed that mainstream communism
might have been more conciliatory to the Maoists, they would have
been proven wrong. The CPN-UML in partnership with other smaller
opposition parties even tried to introduce laws giving police
even more leeway in handling the Maoists. But the hallmark of
the insurgency is the infamous Kilo Sierra 2, a police operation
lasting almost a year. Begun in mid-1998, it was a brutal operation
against the Maoists and their supporters, and many attribute much
of the Maoist sympathy today to the police hard-handedness. It
turned many a villager against the central government and the
symbol of their presence, the men in blue.
The Evolution of a Fighting Force
As it has become increasingly obvious,
direct force has been unable to quell the insurgency and in some
cases, stregthened it. In the last two years, the tables have
seemingly turned and it is now the police that are on the receiving
end. The most disturbing situation for the counter-insurgency
planners is that many of the Maoist affected areas are inhabited
by a large number of well trained retired Indian and British Army
Gurkha soldiers. Authorities suspect that some of these retirees
are providing training to Maoist guerrillas as their organization
and military activities seem increasingly sophisticated. Their
strategy and fighting strength is at its height, and recent actions
against under-manned and ill-equipped policemen in remote posts
have been overwhelming. The death toll has risen dramatically
since September of 2000, when they launched their most brazen
attack yet at Dunai, in Dolpo district. It marked a turning point
in their military strategy, to attack with large waves with fighters
outnumbering police. In April, in one bloody week, 70 police died,
some execution style in Rukumkot and Dailekh. They have come along
way from romantic revolutionaries.
In the beginning, they fielded a pitiful
armoury, a few looted rifles and some home-made weapons. But their
arsenel has grown through the consistent looting of police forces
during attacks, classic Maoist strategy and the development of
explosive traps, grenades and 'pressure cooker' bombs. And they
have begun to visit the extensive weapons bazaar in nearby Bihar.
This arming has been financed through their other strategy of
bank looting, robbery, and forced donations and taxes. Many business
in the Kathmandu Valley pay 'taxes' to the Maoist under intimidation
and the threat of violence.
Indeed the tables have turned. In contrast,
the police have antiquated arms and a demoralized force. In the
worst political twist, the Royal Nepal Army, itself reluctant
to direct confront the Maoists, have denied the Nepal Police the
modern arms it so desperately needs to fight a guerilla war. Their
defensive strategy has been to abandon remote outposts and concentrate
forces in defensible areas. With the spike in police killings,
morale is at an all-time low. Sadly, the Maoists are striking
the at the very heart of the people they proclaim to represent.
Many joined the police as a way out of poverty, to support their
family and serve their country. The plain fact is that the posting
of police to rural and insurgent-hit areas is fraught with influence-peddling
and corruption. The Nepalis that are dying are the poor ones without
connections or money to pay for a cushy job in the capital. There
have been mass desertions and a feeling of dread hands over the
force. Some of the recent victims wrote letters to their families
about such a possibility after being posted to the ill-fated stations.
While no one knows exactly how many guerrillas
are there in the jungles of Nepal, some experts believe that number
of full-time guerrillas under arms is around 2000 and another
10,000 irregulars or militias armed with homemade guns. While
some captured Maoists have said that Maoists have acquired automatic
machinery, none have been used in battle to date. As confrontation
between the Police and the Maoists escalate, one can only imagine
the numbers spiraling upward if this new dimension enters the
picture. But, is force really the answer? The state has justified
authoritarian policies in the name of suppressing the insurgency,
but without addressing the basic inequalities that plague Nepali
society. And this may be the root of it all.
Poverty as the Great Motivator
Deeply entrenched rural poverty and social
inequality provide fertile ground for the rebellion. The Maoists
are most successful in parts of the country with the worst development
statistics - life expectancy in the midwestern area of Rolpa,
a Maoist stronghold, is just 52 years, and per capita annual income
is below $100. This contiguous area of western Nepal is one of
the most backward and least accessible districts of Nepal. Other
affected areas are spread out along Terai districts close to India,
and allow the Maoists to regroup and seek shelter in Bihar. In
these developmentally stunted areas, the Maoists appear to be
the only force for improvement and that is garnering their grass
roots support. They will build a few wells, erect some martyr
gates, and hold kangaroo courts to punish social userers and deviants.
And the central government is absent from the equation.
The money allocated for development of
interior and remote areas never reaches there. A large number
of villages are totally ignored by economic planners. There
are no schools, no roads, no electricity, and no medical facilities.
At the national level, the educated unemployment is increasing
at geometrical proportions. Close to 100,000 rural youths
failing high school examination every year have neither a job
nor a school to go where they could be kept busy. These
unemployed youths, 15 to 18 years in age, are joining the ranks
of armed guerrillas. Many of them are disillusioned with the inability
of their leaders who have participated in parliamentary system
telling the cadres that there is an alternative to armed revolution.
The Maoists seem to be winning the 'hearts and minds' campaign.
This could have been done by means of
massive economic development package to people in the early period
of insurgency. The relief package that the government has
allocated after so much of killings has become irrelevant. Counter-insurgency
measures require civil-military coordination in which clean civil
administrators are expected to disburse economic development package.
Here lies the problem. Nepal's problem is not the Maoist
war but an entrenched coalition of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats
that profits from Maoist war. It is very much likely that
the economic relief package announced to combat insurgency could
be yet another opportunity to corrupt civilian as well as military
authorities for embezzlement. Counter-insurgency measure, if applied
and executed by clean hands, will help minimize the distribution
crisis, which in turn, will help to neutralize popular support
to guerrillas.
Confusion and Control
Throughout all this, one wonders about
the status of the Royal Nepal Army, a modern, well-trained force
that is sent across the globe to keep the peace, while violence
rages in its own backyard. It fact, the Maoists and the Army has
been dancing around each other, careful not to step on either's
toes. Both seem loathe to confront each other. In Rukum District,
the army is building a road and there seems to be an unspoken
agreement between the two parties. On man occasions, the Maoists
will pass an army camp en route to attack a police post and then
return via the same route untouched. But criticism of the army
came to a head when during the attack on Dunai, the army, though
stationed nearby, failed to come to the aid of the beleaguered
police when help was desperately needed.
The root of the matter lies with the control
of the army appartus itself. The constitution is vague on who
actually controls them, except for the mention of a National Security
Council of governmental ministers to direct the army while the
King himself is the commander in chief. There was a big controversy
earlier this year, when General Prajjwal Shumshere Rana said to
a newspaper, that the army would not be deployed with an all-party
consensus. This opened the door to questioning civilian authority
over the army. Many believe that the late King Birendra was opposed
to utilizing the army because he was loathe to see Nepali soldiers
fighting Nepali citizens on their own soil. And this has led to
immense speculation and political opportunity by the Maoist who,
in the wake of the Royal tragedy, have now claimed Birendra for
their own, as a nationalist and liberal monarch who actually believed
in the Maoist movement. They lay claim to having a secret dialogue
and understanding with the King and that his progressive views
led to his demise at the hands of reactionaries and foreign imperialists
intent on smashing the Maoist movement. They have thrown the whole
of their hate at Gyanendra, a man more likely to use the Army
against them.
Insurgency as Political Opportunity
The government's response to the Maoists
has never been unified and all parties attempt to politicize the
matter to their own ends. Some even stand to gain from a protracted
fight. The CPN-UML has consistently used the uprising as a stick
to beat the governing Nepali Congress, blocking their every move
and remaining resolutely in opposition to any solutions put forth
by Congress. Especially any attempts to bring in the Royal Nepal
Army and put in place a para-military police force, which is disingenuous
at best. Their own history suggests that, were they in power,
they would use all resources available to quell it. As people
and politicians alike clamour for a 'political solution' to the
situation, numerous feeble attempts at negotiations have failed
through the insincerity of the parties. A recent effort at negotiations
in October of last year failed over the bungled release of two
leading Maoists. Beleaguered former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala,
brought his own solution to the table with two highly controversial
programs. The Armed Police Force Ordinance and the Integrated
Security and Development Plan. The first was a plan to bring a
para-military police force with modern weaponry on board and trained
to tackle an insurgency. The second is a plan to carry out development
activity in Maoist-affected areas with the Royal Nepal Army providing
support and security. The army's part in the plan has been vague
and undefined. Are they to just defend or pursue and attack? Many
questions have been left unanswered in Koirala's push to get it
through. King Birendra reluctantly agreed in the months before
his demise.
Already Gorkha, the home of Nepal's founding
father has been named a model district and the Army has been deployed
and development activities begun. The possibility of the confronting
the Army has no doubt taken the wind out of the Maoists sails,
and could prove to be a big deterrent, no matter the amount of
bravado put forth by Baburam or Prachanda. And then there was
the fiasco recently when, the Maoists after kidnapping 70 policemen,
were surrounded by the Army in a standoff. News media was blacked
out and reports are still murky. Worse still, the whole matter
has still not be resolved, rather it has melted away like it never
existed, and no one questions it.
Hope on the Horizen
In late February, a surprise statement
was issued after the Maoists' Second National Conference, declaring
the new Prachanda Path that set out new guiding principles the
for the Maoists. But it also indicated a slight backing down of
their previous inflexibility to negotiate a solution to the insurgency.
But any real progress on talks was continually hampered by scandel-ridden
Prime Minister Grijia Prasad Koirala. Parliament was stalled for
the entire winter session in the hopes of ousting him, but he
steadfeastly clung to power and made moves to consolidate his
position. The CPN-UML staked their political fortunes on forcing
him out and no business was conducted. The country ground to a
halt, as successful strikes were called to build pressure for
his resignation. He seemed to want to resign but was awaiting
a face-saving exit.
Then June 1st occurred. The entire Royal
Family was massacred and swept the King's brother to power. Even
the Maoists were taken by surprise, but they were quick to use
it to their own ends, declaring a conspiracy rooted in their own
uprising and praising a man they were vilifiying the week before.
The government was in turmoil and confusionreigned in the streets.
A curfew was called to restore calm and slowly things have returned
to normal. Koirala, unable to forstall the inevitable, stepped
down in hopes of helping the country navigate the stormy waters.
And it has seemingly helped. Sher Bahadur
Dueba, the same PM when the Maoists came upon the scene, is now
Nepal's best hopes for a resolution. Dueba has taken immediate
steps to engage the Maoists in negoatiations and has made it his
top priority. Senior Maoist cadres have been released from prison
and a cease fire has been declared by both sides. After some rounds
of peace talks, the Maoists abruptly pulled out and launched an
attack against a number of remote police posts in the far West
and a very daring one in the Solo Khumbu region surrounding Mount
Everest. The airport at Phalphu was destroyed, and there was fierce
fighting in the hills around there. With that, the government
finally deployed the Royal Nepalese army to fight the insurgents
and announced a State of Emergency, which allows the government
to abrogate a number of issues of freedom of the press, privacy,
etc. There have been numerous clashes in the far west, and surprise
attacks throughout the country even in areas where the Maoists
were previously inactive. Everyday, the papers report the arrest
or death of rebels, but with new regulations in place, it seems
hard to verify these facts. Having been burned, Dueba with the
help of American military aid and high tech weaponry unleashed
the strength of the army, and the body count has risen dramatically,
almost all of it entirely in the remote, hardest hit areas with
many an innocent villager caught in the crossfire.
October 4, 2002
With various constitutional crisis building,
the new King Gyanendra in a surprise move (maybe not so surprising
to some) dissolved the elected Parliment, the Prime Minister and
his cabinet and instituted a government of his own choosing, alarming
many who feared a return to absolute monarchy. But with the squabbling
political parties sidelined, this interim government was able
to negotiate a new cease-fire announced in Febuary 2003 and a
semblence of peace has returned. Raising everyone's hopes that
the Maoists were indeed committed to a political compromise was
the fact that the highest members of the Maoist have come out
publicly from a life underground for the first time since the
insurgency began, including the Maoist mouthpiece and idealogue,
Baburam Bhattarai. My own personal feeling is that the government
will be wary of getting burned twice. But I also believe that
this probably won't be won on the ground. A guerilla war, unless
the govt can stomach devestating losses of military and innocent
villagers lives, will be long, drawn-out and demoralizing.
Future
Whether the Maoists are ready to come
above ground or not is a matter for conjecture. There are indications
that this may be the case. Should they surface as a political
force again, they could find far more success at the ballot box.
There is room for an extreme left group in the political spectrum
as the CPN-UML moves toward the center. They have a party apparatus
in place, including media outlets. And they repeatedly have spared
the capital and not targetted the main power players perhaps to
avoid crossing some invisible line, from whence there is no return.
hey have crassly using recent lull and pretense to peace to regroup
their forces and return to the bush to launch new attacks. Such
cynacism is devestating for the people of Nepal, the majority
truly desiring peace and an end to the bloodshed.
There are also many different factors
since the last peace talks. The world is a much different place,
with much less tolerance for activities seen as terroristic since
September 11. With the US willing to go after terrorist groups
or give substantial aid to governments who claim to be fighting
their own internal terrorists. The Maoists were even recently
declared a terrorist organization by the US State Dept lauching
much criticism that the US was attempting to derail the peace
talks. Given this changed world environment, there are many indications
that the Maoists are genuinely seeking a political solution. First,
the US has in the last year given substantial military training,
financial aid and weaponry to upgrade the Royal Nepal Army, which
no doubt led to the dramatic rise in deadly violence in clashes
with the Maoists. They are facing a brutal and much more devestating
battle with the army if they return to the jungle. Second, its
become increasingly obvious that with the support of the western
world, the maoists face an uphill battle in winning the war outright
and are reluctant to return to fight a demoralizing stalemate.
Third, the Maoists were a political party in the beginning and
they ulimately desire a treturn to the political fold when the
time is right. And lastly, the Maoist have been losing much of
their ground support as the insurgency and body count continued
and this might be the last chance they have of negotiating a settlement.
The Maoist movement has affected so many
aspects of daily life. The many strikes, the closures of public
schools, the forced donations and taxes, the social repressions
and regulations of women's clothing and hair, the ban on alcohol,
the negative publicity for tourism, the death of innocents and
the permanent feeling of paranoia. All these, they pray will be
put to bed and that a brighter future is on the horizen.
from Himal Magazine, Nepal news archives,
and Dr.Chitra K. Tiwari.
The People's War - Maoist Insurgency in Nepal
Nepal page
Index
of Website
Home Page